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Summary 
The right to exclude is portrayed either in a strong-absolute sense or a qualified 
sense. According to the South African doctrinal notion of ownership, ownership and 
the right to exclude are exercised and protected insofar as the law permits. The law 
sometimes grants non-owners access rights to land without the landowner’s prior 
permission or consent and this places substantial limitations on the right to exclude. 
The research problem addressed in this dissertation pivots on the relationship 
between exclusion and access rights. It provides an overview of the theoretical and 
doctrinal perspectives on the existence of limitations in the form of access rights, 
deriving from different sources and for different reasons, and considers possible 
justifications for the limitations. 
This dissertation shows that there is a wide range of limitations originating from 
different sources, with the result that limitations are to be expected and cannot be 
seen as exceptions. In this regard, the dissertation considers the justification issue 
from a constitutional perspective to determine whether it is necessary to justify all 
limitations on the right to exclude. From this perspective, justification for a limitation 
is not based on normative grounds, but instead focuses on the authority and reason 
for the limitation and its effect on the affected owner. The point is that limitations on 
the right to exclude are normal in a legal and constitutional system within which 
property functions and of which limitations are part. Case law and examples dealing 
with the conflict between exclusion and access rights indicate that exclusion of non-
owners is not always the preferred outcome and that it is not prioritised abstractly. 
This suggests that the right to exclude is relative and contextual in nature. 
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Opsomming 
Die reg tot uitsluiting word voorgehou as óf absoluut óf gekwalifiseerd. Volgens die 
Suid-Afrikaanse dogmatiese beskouing van eiendomsreg kan die reg tot uitsluiting 
uitgeoefen word insoverre die reg dit toelaat. Die reg verleen soms toegangsregte 
aan nie-eienaars sonder die eienaar se vooraf toestemming, wat ‘n wesenlike 
beperking op die eienaar se reg plaas. 
Die navorsingsprobleem wat in hierdie proefskrif aangespreek word fokus op 
die verhouding tussen uitsluiting en toegang. Dit verskaf ‘n oorsig van teoretiese en 
doktrinêre perspektiewe op die bestaan van beperkings in die vorm van 
toegangsregte, wat ontstaan uit verskillende bronne en vir verskillende redes, en 
oorweeg moontlike regverdigingsgronde vir die beperkings. 
Die proefskrif toon aan dat daar ‘n wye verskeidenheid beperkings uit 
verskillende bronne ontstaan, met die gevolg dat beperkings verwag moet word en 
dat dit nie as uitsonderings gesien kan word nie. Die proefskrif oorweeg die 
regverdigingsvraag vanuit ‘n grondwetlike perspektief om te bepaal of dit nodig is om 
alle beperkings op die reg om uit te sluit te regverdig. Vanuit hierdie perspektief blyk 
dit dat regverdiging nie op normatiewe gronde gebaseer is nie, maar eerder fokus 
die gesag en redes vir ‘n beperking, asook op die effek daarvan op die eienaar. Die 
punt is dat beperkings op die reg om uit te sluit normaal is in grondwetlike 
regsisteem waarbinne eiendom funksioneer en waarvan beperkings deel vorm. 
Regspraak en voorbeelde van die konflik tussen uitsluiting en toegang toon aan dat 
uitsluiting van nie-eienaars nie altyd die wenslike uitkoms is nie en dat dit nie op ‘n 
abstrakte wyse geprioritiseer kan word nie. Die reg om uit te sluit is dus relatief en 
kontekstueel. 
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Chapter one:  
Introduction 
 
1 1 Introduction to the research problem 
Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, 
Western Cape and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) (Victoria and 
Alfred Waterfront)1 is a South African decision that shows how landowners can be 
prevented from excluding non-owners from private land. In Victoria and Alfred 
Waterfront the Western Cape High Court considered an application for an order to 
ban the second and third respondents permanently from entering the commercial 
premises belonging to the applicants.2 
The applicants applied for a permanent interdict to prohibit the respondents 
from entering into and engaging in certain conduct on the premises. The application 
was based on evidence that the respondents have been misbehaving themselves on 
the premises over a period of time; interfering, harassing, threatening and assaulting 
employees and visitors of establishments on the premises.3 The applicants, as 
private landowners, relied on their allegedly absolute right to exclude non-owners 
                                            
1
 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). See Chapters 3 and 4 below. 
2
 The court also briefly considered whether a prohibition against begging on the premises was 
unconstitutional. Mr De Waal, appearing on behalf of the applicants, sought to amend paragraph 1.2 
of the order granted by Davis J by inserting a specific clause prohibiting the respondents from 
begging at the premises. Even though this application was abandoned, Desai J decided to consider 
the constitutional validity of prohibiting the respondents from begging. See Victoria and Alfred 
Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and Others (Legal 
Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 447-448. 
3
 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 447. 
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from their premises.4 They argued that the power to exclude others and exercise 
control over the use of property lies at the core of the entitlements of private 
ownership, which accrues to a property owner under the common law.5 Furthermore, 
the applicants submitted that a property owner is protected against arbitrary 
deprivation of property rights, including the right to exclude, in terms of section 25 of 
the Constitution.6 
The court decided that owners of premises do not have an absolute right of 
exclusion and refused to grant a permanent interdict.7 Instead, the court granted an 
order that prohibited the respondents from behaving in certain specified ways on the 
premises.8 The court held that the applicants’ right to exclude non-owners from the 
premises was qualified. In the court’s view, the premises had practically become a 
suburb of Cape Town.9 Owners of private premises that are open to the public could 
not exclude, on a permanent basis, members of the public who were causing a 
nuisance on their premises, unless there is no other way of achieving a lawfully 
justifiable goal such as protecting employees and customers from nuisance.10 
In the context of denying an application for an order to prohibit the respondents 
from begging on the premises, the court referred to the Supreme Court of India 
decision in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR11 to substantiate the 
view that the right to life is more than “mere animal existence”; it includes the right to 
                                            
4
 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 449. 
5
 449. 
6
 449. 
7
 449. 
8
 452. 
9
 449, 451. 
10
 451. 
11
 1986 SC 180. 
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livelihood.12 In this part of the decision, the court confirmed that the issue of begging 
raises a direct tension between a non-property constitutional right, namely the right 
to life, and property rights, adding that property rights must give way to protection of 
the right to life.13 The right to life and human dignity are the most important of all 
human rights and they must be valued and protected.14 The court refused to grant a 
prohibition against entry on the premises because, among other reasons, the 
respondents required access to the premises for begging purposes. 
The second part of the decision in Victoria and Alfred Waterfront shows that the 
right to exclude is limited by the fact that exclusion of the respondents would amount 
to a limitation of their non-property constitutional right to freedom of movement.15 
The applicants’ right to exclude and the respondents’ freedom of movement are both 
limited. The court recognised that the applicants have a right to protect their custom 
and business interests as well as an interest in the physical integrity and security of 
their customers.16 However, effective protection of this right does not justify a blanket 
exclusion of the respondents. The court had to resolve the conflict between the 
landowners’ right to exclude (property rights under section 25) and non-owners’ non-
property constitutional rights, namely freedom of movement, in a way that vindicates 
both rights to the greatest extent possible.17 The court concluded that this could be 
                                            
12
 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 448. See also Liebenberg S 
Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 122-123. 
13
 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 448. 
14
 448. 
15
 451. 
16
 452. 
17
 452. 
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achieved by a prohibition of specified unlawful behaviour on the premises rather than 
a blanket prohibition against access to the premises.18 
In Victoria and Alfred Waterfront the court to some extent followed the 
reasoning of the US Supreme Court in PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins.19 The 
Supreme Court had to decide whether state legislation required the owners of 
PruneYard Shopping Center to allow access to people who want to exercise their 
right of freedom of speech and petition inside the shopping centre. The majority 
confirmed that the right to exclude others from property is one of the essential sticks 
in the bundle comprising ownership. However, the PruneYard Shopping Center 
owners had failed to show that the exclusion of non-owners was important to the use 
or economic value of their property. This resulted in the landowners’ right to exclude 
being limited in favour of others’ right to exercise free speech and petition rights on 
privately owned property. In both cases, the respective courts rejected the claim that 
private owners of premises that are generally open to the public have an absolute 
right to exclude persons who have been causing a nuisance on their premises. The 
outcome in both decisions was to uphold a limitation of the right to exclude others so 
as to secure a non-property constitutional right. 
The Victoria and Alfred Waterfront case is interesting for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the court did not decide the case simply based on the property rights, 
particularly the right to exclude, of the owners. Instead, the court ruled in favour of 
the respondents, based on their non-property rights that are protected under the 
                                            
18
 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 452. 
19
 447 US 74 (1980). 
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Constitution.20 In other words, the right to exclude was not upheld absolutely. The 
court did not abolish the common law right to exclude, but limited its exercise so as 
to protect non-property constitutional rights of members of the public. Therefore, one 
might conclude that members of the public have a right of reasonable access to 
quasi-public premises under certain circumstances and the landowners’ right to 
exclude is limited accordingly.21 
Secondly, the case involved a clash between the landowners’ right to exclude 
and non-owners’ non-property constitutional rights, namely the right to life, human 
dignity and freedom of movement. The court’s decision not to issue a blanket 
prohibition upon entry and freedom of movement ensured that the respondents have 
access to the premises for life-supporting activities such as begging, which is 
encompassed in the right to life. The case thus confirmed the importance of the right 
to life and human dignity. In view of the court’s decision, when there is a direct 
tension between the right to life and human dignity and the right to exclude, the latter 
is not absolute. In such instances, the right to exclude must give way to protect the 
right to life and human dignity, which are regarded as unlimited rights.22 The right to 
exclude is thus subject to limitations, even without a balancing process, because the 
                                            
20
 The court had to consider whether prohibition from entering the premises would offend against the 
entrenched constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to life (section 11) and the right of freedom 
of movement (section 21(1), (3)). See Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police 
Commissioner, Western Cape and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 
444 (C) 451. 
21
 Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 30-32. 
22
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 45, 62; Currie I & De Waal J The bill of rights handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 250-253, 
258-259. 
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non-property constitutional rights to life and dignity are unqualified rights that cannot 
be balanced against property rights.23 
A third point of interest is the court’s distinction, albeit not explicitly stated, 
between non-property constitutional rights that are unlimited, such as the right to life 
and dignity, and those that are subject to limitations and statutory regulations, such 
as the right to freedom of movement. The difference is relevant because when the 
right to exclude clashes with unlimited non-property constitutional rights, like life and 
dignity, the right to exclude must simply give way to secure these rights. On the other 
hand, when the right to exclude clashes with other regulated non-property 
constitutional rights like freedom of movement, a balancing approach is usually 
adopted to determine the most suitable outcome.24 
The Victoria and Alfred Waterfront decision provides a good illustration of some 
of the issues relating to non-owners’ right to be on someone else’s land for various 
purposes and the effect that those rights have on landowners’ right to exclude. The 
decision confirms that the right to exclude is not absolute; instead, it is subject to 
limitation by law, and in particular by the Constitution. The decision also shows that 
courts take into account the nature of the property involved in a dispute concerning 
access rights and exclusion, as well as the circumstances of the relevant parties. 
This is an indication that context plays a role in considering whether a landowner can 
in fact exercise his right to exclude. Other relevant considerations include the 
strength of the right to exclude; statutory or legal recognition of access rights to land; 
                                            
23
 In the part of the decision dealing with the right to freedom of movement, the court does seem to 
engage in a balancing process. See Chapters 3 and 5 below. 
24
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 62-63. 
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when and how the right to exclude is limited; reasons for the limitation; and whether 
the effect of a limitation is proportionate. 
 
1 2 Outline of the research problem and hypotheses 
1 2 1 Outline of the research problem 
Different perceptions of the right to exclude as a legal concept and its relevance to 
the ownership of property appear from academic literature and, most importantly, 
from court decisions. In decisions of the United States Supreme Court25 the right to 
exclude is often expressed by the metaphor that “a man’s home is his castle”.26 
Singer states that the metaphor suggests a traditional patriarchal image of the family 
with a single head of household, who is a man in his roles as husband, father, and 
owner.27 The metaphor can be understood in line with Blackstone’s notion of 
ownership as “sole and despotic dominion”, which represents an absolute 
conception of the owner’s right to exclude.28 This metaphor theoretically makes the 
right to exclude the hallmark of privately owned land, suggesting that an owner is in 
control of the land and, by implication, all who enter or live on it. In the South African 
context, Cowen also refers to the castle metaphor in the context of a sectional title 
                                            
25
 An overview of the US academic literature and case law indicates that scholars and judges have 
made a great attempt to define the meaning of the right to exclude and to determine its nature, 
content and importance, mainly with regard to the ownership of private property. 
26
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 130; Peñalver EM “Property 
metaphors and Kelo v New London: Two views of the castle” (2006) 74 Fordham Law Review 2971-
2976 2972; Singer JW “The ownership society and takings of property: Castles, investments, and just 
obligations” (2006) 30 Harvard Environmental Law Review 309-338 314, 317-318. 
27
 Singer JW “The ownership society and takings of property: Castles, investments, and just 
obligations” (2006) 30 Harvard Environmental Law Review 309-338 314. 
28
 Peñalver EM “Property metaphors and Kelo v New London: Two views of the castle” (2006) 74 
Fordham Law Review 2971-2976 2972. 
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owner’s home, describing this metaphor as something that is strongly 
individualistic.29 
The US Supreme Court has stated that the right to exclude is a fundamental 
element of the constitutional right to private property.30 In some of the early US 
Supreme Court decisions, the landowner’s right to exclude appears generally to be 
privileged over non-owners’ access rights.31 Blackstone’s conception of property as 
“sole and despotic dominion” appears to have had a formative influence on this idea 
of private property, since many American scholars perceive property as an absolute 
and exclusionary right.32 A strong focus has thus been placed on exclusion as a core 
entitlement of ownership in the US literature, resulting in guidelines pertaining to the 
extent to which an owner can exercise his right to exclude and what the right 
entails.33 
In English law, the right to exclude is also perceived to be of the highest order 
of property.34 The “gated community” is sometimes used as an example to illustrate 
the link between the understandings of exclusion at the root of property and 
                                            
29
 Cowen D New patterns of landownership: The transformation of the concept of ownership as plena 
in re potestas (1984) 23-24. 
30
 In Kaiser Aetna v United States 444 US 164 (1979) 176, 180 the court held that the right to exclude 
is the most essential stick in the bundle of rights. See also Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp 458 US 419 (1982) 433, 435; Nollan v California Coastal Commission 483 US 825 (1987) 832. 
See further Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for American 
takings jurisprudence (2006) 93 (with reference to footnote 180). 
31
 Kaiser Aetna v United States 444 US 164 (1979); Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp 
458 US 419 (1982); Nollan v California Coastal Commission 483 US 825 (1987). 
32
 Blackstone W Commentaries on the laws of England book ll (5
th
 ed 1773) 2. 
33
 In US literature, it is often claimed that the right to exclude is essential to property. See Cohen MR 
“Property and sovereignty” (1927) 13 Cornell Law Review 8-30 12; Merrill TW “Property and the right 
to exclude” (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730-755. See Chapter 2 section 2 2 2 below. 
34
 Penner J The idea of property in law (1997); Cowan D, Fox O’Mahony L & Cobb N Great debates in 
property law (2012) 8. 
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everyday lives.35 The “gate”, in both a literal and metaphorical sense, operates as a 
protective measure against entry by non-owners.36 In this sense, property is 
generally understood as a tool of exclusion that the owner can use to prevent non-
owners from gaining access to privately owned land. 
In South African law, the right to exclude also plays a major role in the way 
people relate to their land, especially private land. The right to exclude makes it 
possible for individuals to define themselves as owners by excluding non-owners 
from their land. Van der Walt argues that the right to exclude is traditionally regarded 
as one of the strongest entitlements that a landowner possesses.37 Ownership is 
said to be exclusive in its nature and in the absence of any agreement or other legal 
restriction to the contrary, it entitles the owner to claim possession from anyone who 
cannot set up a better title to it, to warn him off the property, and have him ejected 
from it.38 In the context of the rei vindicatio, only the owner has a right to vindicate. 
This makes the right to exclude the strongest entitlement of ownership. These 
perceptions of ownership and exclusion suggest that in general, the right to exclude 
is upheld unless it is limited justifiably. 
According to the South African doctrinal notion of ownership, ownership entitles 
the owner to do with his property as he pleases, unless the right is somehow 
justifiably restricted by law. However, the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront decision and 
                                            
35
 Cowan D, Fox O’Mahony L & Cobb N Great debates in property law (2012) 10. 
36
 10. 
37
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 296; Van der Walt AJ “Enclosed property 
and public streets” (2006) 21 South African Public Law 3-24 20. See also Gray K “Property in thin air” 
(1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252-307; Cohen FS “Dialogue on private property” (1954) 9 
Rutgers Law Review 357-387 370. 
38
 Maasdorp AFS Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African law volume ll: The law of property (10
th
 ed 
1976 edited and revised by Hall CG) 83. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
10 
 
similar examples suggest that the relationship between the right to exclude and 
access rights to land is in fact more complex. The law sometimes grant non-owners 
access rights to land for a specific purpose and this right can place substantial 
limitations on the landowner’s right to exclude, thereby rendering the element of 
exclusivity more relative and contextual than a first impression might suggest. 
Limitations of owners’ right to exclude may originate in different sources of law, 
for different reasons. Generally, and leaving consent aside for the moment, such 
limitations can have any of three origins. Firstly, limitations can originate in the 
Constitution, resulting in court orders to protect non-owners’ non-property 
constitutional rights, such as the right to life, human dignity and equality. Secondly, 
limitations often originate in statutory law; legislation enacted to give effect to non-
property constitutional rights and legislation not directly enacted to give effect to a 
non-property constitutional right sometimes impose limitations that prevent the owner 
from excluding non-owners from his land. Finally, non-consensual access rights are 
sometimes granted to non-owners on the basis of common law principles. In all 
these instances, limitations are imposed on the right to exclude by law without the 
consent of the landowner. 
If limitations on the right to exclude derive from different sources, for different 
reasons, it might be an oversimplification to take the right to exclude as the starting 
point and view all access rights as exceptions.39 This might also be an indication that 
the whole exclusion argument is not just a question of which right is important; the 
right to exclude or access rights. The Victoria and Alfred Waterfront decision 
                                            
39
 See Chapters 2 and 3 below. 
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suggests that some access rights might in fact be constitutionally stronger than, and 
prior to, property or the right to exclude.40 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether limitations deriving from different 
sources, for different reasons, might relate to the right to exclude in different ways.41 
This would complicate the question whether access rights, and the limitation they 
place on the landowner’s right to exclude, are justified. It therefore becomes 
necessary to reconsider the justification issue from a constitutional perspective.42 
The first question that emerges from the constitutional perspective is whether it 
is necessary, as the absoluteness approach assumes, to justify the existence of all 
limitations on the right to exclude.43 If the limitations derive from constitutionally 
stronger and prior rights, justification might be unnecessary. However, even then, the 
effect of these limitations will have to be justified, but that is a different question, as 
appears below. 
A deprivation of the right to exclude may result when the law limits the right to 
exclude or when a court grants (in accordance with the law) access rights to land 
without the landowner’s consent.44 This could have implications for section 25 of the 
Constitution,45 which provides for the protection of property rights. In this regard, the 
question is whether a deprivation occurs when the law imposes limitations on the 
right to exclude, for example by granting non-owners access rights to land, with the 
                                            
40
 See Chapter 3 below. 
41
 See Chapters 3 and 5 below. 
42
 See Chapter 4 below. 
43
 See Chapter 4 below. 
44
 For example, a forced transfer may take place when a right of way of necessity is granted by court 
order or when (in exceptional cases) a court orders a servitude to be registered in favour of the 
encroacher in encroachment cases. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 
346-347. 
45
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
 
effect that the landowner is deprived of his right to exclude non-owners from his land; 
and whether the deprivation complies with the requirements in section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. Accordingly, the limitation of property brought about by granting access 
rights to land must be properly authorised and justified to qualify as a constitutionally 
valid limitation of the landowner’s right to exclude. 
Access rights that are granted to non-owners by law may constitute a limitation 
of the landowner’s right to exclude. The objective of this study is to do a 
constitutional analysis of the competing rights of landowners and non-owners, with 
particular focus on instances where access rights are granted by law to non-owners 
without the landowner’s permission and against his will, so as to determine to what 
extent the landowner’s right to exclude is validly and justifiably limited. Accordingly, 
the aim is to reconsider the notion of absoluteness and the supposed centrality of the 
right to exclude from the perspective of a constitutional analysis. 
However, to conclude that the right to exclude is not absolute when it is limited 
by law would be trite because it has long been recognised that lawfully imposed 
access rights place limitations on property rights.46 To take the analysis further than 
this trite conclusion, this dissertation proposes three strategies. Firstly, a theoretical 
analysis of the issues is introduced to gauge the depth and force of the doctrinal 
assumption that exclusion is central to property rights.47 Secondly, the sources and 
nature of access rights are highlighted in an effort to establish whether some access 
rights are stronger than others or, conversely, whether the right to exclude is weaker 
in certain contexts.48 Finally, a constitutional perspective on exclusion and access is 
                                            
46
 See Chapter 2 below. 
47
 See Chapter 2 below. 
48
 See Chapter 3 below. 
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proposed so as to reduce the impact of the notion of absoluteness in private law 
doctrine.49 
 
1 2 2 Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis of this dissertation is that the impression created in doctrinal 
literature, namely that ownership is absolute and exclusionary, is misleading at 
best.50 The right to exclude is portrayed as the core entitlement of ownership, with 
the effect that an owner of private property can exclude others from his property, 
apparently without any inherent limitations. It is acknowledged that the right to 
exclude may in fact be limited, inter alia in instances where the law grants non-
owners access to privately owned land for specific reasons, without the landowner’s 
prior permission or consent.51 However, according to the literature such limitations 
on the right to exclude are constitutionally justified only if there are fundamental 
normative, pragmatic or otherwise legitimate reasons for them. 
The second hypothesis is that the relationship between rule and exception, 
between exclusion and access rights, is more complex than the literature suggests. If 
access rights that limit the landowner’s right to exclude are in fact constitutionally 
justified, the right to exclude cannot necessarily be regarded as absolute and access 
rights might create inherent limitations, at least in some instances. In this case it 
might appear that property rights are in fact not absolute and that exclusion is not 
central to property. This hypothesis is particularly relevant in a constitutional 
perspective, where private property is not the only (or even a dominant) value. 
                                            
49
 See Chapter 4 below. 
50
 See Chapter 2 below. 
51
 See Chapter 3 below. 
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The third hypothesis is that theoretical, doctrinal and constitutional analysis 
would indicate that exclusion is neither absolute nor central to property and that 
access rights imposed by law in fact impose a wide range of limitations on the right 
to exclude, often for overriding, non-property reasons that are justified by the broader 
constitutional scheme.52 
 
1 3 Overview of chapters 
The central questions considered for purposes of this dissertation are: what does the 
right to exclude entail? How and to what extent do access rights to land granted by 
law limit the landowner’s right to exclude? Are these limitations theoretically, 
doctrinally, and constitutionally justifiable, and what does justification entail? These 
questions are addressed in subsequent chapters. 
As a point of departure it is necessary to distinguish the different meanings of 
the notion of absolute ownership and to ascertain how each meaning relates to the 
right to exclude. Therefore, the discussion in Chapter 2 is informed by theoretical 
and doctrinal (traditional and pre-constitutional) perceptions of ownership in general 
and the right to exclude in particular. The goal of Chapter 2 is to analyse and assess 
theoretical and doctrinal arguments in favour of the idea that ownership and the right 
to exclude are absolute. To understand the theoretical justifications for limitations 
imposed on the right to exclude one must firstly look at property theories, particularly 
the exclusion theory, that support the right to exclude non-owners from land in the 
strong, absolute sense. These justification theories are considered briefly to cast 
some light on the role, scope and supposed primacy of the right to exclude. 
Exclusion theorists view the right to exclude as the essential or core right of 
                                            
52
 See Chapter 4 below. 
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ownership that must be strongly upheld and protected. In instances where the right 
to exclude is inevitably limited, the limitations are regarded as exceptional. 
Secondly, it is necessary to consider theoretical arguments that support and/or 
explain general justificatory grounds for limiting the right to exclude, to ascertain why 
in some instances, if not all, access rights are enforced against the landowner’s will. 
An analysis of the theoretical justifications in this context provides normative 
justificatory arguments53 for limiting the right to exclude, primarily in situations where 
access rights are granted to non-owners, taking into account the different origins of 
limitations. These arguments are often advanced by progressive property theorists, 
who argue against the view that exclusion is the core of property and that non-
owners should respect the “gate-keeping function” of property.54 This perspective, for 
example, includes the notion that landowners have an obligation, sometimes referred 
to as “the social-obligation norm”, to allow non-owners access over or onto their 
land. The progressive property theorists’ arguments present a qualified view of 
absolute ownership and the right to exclude. It is important to establish whether 
access rights are merely exceptions.55 Chapter 2 therefore also provides an 
explanation for deviations from exclusion rules, and hence the move towards so-
called governance rules, in an attempt to assess the weight of the justifications for 
                                            
53
 As Lucy WNR & Barker FR “Justifying property and justifying access” (1993) 6 The Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 287-318 287 explain, “normative justifications refer to arguments of 
a broadly normative nature which provide reasons why either private property or access should be 
taken seriously, or regarded as compelling considerations in practical deliberation”. 
54
 Such progressive theorists include GS Alexander, EM Peñalver, LS Underkuffler, and JW Singer. 
55
 On the one hand Smith HE “Exclusion versus governance: Two strategies for delineating property 
rights” (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies 453-487 argues that governance exceptions (for current 
purposes, access rights) exist at the periphery. On the other hand, Alexander GS “Governance 
property” (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1853-1888 argues that access rights are 
not just exceptions that appear at the periphery but rather that they appear at the core of property. 
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limiting the right to exclude.56 Different perspectives on governance strategies might 
be relevant when assessing the general theoretical justifications for limiting the right 
to exclude. 
A brief historical background is necessary to show how ownership, and 
especially the notion of absolute ownership, relates to the right to exclude. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider doctrinal views regarding ownership in South 
African law. The most accepted definition in South African law is that ownership is 
the most complete real right a person can have over a thing, allowing him to use it in 
any way not prohibited by law. In view of this definition, a landowner is allowed to 
exclude others from his property unless he is prohibited from doing so by law. 
The question arises whether a landowner’s right to exclude can be said to be 
protected and upheld strongly, considering that the law may impose limitations in the 
form of access rights granted to non-owners. The nature and scope of access rights 
that limit the right to exclude is discussed in Chapter 3, starting out from the premise 
that if non-owners are allowed by law to have access to privately owned land without 
the landowner’s permission or against his will, it is possible that in these instances 
the landowner’s right to exclude may in fact be limited. This chapter considers 
examples of limitations that are imposed on the right to exclude. The objective of this 
chapter is to examine the origins (sources of law) of limitations of the right to 
                                            
56
 Smith HE “Property is not just a bundle of rights” (2011) 8 Econ Journal Watch 279-291 285; Smith 
HE “Exclusion versus governance: Two strategies for delineating property rights” (2002) 31 Journal of 
Legal Studies 453-487 455 describes governance rules as those that are implemented by making 
exceptions, for example by way of contracts, servitudes or land-use regulations that open up avenues 
for non-owners to have rights of access to land. Alexander GS “Governance property” (2012) 160 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1853-1888 1855-1886 has a different interpretation of 
governance, namely that it refers solely to the relationship between individuals who have a property 
interest in an asset. Accordingly, his idea is that governance rules regulate ownership’s internal 
relations. 
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exclude, pertaining to different types of land, in terms of different kinds of access 
rights (including their purposes), and the effect that those access rights have on the 
landowner’s right to exclude. The purpose of this overview is to show that all 
limitations on the right to exclude can in fact not be regarded as exceptional, 
considering the wide range of these limitations as well as their origins, their 
underlying justifications, their nature and their effects. 
The analysis in Chapter 3 shows that there are three origins of limitations of the 
right to exclude. In the first instance, limitations on the right to exclude are imposed 
on the basis of direct, non-property constitutional rights. These limitations are 
considered mainly with reference to case law that highlights the justification for and 
the extent of the limitations. The case law involves a clash between landowners’ right 
to exclude and non-owners’ non-property constitutional rights, namely the right to 
life, human dignity and equality. This tension is interesting when landowners want to 
exercise their right to exclude non-owners but are prevented from doing so by law to 
ensure that non-owners have access to land for life-supporting activities like 
begging. The central question is whether the exclusion of non-owners is justified in 
these circumstances. Case law from foreign jurisdictions is analysed to determine 
how these jurisdictions deal with the clash between the right to exclude and non-
property constitutional rights. 
In the second instance, limitations are imposed on the basis of legislation 
implementing state regulation that limits the landowner’s right to exclude. Both 
legislation enacted to give effect to a non-property constitutional right and legislation 
not specifically enacted to give effect to a constitutional right sometimes create 
statutory rights that allow non-owners to be on land without the landowner’s 
permission. Foreign legislation is considered in this chapter to identify examples of 
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statutory access rights that limit the right to exclude for constitutional or policy 
purposes. 
In the third instance, common law principles governing non-consensual access 
rights place limitations on the right to exclude. An example of non-consensual 
access rights that is considered in this chapter is the right of way of necessity, which 
involves the creation of a non-consensual servitude by operation of law. Another 
example is encroachment, which involves the exercise of the court’s discretion to 
leave an encroachment in place against compensation, instead of granting a removal 
order in favour of the affected landowner. 
In all these instances, it is important to consider justifications for limiting the 
right to exclude. Therefore, in Chapter 4 I determine whether limitations on the right 
to exclude are justified. Justification analysis may involve two types of justification. 
The first type of justification analysis considers the justification for a specific limitation 
on the landowner’s right to exclude. With reference to the first type of the justification 
analysis I investigate the reasons and authority for the imposition of a specific 
limitation on the right to exclude. The second type of justification proceeds on the 
basis of section 25(1) of the Constitution, which determines whether the effect that 
the limitation has on an individual landowner is justified. It is therefore necessary to 
consider whether the outcome that results when access rights are granted to non-
owners by operation of law amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of the right to exclude 
in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. If the deprivation is not arbitrary, it does 
not require section 25(1) justification. If the outcome does indeed constitute an 
arbitrary deprivation, the question is whether the deprivation in a particular instance 
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can be justified.57 I also consider whether the deprivation amounts to expropriation 
that needs to comply with section 25(2) of the Constitution. Accordingly, this part of 
the chapter undertakes a constitutional analysis of the justifications for limiting the 
landowner’s right to exclude non-owners from land. 
In the final chapter I consider the complex relationship between the right to 
exclude and access rights, and especially whether the right to exclude should be 
viewed in the strong-absolute sense or a qualified sense. I also propose a solution 
that reconciles or balances the right to exclude and access rights, to such an extent 
that both the non-owners’ and the individual landowner’s interests in land are fairly 
recognised and protected. I rely on Dyal-Chand’s58 and Van der Walt’s59 notions of 
sharing and on Singer’s60 idea of property and democracy as guidelines to resolve 
disputes involving landowners’ right to exclude and non-owners’ access rights. 
These ideas may help to clarify some of the uncertainties regarding what the right to 
exclude entails, taking into account different contexts (constitutional, legislative and 
common law), different types of land and different kinds of access to land and their 
purposes. I conclude by emphasising that exclusion is not always the outcome in 
disputes concerning the right to exclude and access rights and that access rights are 
not always exceptional. Depending on the particular context, the right to exclude can 
be stronger or weaker when considered together with access rights to land. 
                                            
57
 The Constitutional Court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (FNB) 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 46, 57-58 established a new methodology, which proposes that all 
limitations to property will be regarded as deprivations and tested against the requirements of section 
25(1) of the Constitution. 
58
 Dyal-Chand R “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723. 
59
 Van der Walt AJ “Sharing servitudes” 2016 (Forthcoming) 1-77. 
60
 Singer JW “Property as the law of democracy” (2014) 63 Duke Law Journal 1287-1335. 
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1 4 Terminology 
At the outset, it is necessary to make certain terminological points. South African, US 
and English legal sources often refer to exclusion as a right or an entitlement. In the 
present context of examining what the right to exclude as an entitlement of 
ownership entails, it is important to distinguish between a right and an entitlement, 
although the two notions are related. Generally, a landowner is said to have a right to 
exclude non-owners from his property. It is important to determine in what sense 
reference is made to exclusion in each particular legal system. Is exclusion a right or 
an entitlement? 
A right can be viewed as an entitlement. An entitlement signifies what the 
owner may do with his property and gives practical effect to the power of disposition 
included in private-law rights.61 The entitlements of ownership determine the extent 
of the legal relationship that exists between the owner and his property and between 
the owner and others. For example, saying that a landowner has the entitlement to 
exclude means that he can prohibit non-owners from entering and using his land 
without permission or good legal cause. 
The term “entitlement” should also be distinguished from what Honoré refers to 
as the “incidents of ownership” that make up the notion of ownership.62 Honoré uses 
the term “incident” to refer to a wide spectrum of entitlements, concomitant rights, 
                                            
61
 Van der Vyver JD “Ownership in constitutional and international law” 1985 Acta Juridica 119-146 
133; Mostert H The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform 
of private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany: A comparative analysis (2002) 174. 
62
 The words entitlement and incident cannot be used interchangeably. Honoré writes from an English 
law perspective that was never strongly influenced by pandectism. Unlike English law, South African 
law was greatly influenced by pandectism. 
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functions, obligations, and prohibitions.63 For purposes of this dissertation, the 
landowner’s right to exclude can be understood as an entitlement in that it describes 
what the landowner may lawfully do with regard to his property. However, the phrase 
“right to exclude” is used instead of using the phrase “entitlement to exclude”. The 
“right to exclude” is an established term, even though its meaning depends on the 
context. 
The right to exclude concerns the exclusion of non-owners from permanent, 
temporary or continuous access to pass over or be on private, public or quasi-public 
land. The nature of the property involved in a particular dispute dealing with the right 
to exclude and access rights to land is important. Therefore, this dissertation 
determines the extent of the limitation on the right to exclude with reference to three 
types of land, namely private, public and quasi-public land. Private land refers to land 
that is owned by a private person and that is not open to the public, or that is subject 
to restricted access by non-owners for a specific purpose. In contrast, the term 
“public land” refers to land that is owned by the government or the state for public 
use or in any other way that implies either general or restricted public access to it. 
The term “quasi-public land” refers to publicly used private land. Gray and Gray 
explain that the term “quasi-public” is widely used, particularly in North America, to 
denote land that, although nominally subject to private property rights, has been 
                                            
63
 Honoré argues that the incidents of ownership are those legal rights, duties and other incidents 
which apply, in the ordinary case, to the person who has the greatest interest in a thing admitted by a 
mature legal system. See Honoré T Making law bind: Essays legal and philosophical (1987) 161. The 
original version was published as Honoré AM “Ownership” in Guest AG (ed) Oxford essays in 
jurisprudence (1961) 104-147. See also Van der Vyver JD “Expropriation, rights and entitlements and 
surface support of land” (1988) 105 South African Law Journal 1-16 8; Van der Walt AJ “Rights and 
reforms in property theory – A review of property theories and debates in recent literature: Part lll” 
1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 493-526 511. 
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opened up to a public use zone.64 In such instances, the land loses its purely private 
character because of the general invitation of the public to have access to the land 
and it acquires a public character.65 
In Chapter 2 I use the term “ownership”, which is defined in South African law 
as the most complete real right a person can have or exercise over a thing insofar as 
is not prohibited by law. This definition informs the doctrinal view discussed in 
Chapter 2 where the discussion is focused on the absolutist private law definition of 
ownership. This dissertation adopts a constitutional perspective, which means that 
the private law focus on ownership only features in Chapter 2 because it is the focus 
of doctrinal writing and in case law. Throughout the rest of the dissertation I focus on 
“property” in the wide sense, which includes ownership and limited real rights, 
because it is more suitable for constitutional analysis. 
The examples and case law that I consider for purposes of this dissertation 
concern access that a non-owner may or may not have to property that belongs to 
another and the right of the landowner that he may or may not have to exclude 
others from his property. In Chapter 3 I analyse how access rights and exclusion 
pivot on each other. As a starting point, I consider access rights not as an individual 
right but in the wide sense, to include public access rights. In some cases this may 
not involve actual individual rights to gain access but rather denotes a limitation of 
the landowner’s right to exclude. 
In instances where I discuss limitations on the right to exclude, I use the term 
“limitation” to refer to instances where the law or legal principle prevents a landowner 
                                            
64
 Gray K & Gray SF “Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public space” (1999) 4 European Human 
Rights Law Review 46-102 57 (with reference to footnote 65). 
65
 57 (with reference to footnote 65). 
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from exercising his right to exclude. In Chapter 4 I use the term “limitation” in a 
different, technical constitutional-law sense, referring specifically to an action that 
constitutes a limitation of a constitutional right. In this sense, a statutory provision 
that imposes a limitation (in the general sense) on landowners’ right to exclude 
striking workers from industrial premises does not necessarily constitute a limitation 
(in the technical, constitutional sense) of the section 25(1) right to property – it would 
only do so if the deprivation is for some reason arbitrary, since section 25(1) only 
proscribes arbitrary deprivation of property. I use the term in both senses, depending 
on the context. 
The term “justification” appears in all chapters but with different meanings. In 
Chapter 4 I specifically discuss justifications for limiting the right to exclude and what 
justification means in different contexts where the right to exclude is limited. In a 
general sense, “justification” simply refers to the reason for a limitation. Again, I use 
the term in both senses, depending on the context. 
 
1 5 Qualifications 
This dissertation is confined to an assessment of the limitations imposed on the 
landowner’s right to exclude by access rights that non-owners may have, based on 
the operation of law, without the landowner’s permission. Therefore, I consider 
examples and case law largely limited to land and access to land. 
I do not attempt to discuss all the relevant case law or all examples concerning 
instances in which access rights limit the right to exclude, but only consider a 
selection of important and relevant cases and examples. The analysis of examples 
and cases on exclusion in foreign law, in particular US, English and Scots law, is not 
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intended to cover or represent all cases from or to discuss the context of those 
jurisdictions; they are simply examples of access rights or limitations. The examples 
provide a framework within which to assess the different kinds of access rights and 
limitations, the different purposes for granting them to non-owners, how conflicting 
interests can be resolved, instances when an owner is entitled to exclude, and 
whether compensation should be awarded. 
In Chapter 2 I consider the Roman-Dutch law notion of ownership, but I do not 
undertake a comprehensive discussion of the history of doctrinal thinking or of 
Roman-Dutch law. 
This dissertation does not provide an extensive discussion of property theories 
relating to exclusion. Instead, it refers to specific aspects of specific theories that are 
relevant for the analysis. Therefore, I do not write complete overviews of the relevant 
comparative law, history of ownership or property theories. 
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Chapter two:  
Absolute ownership and the right to exclude 
 
2 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore theoretical and doctrinal perspectives on 
the existence of limitations on ownership and specifically on the right to exclude. 
Ownership is described as absolute in several distinguishable senses (to indicate 
different characteristics of ownership) and only some (or just one) of those meanings 
are significant for the right to exclude. 
In South African law ownership is usually described as absolute. The idea of 
absoluteness can be understood as an indication that ownership is the most 
complete real right to distinguish it from limited real rights or that ownership is 
unlimited in principle but only insofar as the law allows. Even in these senses, 
absoluteness is subject to qualifications. Ownership is not really absolute in either of 
these senses because on the one hand, it is limited by limited real rights and on the 
other hand, it is limited by law. 
Outlining the contours of the right to exclude and its relation to access rights 
raises difficult questions about the sphere of property as well as the idea of absolute 
ownership. The main question is: what does the idea of absolute ownership mean 
theoretically and doctrinally? The unavoidable question is what the implications of 
the different meanings of exclusion are. More specifically, the question is whether 
the idea of absolute ownership implies that the right to exclude is either absolute as 
well or central to ownership. To determine the meaning of absolute ownership and 
the right to exclude, a broad overview of the theoretical and doctrinal notions of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
26 
 
ownership and exclusion is therefore essential. It is particularly necessary to explore 
theoretical arguments, and specifically moral property theories such as Locke’s 
labour theory and Hegel’s first occupation theory, to understand the extent to which 
they support the idea that the right to exclude is a necessary characteristic of 
property. The impact of these theories has to be assessed in view of the ongoing 
debate between modern exclusion theorists and progressive property theorists. 
Finally, it is also necessary to examine the impact of these theories on the South 
African law doctrine of ownership. 
Although it is widely agreed that an owner of private property has at least some 
right to exclude others from using or interfering with his property, there is 
disagreement about how central the right to exclude is to the understanding of 
property.1 The right to exclude is presumed to be the starting point for deciding 
property law disputes. A contentious issue is whether ownership and the right to 
exclude are absolute. The focus of this debate is on the nature of limitations; whether 
they are inherent in property or whether they are exceptional to the extent that 
limitations are not easily accepted and, if they are accepted, they have to be proven 
and justified. 
The theoretical literature on exclusion suggests that the notion of absolute 
ownership and exclusion can be explained in two parts. The first part is the strong 
version of absoluteness, which favours the protection of the right to exclude. 
Grounding property in exclusion suggests that ownership and the right to exclude are 
absolute. The exclusion theorists’ arguments on property and exclusion portray a 
strong view of absolutism in that the landowner can exclude everyone from the 
property. Limitations on ownership and specifically on the right to exclude are 
                                            
1
 Merrill TW “Property and the right to exclude” (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730-755 734. 
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accepted but the limitations are seen as exceptions, which have to be proven and 
properly justified. This strong version of absolutism does not allow social context or 
purely legislative will to limit ownership. Ownership or exclusivity can only be limited 
if there are good normative reasons for doing so. 
The second part is the qualified view of absoluteness, which supports the claim 
that ownership includes a right to exclude but allows for limitations imposed by law. 
The progressive property theorists’ arguments offer a qualified view in that they 
support a limited property and exclusion right. As a point of departure, the 
progressive property theorists assume that ownership and the right to exclude are 
free of limitations, but limitations can be imposed by law or by the landowner and will 
not be treated as exceptional. It is possible to accept limitations on ownership in 
general and on exclusion in particular and, although limitations have to be justified, 
the reasons for the limitations are not expected to be normatively strong. These 
qualified arguments show that the right to exclude can be subject to significant 
limitations on pragmatic and contextual grounds. 
Arguments about the idea of absolute ownership and exclusion can also be 
assessed doctrinally. From a doctrinal perspective, the starting point is that 
ownership is unlimited unless and until the law imposes limitations on it, sometimes 
on pragmatic and contextual grounds. In the doctrinal perception of ownership that 
dominates South African legal literature ownership, particularly landownership, is 
often presented as absolute, exclusive and abstract in nature.2 Context plays no role 
                                            
2
 Van der Walt AJ “The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” 
(1992) 25 De Jure 446-457 447; Van der Walt AJ “Roman-Dutch land and environmental land-use 
control” (1992) 7 South Africa Public Law 1-11 4; Milton JRL “Ownership” in Zimmermann R & Visser 
DP (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 692-699; Van der 
Merwe CG “Ownership” in Joubert WA & Faris JA (eds) The law of South Africa volume 27 (1
st
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in this perception of ownership because the rights paradigm does not reflect context 
- rather, it is portrayed as abstract and hierarchical.3 This paradigm has an effect 
upon whether and how much ownership (the right to exclude) can be limited or 
regulated. In essence, any limitation of the right to exclude is exceptional in the rights 
paradigm. In this way, a non-owner’s rights or interests in the property are less likely 
to be enforced or favoured over the landowner’s right to exclude. The rights 
paradigm creates a presumption in favour of the right to exclude, in that this right 
trumps lesser competing rights, such as access rights. Hence, the outcome in any 
property dispute is determined by the strong right to exclude, unless non-owners 
(with a weaker right) can show why the lesser right (access rights) should prevail and 
unless the law imposes limitations on the strong right to exclude. 
The rights paradigm therefore seems to present the right to exclude as 
absolute, but the fact that a weaker right could prevail once proven shows that 
ownership is in fact qualified. In cases involving access rights to privately owned 
land, the common law does not always allow a landowner to exclude non-owners, 
because the courts refer to non-owners’ access rights as well as the landowner’s 
                                                                                                                                       
Reissue 2002) 217-355 para 296. In this regard see also Reid K & Van der Merwe CG “Property law: 
Some themes and some variations” in Zimmermann R, Visser D & Reid K (eds) Mixed legal systems 
in comparative perspective (2004) 637-670 659-660, who state that in the tradition of the ius 
commune, ownership at the beginning of the twenty first century is still viewed as absolute, exclusive 
and abstract in nature. See also Van der Walt AJ “Developments that may change the institution of 
private ownership so as to meet the needs of a non-racial society in South Africa” (1990) 1 
Stellenbosch Law Review 26-48 43. 
3
 According to Van der Walt, contextual issues such as the general historical, social, economic or 
political context of the property dispute and the personal circumstances of the parties have no 
relevance or effect in the rights paradigm. See Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 27-28. 
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right to exclude.4 Therefore, the rights paradigm and the abstract right to exclude do 
not feature as strongly in case law as they do in the doctrinal literature. 
It is often said that the backbone of the South African common-law system is 
that a private landowner can exclude non-owners from his land.5 However, property 
is in fact a fundamentally restricted right, with the result that all entitlements of a 
particular property holder, particularly the right to exclude, may not necessarily be 
upheld. The right to exclude may sometimes be protected in terms of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution)6 but a landowner’s 
right to exclude may also be restricted because of the need to protect other rights, 
some of which may also be embodied in the Constitution.7 In effect, limitations 
imposed on the right to exclude show that this right is not absolute and that context 
does play a role in property disputes in that all relevant circumstances are taken into 
account in deciding whether a particular limitation is justified. 
                                            
4
 In a leading Constitutional Court (CC) decision dealing with an eviction application, the right to 
exclude was upheld when the court ordered the eviction of non-owners from privately owned land. In 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 
2012 (2) SA 104 (CC), even though the court recognised the constitutionally protected non-property 
rights of non-owners, the landowner’s rights took precedence. However, in other CC decisions such 
as Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and Others 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) the 
landowner’s right to evict has not been allowed to trump the constitutional rights of non-owners, such 
as the right to equality and the right to have access to adequate housing. 
5
 The common law rei vindicatio can be instituted by the owner to reclaim his property from anyone 
who is unlawfully in possession thereof. See the discussion below in section 2 3 2. 
6
 Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 protects the owner of property 
against deprivation of property, except in terms of law of general application and provided that the law 
should not permit arbitrary deprivation. 
7
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 215; Van der Walt AJ Property and 
constitution (2012) 29. 
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Accordingly, this chapter reviews property theories that are sometimes relied on 
to support the idea of absolute ownership and the right to exclude; and theories that 
qualify both ownership and the right to exclude in view of context. The chapter 
further reviews the South African law doctrine of ownership that sometimes might or 
might not support the idea of absolute ownership and the right to exclude. 
 
2 2 The idea of absolute ownership and exclusivity: A theoretical analysis 
2 2 1 Moral property theories 
Arguments in favour of the idea that ownership is absolute, that the right to exclude 
is central to ownership, and that limitations of either are exceptional are often 
bundled with an appeal to certain property theories. The assumption is that support 
from the theories in question would strengthen the claims in favour of exclusivity. In 
fact the theories in question sometimes do not provide the necessary support for 
exclusion arguments. What follows is not a complete discussion of the relevant 
theories or the theoretical debates about them but a brief overview to indicate how 
strong or weak the theoretical support is for exclusivity. 
The discussion commences with what Van der Walt8 refers to as moral property 
theories.9 Moral property theories can be divided into labour (Locke) and first-
occupation (Hegel) theories.10 These theories are often said to offer historical 
                                            
8
 Van der Walt AJ “Property rights, land rights and environmental rights” in Van Wyk DH, Dugard J, 
De Villers B & Davis D (eds) Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African legal order (1994) 
455-501. 
9
 The discussion is limited to an analysis of the theories of private property propounded by Hegel and 
Locke as justifications for the institution of private property. 
10
 Van der Walt AJ “Property rights, land rights and environmental rights” in Van Wyk DH, Dugard J, 
De Villers B & Davis D (eds) Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African legal order (1994) 
455-501 455-456. 
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support for the claims of the exclusion theory in justifying not only the acquisition and 
protection of property in general, but also its exclusivity, autonomy and 
absoluteness.11 This means that interferences with property should at least be 
limited to the minimum to allow the owner to exercise his rights freely and to protect 
the owner’s rights and values. The right to exclude is viewed as embodying a host of 
important interests that promote human values.12 The values implicated in a private 
property institution include but are not limited to autonomy, personhood, privacy, 
liberty, and utility.13 An important question in this section is whether the moral- and 
value-based arguments for property indeed support an absolute or a relative but 
strong right to exclude. 
Some natural rights theorists argue that all rights are derived from a conception 
of property as “self-ownership”.14 Locke is regarded as the first to make the case for 
private property as a natural right of the individual and it remains the standard 
justification for private property.15 Natural rights were held to be natural because of 
                                            
11
 Van der Walt AJ “Property rights, land rights and environmental rights” in Van Wyk DH, Dugard J, 
De Villers B & Davis D (eds) Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African legal order (1994) 
455-501 455-456. 
12
 According to Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 25 these interests include exclusive 
possession and quiet enjoyment. 
13
 Dagan H Property: Values and institutions (2011) 46; Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 
2005) 25; Freyfogle ET Bounded people, boundless lands: Envisioning a new land ethic (1998) 97. 
14
 Ryan A Property (1987) 61. Barnes R Property rights and natural resources (2009) 30 argues that 
property as a natural right approach starts from the proposition that individuals have certain essential 
rights that derive from their independence and dignity as individuals, as expressed in terms of rights 
over self. Such rights arise without the operation of law. 
15
 Paul EF Property rights and eminent domain (1987) 198; Barnes R Property rights and natural 
resources (2009) 30; Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 38-41; 
Howe H “Lockean natural rights and the stewardship model of property” (2013) 3 Property Law 
Review 36-50 38. Locke J Two treatises of government (reproduced in Laslett P Two treatises of 
government: A critical edition with an introduction and apparatus criticus 1963) para 27 states: 
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their historical or moral precedence over legal rights. Locke employed the idea of 
there being a “state of nature” in which man’s natural rights are governed by natural 
law.16 Consequently, governments were legitimate insofar as they protected natural 
rights and illegitimate if they violated them.17 
Locke’s theory provides an effort to define the limits of sovereign power. In 
terms of Locke’s theory the existence of individual property rights is justified on the 
basis of the labour argument, specifically in order to protect those rights against 
interference by the sovereign.18 The US Constitution is a classic example of a 
property clause that reflects this understanding of Locke’s theory, providing 
constitutional protection for life, liberty and property as the parameters of personal 
freedom and individuality.19 In this form, the property clause is part of a specific 
perception of the social function of property relationships, namely that private 
                                                                                                                                       
“Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a 
Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his 
Body and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. 
It being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by his labour 
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men. For this Labour 
being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to 
what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common 
for others” 
In this chapter, I do not intend to discuss Locke but rather the claim in secondary literature that his 
theory supports a strong exclusion thesis. Therefore, I refer to the secondary literature. 
16
 Howe H “Lockean natural rights and the stewardship model of property” (2013) 3 Property Law 
Review 36-50 38. 
17
 Ryan A Property (1987) 62. 
18
 Freyfogle ET Bounded people, boundless lands: Envisioning a new land ethic (1998) 94-95 states 
that Locke’s interpretation of the Bible acknowledges that God originally gave earth to humankind as 
collective property, yet any individual could seize a piece of land from the common stock and make it 
his own simply by mixing labour with it. This seems to suggest that before labour was added, the land 
had no value, and once labour was applied, the tilled land gained value and became private property. 
On this basis, one gained the right to exclude non-owners from his tilled land. 
19
 Van der Walt AJ “Property rights, land rights and environmental rights” in Van Wyk DH, Dugard J, 
De Villers B & Davis D (eds) Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African legal order (1994) 
455-501 461. 
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property forms a guaranteed enclave of individual freedom within which the 
individual is shielded from the threats posed by society.20 
For Locke, property rights established in a state of nature are both more 
determinate in their content and less susceptible to political rearrangement once the 
civil government is formed.21 The right to exclude has been identified as the most 
important among the rights established within the state of nature.22 An exclusive 
property right is derived from the “mixing-labour” argument for property.23 The labour 
argument suggests that when a man mixes his labour with something from the 
commons, it is by his labour that he acquires something (property), which excludes 
the common rights of other men.24 As a result, man acquires claim-rights to the 
exclusive possession, use and control, and imposition of correlative duties on all 
others not to interfere with the property that he acquired through his labour.25 In this 
regard, the right to exclude others becomes important as emphasis is placed on the 
individual. From this perspective, Locke is said to have viewed ownership as an 
exclusive and unlimited right because it is based on individual labour. 
                                            
20
 Van der Walt AJ “Property rights, land rights and environmental rights” in Van Wyk DH, Dugard J, 
De Villers B & Davis D (eds) Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African legal order (1994) 
455-501 462. 
21
 Howe H “Lockean natural rights and the stewardship model of property” (2013) 3 Property Law 
Review 36-50 48. 
22
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 146; Howe H “Lockean 
natural rights and the stewardship model of property” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 36-50 38. 
23
 Mossoff A “What is property? Putting the pieces back together” (2003) 45 Arizona Law Review 371-
444 387-389. 
24
 Howe H “Lockean natural rights and the stewardship model of property” (2013) 3 Property Law 
Review 36-50 38; Lucy WNR & Barker FR “Justifying property and justifying access” (1993) 6 The 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 287-318 299-300. 
25
 Lucy WNR & Barker FR “Justifying property and justifying access” (1993) 6 The Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence 287-318 297. 
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Locke’s labour theory creates the impression that owners should be able to 
exclude others from the fruits of their labour. Mossoff notes that Locke’s labour 
argument adds the essential element of exclusion to property rights.26 It is labour that 
transforms the inclusive claim-rights in the state of nature into exclusive property 
rights, which is one of the primary rights civil society is formed to protect.27 To this 
extent, Locke’s labour theory strengthens the rights of the individual in that, once an 
individual acquires property, he has the right to exclude others from his property.28 
Locke’s labour theory justifying private property is also important for promoting 
personal autonomy in that it creates a sense of personal freedom and individuality. 
Therefore, allowing the landowner to exclude non-owners from private property 
ensures that the owner can establish a sphere of personal autonomy and exercise 
his unique power of personal autonomy.29 
In the same vein, Hegel’s idea of property is said to present the right to exclude 
as necessary and essential to property.30 His first occupation theory entails that a 
thing belongs to the person who happens to be the first in time to take the thing into 
his possession.31 Property is an abstract and indeterminate concept, which 
                                            
26
 Mossoff A “What is property? Putting the pieces back together” (2003) 45 Arizona Law Review 371-
444 388. Lucy WNR & Barker FR “Justifying property and justifying access” (1993) 6 The Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 287-318 297 state that an individual acquires private property 
through his labour and in so doing, he unilaterally deprives all others of the resource he acquires. 
27
 Mossoff A “What is property? Putting the pieces back together” (2003) 45 Arizona Law Review 371-
444 389. 
28
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 146. 
29
 Van der Walt AJ “Tradition on trial: A critical analysis of the civil-law tradition in South African 
property law” (1995) 2 South African Journal on Human Rights 169-206 179. 
30
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967). I do not 
intend to undertake an extensive analysis of Hegel, rather I analyse the secondary literature that point 
to or deny the fact that Hegel’s first occupation theory provides a strong justification for exclusion. 
31
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 45. 
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emanates from an individual’s will;32 a person has a right of putting his will into any 
and every thing, thereby making it his with the absolute right of appropriation that a 
person has over all things.33 A thing lacks form until a person embodies it with 
human will when he confers a form or concept onto it.34 The thing only becomes 
property by virtue of its embodiment with human will or assimilation into one’s 
personhood.35 As a result, property acquires the character of private property.36 
Hegel identifies three essential phases of property, namely possession, use 
and alienation.37 Each of these phases requires that an individual be entitled to 
exclude others, at least to some degree.38 The first stage of the human will is to 
physically seize the thing into one’s possession and in this regard, taking possession 
signifies the human will.39 After physical seizure, the second stage is that of giving 
form to something by creating something out of the seized thing.40 In this way, the 
will of an individual is identified in the product of his work.41 Since an individual’s will 
                                            
32
 Conklin WE Hegel’s law: The legitimacy of a modern legal order (2008) 119-120. 
33
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 41. See also 
Fox O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA “The idea of home in law: Displacement and dispossession” in Fox 
O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA (eds) The idea of home in law: Displacement and dispossession (2011) 1-
11 2. 
34
 Conklin WE Hegel’s law: The legitimacy of a modern legal order (2008) 121. 
35
 Conklin WE Hegel’s law: The legitimacy of a modern legal order (2008) 121; Fox O’Mahony L & 
Sweeney JA “The idea of home in law: Displacement and dispossession” in Fox O’Mahony L & 
Sweeney JA (eds) The idea of home in law: Displacement and dispossession (2011) 1-11 2. 
36
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 42. 
37
 46. 
38
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 143. 
39
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 46-47; 
Knowles D Routledge philosophy guidebook to Hegel and the philosophy of right (2002) 130; Lucy 
WNR & Barker FR “Justifying property and justifying access” (1993) 6 The Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 287-318 306. 
40
 Knowles D Routledge philosophy guidebook to Hegel and the philosophy of right (2002) 131. 
41
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 46. 
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is used to transform a thing into property, such property belongs in the possession of 
the individual as the owner. In other words, the thing is assimilated into one’s 
personhood, making the thing his property. 
The third stage involves the marking of things with signs.42 An example of a 
marking for a private property is a sign saying “No trespassers”. According to Hegel, 
this sign indicates that an owner has put his will into the thing, which symbolises that 
he is the sole owner and that non-owners should recognise his ownership of the 
thing.43 The sign can also be a means of keeping non-owners out of the private 
property. This provides an individual owner with the exclusionary powers that 
enables him to exclude others from the property interest and this also suggests that 
the owner has complete ownership of the property.44 
Accordingly, the owner is entitled to the use of his property, to the exclusion of 
others. Hegel explains that the use of a thing satisfies the needs of the owner, since 
the use reveals the aspect of human will that is displayed in ownership.45 In this light, 
the entire use of the thing belongs to the owner and this renders it difficult for another 
person to be the owner in an abstract sense. According to Hegel, ownership is 
therefore essentially free and complete.46 
                                            
42
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 49; Knowles 
D Routledge philosophy guidebook to Hegel and the philosophy of right (2002) 131. 
43
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952) (translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 49. See 
also Knowles D Routledge philosophy guidebook to Hegel and the philosophy of right (2002) 131. 
44
 Conklin WE Hegel’s law: The legitimacy of a modern legal order (2008) 123. 
45
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 49. See also 
Knowles D Routledge philosophy guidebook to Hegel and the philosophy of right (2002) 132-133. 
46
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right (1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 50. See also 
Knowles D Routledge philosophy guidebook to Hegel and the philosophy of right (2002) 133. 
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Radin relies on Hegel in developing her personhood theory of property.47 Like 
Hegel, she focuses on the relationship between property and self-development.48 
The underlying premise of the personhood perspective is that, to achieve proper self-
development, a person needs some control over resources in the external 
environment.49 For Radin, the necessary assurances of control take the form of 
property rights and as a result the protection of property should be enhanced to allow 
for personal development.50 
                                            
47
 Radin MJ “Property and personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1016. The personhood 
theory is further elaborated in some of Radin’s work see, Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) 100 
Harvard Law Review 1849-1937; Radin MJ Reinterpreting property (1993); Radin MJ Contested 
commodities (1996). Fox O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA “The idea of home in law: Displacement and 
dispossession” in Fox O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA (eds) The idea of home in law: Displacement and 
dispossession (2011) 1-11 3 state that the significance of housing and home for Hegelian self-
development and the implication this bears for law and policy, has been mostly developed through 
Radin’s concept of property and personhood. 
48
 Although Radin and Hegel share the same insights, Radin has a different understanding of self-
development. In terms of Radin’s personhood theory, personal property is bound up with an 
individual’s personhood in a constitutive sense in that it is part of the way people constitute 
themselves as continuing personal entities in the world. Radin rejects Hegel’s initial conception of self 
(person) because Hegel conceives the self as merely an abstract unit of free will, which has no 
concrete existence until the will confronts the external world. In this regard see Radin MJ “Property 
and personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1016 959, 971-972. See also Fox L 
Conceptualising home: Theories, laws and policies (2007) 299-300; Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An 
introduction to property theory (2012) 66. 
49
 Radin MJ “Property and personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1016 957; Clarke A & 
Kohler P Property law: Commentary and materials (2005) 54; Fox L Conceptualising home: Theories, 
laws and policies (2007) 296; Fox O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA “The idea of home in law: 
Displacement and dispossession” in Fox O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA (eds) The idea of home in law: 
Displacement and dispossession (2011) 1-11 3. Dagan H “The social responsibility of ownership” 
(2007) 92 Cornell Law Review 1255-1274 1259-1260 discusses the relationship between the 
justification of control over external resources and their role in constituting personhood. 
50
 Radin MJ “Property and personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1016 957. 
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The necessity to provide constitutional protection for property in such a sphere 
of personhood appears from the US Supreme Court decision in Loretto.51 The court’s 
strong emphasis on the physical integrity of the property and the property owner’s 
right to exclude is clearly linked to the will of the property owner.52 Sharfstein claims 
that the pure exercise of exclusion rights has fostered personhood in American 
history.53 For instance, a private family home is a smaller sphere of property that 
serves the promotion of personhood.54 At the core of Radin’s theory is the idea that 
an individual’s attachment to particular property, such as a home, may be so strong 
that the particular property becomes constitutive of personhood.55 Personhood is a 
more individualistic justification of private property,56 which seems to reflect Hegel’s 
idea of an individual’s free will embodied in property. 
The permanent physical occupation rule applied in Loretto prima facie appears 
to vindicate the owner’s personhood interest.57 However, from a different viewpoint, 
and in line with Radin’s treatment of property, the personhood perspective does not 
justify the permanent physical occupation rule. Radin treats property owned by 
businesses as fungible rather than personal,58 so that even if one assumes that a 
                                            
51
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 176. 
52
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 136, citing Peller G “The metaphysics of 
American law” (1985) 73 California Law Review 1151-1290. 
53
 Sharfstein DJ “Atrocity, entitlement and personhood in property” (2012) 98 Virginia Law Review 
635-690 675. 
54
 Van der Walt AJ “Marginal notes on powerful(l) legends: Critical perspectives on property theory” 
(1995) 58 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 396-420 411. 
55
 Fox O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA “The idea of home in law: Displacement and dispossession” in Fox 
O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA (eds) The idea of home in law: Displacement and dispossession (2011) 1-
11 3, 5. 
56
 Dagan H “The social responsibility of ownership” (2007) 92 Cornell Law Review 1255-1274 1259. 
57
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 176. 
58
 See Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 175-176, citing Radin 
MJ Reinterpreting property (1993) 153-155. Radin view personal property as property that is 
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building is personal property, de minimis physical invasions, such as the cable 
installations at issue in Loretto, might not constitute significant intrusions on personal 
identity.59 Generally speaking, a closer connection between property and 
personhood warrants stronger property entitlements that deserves constitutional 
protection60 and therefore the right to exclude is at least important when and 
because it secures personhood. 
The moral property theories seem to support the strong view of absoluteness. 
Ryan observes that Hegel’s view of property is that the human will is essentially 
individual and property therefore essentially private61 in the sense of excluding 
others from the property.62 Another person can use the property but only if the owner 
decides to alienate his property, thereby disembodying his will.63 Private property 
invokes rights against others (non-owners) entailing that, for example, they cannot 
have access to or use property in which the will of the owner is embodied without the 
owner’s permission. 
For Hegel, possession, use and alienation are simultaneously individualistic 
and relational. Some authors’ perspective of Hegel’s view on property is that 
property is needed by everyone for the development of freedom and personality.64 
Hegel does recognise a right to exclude, but because of the relational character 
                                                                                                                                       
connected with the proper development and flourishing of persons and fungible property as property 
that represents interchangeable units of exchange value. See also Radin MJ “Property and 
personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1016 960, 986. 
59
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 176. 
60
 Radin MJ “Property and personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1016 986. 
61
 Ryan A Property (1987) 60. 
62
 Conklin WE Hegel’s law: The legitimacy of a modern legal order (2008) 123. 
63
 Hegel GWF Hegel’s philosophy of right 1952 translated with notes by Knox TM 1967) 52. 
64
 Waldron J The right to private property (1988) 351; Lucy WNR & Barker FR “Justifying property and 
justifying access” (1993) 6 The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 287-318 304. 
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embodied in his property theory, the right to exclude is not absolute; nonetheless, it 
is essential in depicting the nature and extent of private ownership.65 At least from 
one reading of Locke’s and Hegel’s property theories, the right to exclude others is 
justified, on a moral basis, because it promotes personhood and personal autonomy. 
The result is that any limitation of the owner’s right to exclude is exceptional and 
immoral except if the limitation is in accordance with the owner’s will. Although these 
property theories play an important role in the understanding of property, they should 
not be interpreted as an unqualified endorsement of an absolute right to exclude. 
 
2 2 2 Contemporary exclusion theory 
A strong-absolute version of ownership and the right to exclude is integral to a set of 
more recent exclusion theories. Generally, within the private property system, 
ownership of a given resource is assessed on the basis of who can exclude others 
from interfering with the resource without the consent of the owner.66 Penner’s 
understanding of the right to exclude is expressed in what he refers to as the 
exclusion thesis, which means that the right to property is a right to exclude others 
from things that are firmly in the owner’s interest to use.67 According to Penner, an 
owner has the right to exclude others, and the very idea of property depends on the 
assumption that others are to be excluded.68 Epstein argues that the institution of 
ownership gives people the right to exclude, not because they will invariably exercise 
it, but so that they can select those individuals to whom they will extend permission 
                                            
65
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 143. 
66
 Lucy WNR & Barker FR “Justifying property and justifying access” (1993) 6 The Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence 287-318 293. 
67
 Penner JE The idea of property in law (1997) 68-104. 
68
 74. 
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to enter their property.69 The right to exclude is enforceable against the world, and 
permission isolates those individuals who are entitled to use the property subject to 
any terms and conditions the owner chooses to impose. 
Similarly, Merrill argues that by virtue of simply excluding others, a landowner is 
free to determine the use of his property.70 The right of a property owner to exclude 
others is not just one of the most essential sticks in the bundle that is seen as 
comprising property, but is in fact the “sine quo non” of property. He puts it as 
follows: 
“Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource … and you 
give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have 
property”.71 
The conception of property is grounded in exclusion because, while property owners 
enjoy various legal rights, the right to exclude is both necessary and sufficient for 
identifying the existence of property.72 Merrill advances three arguments in support 
of the view that the right to exclude others from one’s property is both a necessary 
and sufficient condition of property.73 
The first argument is a logical one, that is, if one starts with the right to exclude, 
it is possible to derive most of the other attributes commonly associated with 
property by adding minor clarifications about the domain of the exclusion right.74 
However, the converse is not true: if one starts with any other attribute of property, 
                                            
69
 Epstein RA “Takings, exclusivity and speech: The legacy of PruneYard v Robins” (1997) 64 
University of Chicago Law Review 21-56 36. 
70
 Merrill TW “Property and the right to exclude” (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730-755 741. 
71
 730. 
72
 731. See also Dagan H Property: Values and institutions (2011) 38-39. 
73
 Merrill TW “Property and the right to exclude” (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730-755 740. 
74
 740. 
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one cannot derive the right to exclude by extending the domain of that other 
attribute. Rather, the right to exclude has to be added as an additional or 
independent premise.75 Mossoff rejects this argument and claims that it is not 
necessary to start with the right to exclude, but that it is possible to start with other 
rights.76 
The second argument in support of the primacy of the right to exclude is 
historical in nature. Merrill states that there is strong evidence that, with respect to 
land, the right to exclude is the first right to emerge in primitive property rights 
systems.77 Since it appears that the right to exclude was the first to evolve in time, it 
is more basic to the institution of property than other incidents of property recognised 
in mature property systems.78 The examples show that the first step in the evolution 
of property rights in land was the recognition of the right to exclude and once this 
right was established, it was possible to add other rights to the bundle.79 
The third argument refers to existing legal practices in a mature legal system to 
determine whether the right to exclude is invariably associated with interests 
identified as property rights.80 Merrill points out that where the law recognises a right 
to property, it confers a right to exclude and this cannot be the same with the other 
incidents of property identified by Honoré.81 
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Accordingly, Merrill’s three arguments for the primacy of the right to exclude 
support the conclusion that the right to exclude provides the key to the 
understanding of the nature of property. This does not in any way suggest that the 
right to exclude must be or should be unqualified; it simply shows that if one has the 
right to exclude to a certain extent, one has property; if one does not have the right 
of exclusion, one does not have property.82 Epstein also argues that it is indeed quite 
difficult to conceive of property as private if the right to exclude is rejected.83 The 
right to exclude in a private property institution is essential because it tends to favour 
stability and predictability.84 This argument suggests that rejecting the right to 
exclude, as a central feature, might bring uncertainty to the principles governing the 
private property institution. 
Exclusion theorists value property’s stability over change. Merrill and Smith 
argue that property institutions employ boundaries, which economise on information 
costs by delegating most decision making about the exercise of rights to owners.85 
Furthermore, they argue, by establishing boundaries and by granting owners the 
broad power to control access to property within those boundaries, the institution of 
private property rewards people who successfully gather information about the most 
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productive use for the thing they own.86 Interestingly, the economic argument for 
individual ownership is sometimes made with reference to the tragedy of the 
commons,87 in that, by protecting the right to exclude, social costs or negative 
externalities are reduced. Even though negative externalities are reduced, the 
possibility of non-owners to negotiate access when transaction costs are low 
indicates a qualified but strong version of the right to exclude. 
A utilitarian account of property claims that private property maximises human 
welfare. Its focus is on welfare maximization in that utility tends to produce benefit, 
advantage and happiness for the owner of privately owned land.88 Such an account 
appears to favour the right to exclude, given that the landowner has a right to his 
property to the exclusion of others. The utilitarian defence of property in any form is 
the defence of the legal recognition of ownership as an instrument in promoting the 
greatest happiness for the largest number of people, and as such it attaches all the 
incidents of ownership to one person.89 In this regard, the right to exclude therefore 
enhances utility. 
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The economic approach to property is based on the idea that efficiency is a 
plausible measure of utility.90 In line with the law and economics argument, the 
promotion of economic efficiency is usually advanced as a justification for private 
property.91 Efficiency is defined in terms of success in satisfying the wants people 
actually have, and the only test of their having those wants is the choices they make 
when they are offered them in a marketplace. The efficiency argument founded on 
economic analysis of law can be described with reference to the Coase theorem.92 
The Coase theorem asserts that where there is a conflict involving property rights, 
the parties involved can always successfully bargain for an efficient outcome, 
regardless of the initial allocation of property rights, provided that transaction costs 
are zero.93 If parties bargain successfully an efficient outcome can be achieved 
without government intervention, provided that transaction costs are low. Property 
rights are therefore awarded to the party who values them the most. By awarding 
property rights to the party who values them the most, the law makes exchange of 
rights possible when transaction costs are low.94 Consequently, state intervention (in 
the form of enforced access rights) is unnecessary. 
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Efficiency would be maximized when resources are in the hands of those who 
would pay most for them. It is only when full liberal ownership is vested in an 
individual that efficient outcomes are generated.95 In view of the Coase theorem, the 
right to exclude lessens the externality problem by concentrating the costs and 
benefits on landowners, thereby providing them with an incentive to employ their 
resources efficiently. Accordingly, an unqualified right to exclude is more efficient 
because it minimizes the information cost of determining rights.96 
In the absence of transaction costs or if transaction costs are low parties are 
forced to bargain for an efficient outcome.97 What this means for ownership (the right 
to exclude) is that where there is an access claim to land, non-owners can bargain 
for access without the intervention of the courts or law. In other words, when 
transaction costs are low, non-owners can acquire access rights if they value those 
rights. 
The conventional economic position provides that the principles governing 
property will lean towards efficiency and wealth maximization if several features are 
in place.98 Firstly, the law should protect exclusivity of ownership, that is, it should 
enforce ownership rights and ensure that exclusive rights cannot be infringed by 
anyone else without the landowner’s consent.99 Secondly, the law needs to protect 
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exclusivity of ownership to spur on productivity,100 for example in cases where the 
landowner wants to make improvements on his land. In this regard, the economic 
justification of private property is that maximum productivity is promoted.101 In 
addition, allowing the landowner to exercise his right to exclude curbs negative 
externalities and increases economic efficiency. Posner argues that if a landowner 
can exclude others from accessing any given area on his land, the landowner will 
endeavour by cultivation or other improvements to maximise the value of his land.102 
Rose argues, although not from a law and economics perspective, that the right 
to exclude makes private property fruitful by enabling owners to capture the full value 
of their individual investments.103 Similarly, Epstein argues doctrinally and not from a 
law and economics angle, that once an owner has the right to exclude, the ability to 
set the terms and conditions of admission should lead to the optimal use of the 
resource for all parties involved.104 Private property rights can therefore also be 
justified by their ability to promote economic growth.105 
Epstein suggests two possible ways to view the right to exclude.106 In its 
stronger sense, the right to exclude is absolute in that no private party can overcome 
it unless he procures the consent of the owner. Calabresi and Melamed refer to this 
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as a “property rule”.107 Contrary to the stronger view, the right to exclude could be 
regarded as defeasible upon payment of just compensation. In such cases, the right 
to exclude is protected only by a “liability rule”, such as that the owner of the right 
can be forced to surrender it to an outsider against payment of compensation.108 The 
US Supreme Court has held that permanent deprivation of the right to exclude 
constitutes a taking of property that must be compensated.109 In this way, the right to 
exclude is protected by a “liability rule” when there is a taking of property. Liability 
rules allow the courts to coerce exchanges in the allocation of rights when the 
transaction costs are high and bargaining is not possible.110 The courts dictate the 
conditions under which relief is granted, by replacing the owner’s consent with 
compensation in the form of a monetary payment.111 This implies that the US 
Supreme Court, although not explicitly, applies the exclusion claim that the right to 
exclude should be upheld in property disputes, if necessary by transforming the 
property rule into a liability rule. In this context, applying a liability rule suggests that 
the right to exclude could be overruled or limited where transaction costs are high 
and a desirable exchange is only to be realised by the forcible or involuntary transfer 
of property rights. Transforming a property rule to a liability rule in this way, against 
compensation, undermines the idea that the right to exclude is absolute. 
The strong-absolute view of ownership and the right to exclude is further 
illustrated by Merrill’s discussion of three traditions regarding the role of exclusion in 
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property, namely “single-variable essentialism”; “multiple-variable essentialism”; and 
“nominalism”.112 The three traditions distinguish between strong and weaker 
approaches to absoluteness although Merrill does not argue this point explicitly. 
Firstly, the single-variable version of essentialism posits that the right to 
exclude others is the irreducible core attribute of property.113 This version is in line 
with Blackstone’s conception of ownership as “sole and despotic dominion”. 
According to this conception, the right to exclude is both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition of property. Blackstone’s conception in a way singles out the right to 
exclude as the most essential attribute of property. Such a notion has also been 
expressed in the work of Penner and Harris.114 Accordingly, property is not merely 
dependent on different rights and duties, but rather the right to exclude is a 
necessary, essential characteristic of property. 
The single-variable essentialism finds extensive support in the US Supreme 
Court decisions involving the government’s attempts to secure access to private 
property for a public benefit.115 In a series of cases,116 the US Supreme Court 
sanctified the idea that the right to exclude others is essential to the concept of 
private property. The characterisation of the right to exclude as essential bears a 
connotation of absolutism. In US law, the absolute right to exclude is enshrined in 
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the common law. The common law rule is that property owners may exclude others 
at will unless they fit in a small class of businesses with a duty to serve the public or 
if a civil-rights statute limits their right to exclude.117 In Kaiser Aetna v United 
States118 the US Supreme Court first declared the right to exclude a fundamental 
element of private property. In this case, a private marina was constructed on the 
island of Oahu, Hawaii and connected to a bay with the permission of the Army 
Corps Engineers. After the marina was connected to the bay, a dispute arose as to 
whether the public had to be given access to the marina under a navigational 
servitude. The Army Corps Engineers claimed that certain improvements to the 
marina resulted in a navigational servitude, which precluded the pond owners from 
denying public access to the pond. The court stated that the right to exclude is 
universally held to be a fundamental element of property and that it is one of the 
most treasured rights of property. As a result, the right cannot be terminated without 
just compensation.119 The court characterised the government’s activity as a physical 
invasion of property for which compensation had to be paid. Perhaps this is the most 
authoritative decision regarding the position that any physical intrusion in the form of 
permanent or continuous access to privately owned land violates the landowner’s 
right to exclude.120 
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In Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp121 the court confirmed that the 
right to exclude is the pinnacle of property rights. The court held that a New York law 
requiring landlords to allow cable companies to install cables and cable boxes on 
their buildings constituted a physical invasion. This occurs when the state or 
someone acting on its authority physically and permanently occupies someone’s 
property.122 The occupation must be direct and permanent.123 A regulation like this 
triggers a per se taking irrespective of the slightness of the occupation, the triviality 
of the effect or whether there are any compelling reasons for the state’s action.124 In 
Loretto, the court held that regardless of the relatively minor intrusion, the 
government had authorised a permanent physical occupation of Loretto’s property 
and that such a permanent physical occupation is a taking without regard to the 
public interests that it may serve. This ruling shows that even if property has other 
elements to it, the right to exclude is the core element.125 
In Nollan v California Coastal Commission126 the court emphasised the 
importance of the right to exclude by extending the protection of the right to non-
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permanent physical invasions. The case involved exactions127 that authorised the 
public to enter private land over which the owners had previously had an unlimited 
right to exclude. The court held that the granting of a building permit that is 
conditioned on the dedication of a public right of way constituted an unconstitutional 
taking of private property.128 The landowners’ right to exclude was upheld, without 
any limitations. The right to exclude is therefore a fundamental aspect of private 
property, particularly in land.129 This confirms the common law rule or formalistic 
approach to property that grants the absolute right to exclude unless it is limited by 
legislation.130 In an earlier publication, Singer explains that, according to tradition and 
current constitutional law, the right to exclude is the most central right associated 
with property.131 In Nollan, the exaction would have had the effect of restricting the 
owner’s right to exclude the public from her land.132 The classical conception of 
property suggests that all owners have rights to exclude non-owners, with only a few 
exceptions. 
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The physical invasion reasoning (per se taking) was qualified in PruneYard 
Shopping Center v Robins133 because of the need to accommodate the right to 
freedom of speech and petition.134 The court held that there was no taking when a 
state law required shopping centre owners to permit members of the public to enter 
shopping centres for the purpose of distributing leaflets.135 Although the state-
authorised occupation was direct and physical, it was only temporary and as such 
did not meet the per se taking requirements. In PruneYard, unlike Kaiser, the right to 
exclude was therefore not prioritised by the court. The owners of PruneYard 
Shopping Center failed to demonstrate that the right to exclude others is so essential 
to the use or economic value of their property that the state-authorised limitation of it 
amounted to a taking. The right to exclude was therefore limited to protect the non-
property constitutional rights of the students who were asking people to sign petitions 
at the shopping centre.136 The ruling does not prioritise the right to exclude abstractly 
and shows the interplay between constitutional rights and private property (the right 
to exclude); the importance of context; the nature of property in which the right to 
exclude can be exercised; and the qualified nature of the right to exclude. 
Secondly, under the multiple-variable version of essentialism, the right to 
exclude is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of property.137 This means that 
the right to exclude is only part of a list comprising of other entitlements of ownership 
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(such as rights of use, enjoyment, and disposal), which are needed to create a 
bundle of rights that is sufficient to constitute property.138 The multiple-variable 
version can be compared to Honoré’s conception of ownership, which identified the 
standard incidents of ownership that provide the most ample conception of property 
to be found in a mature legal system.139 Honoré’s idea of property fits in perfectly 
with the multiple-variable version of essentialism, in that his explanation of property 
does not single out an essential minimum element; this can only be determined by 
law in each particular legal system. The multiple-variable version does not regard the 
right to exclude as the essence of property or as central to the understanding of 
property. Instead, the right to exclude is seen as just another right that contributes to 
the make-up of property. 
Thirdly, nominalism views property as a purely conventional concept with no 
fixed meaning.140 Property is therefore an empty vessel that can be filled by each 
legal system in accordance with its peculiar values and beliefs. In line with the 
nominalist view of property, the right to exclude is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition of property. This means that the right to exclude may be a 
characteristic commonly associated with property, but its presence is not essential 
and therefore not a fundamental aspect of property. Merrill concedes that there are 
other rights associated with property but maintains that the courts in various takings 
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cases have singled out and endorsed the right to exclude as the most essential right 
in property.141 
It is one thing to say that the right to exclude is the most essential or core right 
of property and quite another to say the right to exclude is absolute. None of the 
justificatory grounds embodied in moral property theories or in the more recent 
exclusion theory indicates that a landowner has an absolute right to exclude. These 
theories appear to support a strong but qualified right to exclude. The justifications 
support exclusionary practices to some extent, but they also allow for access rights, 
and sometimes they even require or recognise non-owners’ access rights.142 Hence, 
the same theoretical arguments can justify both landowners’ exclusion rights and 
non-owners’ access rights. 
 
2 2 3 Exclusive-use theories 
There are some interesting variations on the idea that the right to exclude is the 
defining feature of property. Exclusive use theorists such as Katz, Mossoff and 
Claeys embrace the idea that some kind of unifying and robust exclusion right exists 
at the core of property ownership, but differ with the exclusion theorists on the 
ground that the central value that property law protects is not so much a formalistic, 
boundary-based right to exclude, but the exclusive authority of property owners to 
set agendas about the use to which property can be put.143 
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As opposed to theories that depict the right to exclude as the core of property, 
the exclusive use theories conceive property as a right to exclusively determine the 
use to which property is put.144 The right to exclude means more than the right of 
physical exclusion from privately owned land. The overarching idea of exclusivity is 
that the owner holds a monopoly over the rights and entitlements that are recognised 
as part of ownership of his property.145 The owner is in a position to make decisions 
regarding his property that must be respected by non-owners.146 Katz proposes the 
“exclusivity model” to describe her own view and understanding of ownership.147 Her 
understanding of the structure of ownership in property law is that its central concern 
is not exclusion of all non-owners from the property, but rather the preservation of 
the owner’s position as the exclusive agenda setter for the property. Ownership is a 
legal concept with a well-defined structure, which derives from its nature an 
exclusive right or authority to make decisions about the use of property.148 Even 
though ownership is an exclusive right as indicated by the boundary approach, the 
right to exclude does not describe the essence of ownership.149 Instead, ownership’s 
defining characteristic is that it is the special authority to set the agenda for a 
resource - the exclusivity of ownership is just one aspect of ownership’s nature as a 
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position of agenda-setting authority rather than exclusivity being the essence of 
ownership.150 Exclusivity of ownership places landowners in a special position to set 
the agenda for the property they own and therefore it is wrong to suggest that the 
owner’s right to exclude (gatekeeping function) is the essence of property.151 
Property law protects ownership not by upholding an absolute right to exclude others 
but by harmonising their interests in the use of the object with the owner’s agenda-
setting authority.152 
Similarly, Mossoff claims that, even though the right to exclude is an essential 
characteristic of property, it is not a fundamental or sufficient element in the concept 
of property.153 Instead, the fountainhead of property is possessory rights, namely the 
rights of acquisition, use, and disposal, and the right to exclude is only a corollary of 
these three core rights, a secondary or derivate right within the concept of 
property.154 This view is contrary to Merrill’s view that the right to exclude is the 
starting point and that all other rights are derived from it. In light of Mossoff’s view, it 
may be possible to start with any other right like the right to use. In this way, the right 
to exclude can be invoked as a protection mechanism when an owner has already 
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151
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identified his property entitlements. As Mossoff argues, the right to exclude is 
therefore only a formal claim.155 Claeys also disagrees with the exclusion theorists’ 
(Merrill and Smith) idea of reducing ownership to an owner’s right to exclude others 
from his property and instead refers to property as a right to determine exclusively 
how a thing may be used.156 An exclusive right to use determination justifies the 
rights owners have to use the things they own exclusively in a productive way.157 
The particular use of the property, therefore, determines whether non-owners can 
have access or not because the owner has a more general and exclusive right to 
choose how to use his land.158 The exclusive use determination gives conceptual 
focus to the “exclusion” in a right to exclude. Claeys argues that “exclusion” is not 
necessary to property; it is only a feature of property.159 Property exclusion does not 
exclude non-owners from the thing, but rather from the “dominion or indefinite right of 
user or disposition” associated with the thing.160 
The exclusive use theorists’ arguments differ descriptively from the exclusion 
theorists’ arguments. The exclusive use theorists show that exclusion is not always 
about physical exclusion, creating boundaries or a simple keep-off message. Rather, 
exclusion is an exclusive right to use,161 or to determine the use of the property162 or 
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an exclusive right of agenda-setting.163 A landowner has the power to control and 
make decisions regarding the use of his property but cannot exclude non-owners. 
Exclusive-use decision making can be limited by law (regulation) in specific 
instances, depending on the nature of the property and the identity of the owner. The 
exclusive use theorists’ conception of property suggests that property is a social 
concept, that is, it plays a role in structuring social relations, which is more or less 
what the progressive property theorists argue as well. Exclusive-use theory creates 
the potential for mutual accommodation with regard to the property, whereas 
exclusion theory merely states a particular outcome, a simple keep-off rule. 
In a similar vein, Dagan states that property should not be solely about 
exclusion or exclusivity and that, at times, inclusion is part of what property is, rather 
than being external to its core.164 Dagan is mainly concerned about non-owners’ 
claim to have access to property. One of the examples he uses is the law of public 
accommodations, which is widely recognised as an important limitation on the right 
to exclude.165 
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Dyal-Chand’s notion of a forced sharing of property provides a comparable 
theoretical basis for limiting the right to exclude.166 Dyal-Chand proposes an interest-
outcome approach that focuses on sharing instead of exclusion.167 The interest-
outcome approach is a means of resolving property disputes where more than one 
legitimate interest exists concerning the use, possession or access to a piece of 
property.168 In instances where a dominant tenement owner or an encroacher 
demonstrates a need to use the property, such need could be answered through the 
enforcement of sharing by the courts. The common law principles dealing with the 
enforcement of a right of way of necessity and encroachments appears to be a good 
example of an enforced common law sharing remedy. The outcome in disputes 
concerning a right of way of necessity or encroachment169 also often amounts to 
compelled sharing instead of exclusion. In this regard, the courts focus on the actual 
use of the land, the interests of the parties and compensation to construct a sharing 
remedy.170 Sharing as a feature of property law ensures mutual accommodation of 
rights and interests of the parties involved in a particular dispute. 
 
2 2 4 Progressive property theory and exclusivity 
There is currently a robust debate about how too much emphasis on the right to 
exclude overshadows the issue of access rights relating to land. On numerous 
occasions, scholars have disagreed on whether the right to exclude is the core of 
                                            
166
 Dyal-Chand R “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723. 
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property. Baron reviews this scholarly debate with reference to two theoretical 
approaches to property, which she describes as information theory and progressive 
theory.171 The information theorists argue that exclusion (the right to exclude) 
constitutes the core of property,172 while the progressive theorists argue that human 
relationships and values constitute the core of property. Other scholars in this debate 
do not belong to either the information or progressive group, but their arguments are 
premised on more or less the basic assumptions.173 The scholarly debate on 
exclusion focuses on the extent to which the right to exclude can be exercised (or on 
the centrality of its role in property law) and how this affects fundamental human 
rights if non-owners are denied access to land. 
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The information or formal exclusion theorists (hereinafter exclusion theorists) 
rely on the idea that property revolves around exclusion or exclusivity.174 These 
theorists argue that the right to exclude is at the centre of the property system 
because it consolidates a large number of powers in one property owner, which 
sends a simple message to non-owners to keep off.175 Katz argues that exclusion 
theorists, like Merrill, propose a model of ownership that emphasises the owner’s 
right to exclude non-owners from the property as the central defining feature of 
ownership.176 Katz refers to this model as the “boundary or exclusion-based 
approach” because it focuses on the owner’s power to decide who may cross the 
boundaries of the property. In an exclusion-based (or boundary) approach, 
ownership is the product of a norm that protects the boundaries around an object so 
as to exclude the whole world except the owner.177 It follows that the owner controls 
access to the attributes of the resource within the boundaries, which are his by virtue 
of the exclusion of others. The essential feature of the exclusion-based approach is 
the power to determine who can enter and who must keep out.178 In effect, 
ownership has a gatekeeping function in that property law constructs not a wall but 
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rather a gate, which an owner may open or shut according to his or her 
preferences.179 This metaphor is a reminder that property creates power 
relationships among people.180 
Baron asserts that progressive property theorists attempt to ground the system 
of property on values rather than on transaction costs and externalities of 
information.181 Progressive property theorists state that “we must look to the 
underlying human values that property serves and the social relationships it shapes 
and reflects”.182 These theorists focus on the role that property and property law play 
in a free and democratic society, and often remark that property rights can be limited 
to further the interests of society or to enforce human values.183 This implies that 
property is often subject to limitations and obligations to secure these interests and 
values. Singer, Peñalver, Alexander, Underkuffler and Purdy propose a democratic 
model of property, which recognises that property serves plural values and that the 
law should reflect those multiple values.184 The argument that property serves 
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human values has been extended by several theorists in theoretical literature. For 
example, Alexander states that the pluralistic conception of human flourishing means 
that property serves multiple values that are incommensurable185 and that give a 
person the opportunity to live as fulfilling a life as possible.186 These values include 
personal autonomy, individual security, self-development or self-realisation, social 
welfare, community and sharing, fairness, friendship and love.187 Dagan also points 
out that property law reflects a commitment to not just one value but to multiple 
values.188 Furthermore, Singer rejects the idea that the right to exclude is the core of 
property or that property should be defined in terms of exclusion. Property is defined 
not by reference to a fixed conception but by reference to human values and these 
values underlying property rights are various and incommensurable.189 Property 
rights implicate values such as individual autonomy, liberty, personal security, 
fairness, economic efficiency, social welfare, social justice and human dignity190 and 
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accordingly, limitation of the right to exclude by law to advance public access rights 
to property or occupancy rights of tenants and farmworkers can be justified by 
underlying human values or moral principles - what Singer calls the reliance interest 
in property.191 
The view that property serves human values seeks to justify limiting the right to 
exclude and to strengthen arguments about the social-obligation norm.192 Since 
property serves human values and concerns social relations, landowners have 
obligations in addition to rights. Alexander has advanced arguments for the social-
obligation norm, in light of the commitment to human flourishing.193 An analysis of 
the social-obligation norm paves the way to look at further theoretical justifications 
that highlight the relative nature of the right to exclude and justifications for limiting 
the right to exclude such as virtue ethics;194 human flourishing;195 democratic 
governance;196 and public policy.197 
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Property scholars have argued that the social-obligation norm exists in US law. 
This norm entails that property owners have social responsibilities to others that 
extend beyond the highly individualized conventional account of property rights.198 
According to Alexander, the social-obligation norm strongly resonates in two 
categories.199 The first category consists of cases in which the landowner’s 
entitlements, including the right to exclude, are limited in exchange for monetary 
compensation, in other words cases in which ownership entitlements are protected 
by liability rules instead of property rules.200 In South African law, an example would 
be encroachment cases, where the remedy for removal that upholds the right to 
exclude is denied and compensation is awarded instead. Similarly, the courts will 
sometimes grant a right of way of necessity without the consent of the servient 
tenement but subject to compensation.201 The second category deals with cases in 
which the property owner continues to hold title to his property but loses the right to 
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use it in some way because of judicial order or legislative regulation.202 Both these 
categories highlight instances in which the right to exclude is limited, without 
explicitly citing something like the social-obligation as the justification for this 
limitation. 
Alexander claims that the social-obligation norm explains and justifies decisions 
concerning instances when the right to exclude is limited.203 The social-obligation 
norm is shaped by the desire to promote the capabilities204 that are essential to 
human flourishing, which refers to the idea that individuals should live lives worthy of 
human dignity.205 Imposing a set of obligations on landowners or limitations on 
property interests, such as non-consensual transfers and use restrictions, is a means 
for promoting human flourishing.206 The social-obligation norm entails that the 
landowner must provide the means for others (non-owners or other landowners) to 
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flourish if their property bears a sufficient nexus to ensure or to cater for the needs of 
others.207 
The idea of the social-obligation norm signifies that property rights should have 
their share of social responsibility.208 Mirow points out that the notion of the social-
obligation norm contrasts with the idea of absolute ownership and that it has been 
used to justify limitations on the use of property by its owner, such as in cases of 
expropriation and the redistribution of property through land reform programmes.209 
Mirow concludes that the social-obligation theory is important because property 
rights are defined and enshrined in constitutions and civil codes.210 An analysis of 
the social obligation theory of ownership assists in determining the justification for 
limiting the right to exclude; the nature of the concept of ownership;211 and the 
appropriate way to reconcile and balance the landowners’ with non-owners’ interests 
in land so as to promote human flourishing. 
Alexander and Peñalver discuss human capabilities that symbolise well-lived 
lives, namely life (including subsidiary goods such as health and security); freedom 
(including identity and self-knowledge); practical reason (involving the capacity of 
deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for oneself); and affiliation or 
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sociality (encompassing subsidiary goods such as social participation, self-respect 
and friendship).212 The point they make is that an individual cannot acquire these 
capabilities on his own; he is dependent on others to flourish.213 Some degree of 
state intervention in resource distribution is required so that non-owners can benefit 
from the property institution.214 It is possible to argue, as Alexander does,215 that the 
South African Constitution extends the idea of a social-obligation norm because of its 
inclusion of an explicit commitment to land reform (the property clause)216 and 
provisions that create a number of positive socio-economic rights.217 The land reform 
programmes indicate that private property rights are subject to the social needs of 
others.218 Furthermore, he argues that the socio-economic rights provisions show 
that the landowner’s interests coexist with the constitutional entitlements of non-
owners to basic needs such as housing.219 To this extent, for example, the Extension 
of Security of Tenure Act220 as well as provisions in the Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act221 and the Rental Housing Act,222 are 
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necessary interventions that support the state’s obligation to impose regulatory 
measures on the landowners’ use and control of their land to foster human 
flourishing. For purposes of this dissertation, one can say that non-owners require a 
degree of access to private, public or quasi-public property to enhance their 
capabilities.223 As a result, limiting the landowner’s right to exclude is justified 
because the landowner contributes to non-owners’ human flourishing or the 
fulfilment of their human capabilities. 
In South African law the rights to secure tenure and adequate housing foster a 
sense of belonging and also advance the rights to life and human dignity. The 
realisation of these constitutional rights will often place limitations on the right to 
exclude. In such circumstances, access rights that are backed by the Constitution 
cannot be seen as exceptional limitations on the right to exclude but as built-in 
elements of the property system. Regulatory measures that limit the right to exclude 
to ensure access to land for housing purposes are justified because, in view of the 
human flourishing idea, housing is needed for people to live in a healthy environment 
and enjoy their right to life. This reasoning is in line with the social-obligation norm or 
social function of property, which demands equality, fairness and justice when it 
comes to access to land. Therefore, the state has legitimate and justifiable grounds 
for granting access rights on privately owned land against the landowner’s will. 
                                                                                                                                       
222
 50 of 1999. 
223
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM “Properties of community” (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
127-160 138 state that freedom, practical reason and sociality can meaningfully exist only within a 
vital matrix of social structures and practices. 
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Alexander posits that property rights are inherently relational and as such 
owners owe obligations to others, both owners and non-owners.224 From this 
perspective, property rights, including the right to exclude, are deeply informed by 
the cultural, political and social norms of a given society. For non-owners to flourish 
they require access to property and this sometimes requires limiting the right to 
exclude of those who own property so as to ensure that human values of non-
owners are guaranteed as well. Excluding others (landowners and non-owners) 
means that the development of human flourishing is limited. Indeed, limiting the right 
to exclude by granting access to others who seek access to be on or to pass over 
private, public or quasi-public land should be viewed as a way of promoting human 
flourishing. In line with the human flourishing idea, access rights are so fundamental 
that exclusion of non-owners would have to be justified in instances where the 
development of human flourishing is dependent on access to land. 
Peñalver and Alexander are of the opinion that the social-obligation norm 
should guide landowners when making decisions that also accommodate non-
owners.225 Recently, Alexander has argued that ownership of governance property226 
                                            
224
 Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 745-820 747-748. For other writings on the relational aspect of property see also Peñalver 
EM “Property as entrance” (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1889-1972; Underkuffler LS The idea of 
property: Its meaning and power (2003); Singer JW Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 
95-139; Singer JW The edges of the field: Lessons on the obligations of ownership (2000); Singer JW 
& Beermann JM “The social origins of property” (1993) 6 The Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 217-248; Nedelsky J “Reconceiving rights as relationship” (1993) 1 Review of 
Constitutional Studies 1-26. 
225
 Peñalver EM “Land virtues” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 821-888; Alexander GS “The social-
obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-820. See also Katz L 
“The regulative function of property rights” (2011) 8 Econ Journal Watch 236-246 243. 
226
 Governance property refers to multiple-ownership property that does not have the right to exclude 
as its central characteristic or most important element. In this regard see Alexander GS “Governance 
property” (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1853-1887 1856, 1887. 
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contributes to the development of virtues that are necessary for human flourishing.227 
Peñalver defines virtues as “acquired, stable dispositions to engage in certain 
characteristic modes of behaviour that are conducive to human flourishing”.228 He 
identifies virtue ethics as a useful normative view for thinking about property and 
property law.229 Peñalver argues that the case of State of New Jersey v Shack230 
provides an example in which virtue-based obligations sometimes justifiably limit the 
landowner’s power to exclude.231 
Singer has focused on the landowner’s obligations that flow from reliance and 
social relations.232 His description of property as “the law of democracy”233 implies 
that property law shapes social life and both reflects and promotes fundamental 
values.234 Property is all about the social order in that it reflects and enables our 
conception of what it means to live in a free and democratic society that treats each 
person with equal concern and respect.235 In the same vein, Dagan argues that 
property in its broader sense embodies social values, reflects them and participates 
in their formation.236 Dagan accepts that the right to exclude others from property 
can be limited and that this is justified because property can be or is used to serve 
                                            
227
 Alexander GS “Governance property” (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1853-
1887 1876. 
228
 Peñalver EM “Land virtues” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 821-888 864. See also Alexander GS 
“Governance property” (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1853-1887 1876. 
229
 Peñalver EM “Land virtues” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 821-888. 
230
 State of New Jersey v Shack 58 NJ 297 (1971) 369. 
231
 Peñalver EM “Land virtues” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 821-888 883. 
232
 Singer JW “The reliance interest in property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751. 
233
 Singer JW “Property as the law of democracy” (2014) 63 Duke Law Journal 1287-1335. 
234
 1291. 
235
 Singer JW “Property as the law of democracy” (2014) 63 Duke Law Journal 1287-1335 1299. See 
also Singer JW “Democratic estates: Property law in a free and democratic society” (2009) 94 Cornell 
Law Review 1009-1062 1010, 1047. 
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commitments to personhood, desert, aggregate welfare, social responsibility and 
distributive justice.237 
Limiting the right to exclude by including non-owners as lessees, or farm 
workers, is also grounded in the social-obligation norm justificatory arguments. 
According to Singer, landowners have an obligation to allow non-owners access to 
their property if they have previously and voluntarily granted access or opened their 
property to others.238 In line with this view, in the case of a lease (landlord-tenant 
situation) or farm owner-farmworker relationship, limiting the right to exclude is 
justified if the landowner has voluntarily granted access in the form of granting use 
and occupancy rights to his property to a tenant or farmworker. Singer also refers to 
State of New Jersey v Shack,239 where the court held that a farm owner could not 
prevent migrant farmworkers living on his property from receiving visitors in the 
privacy of their dwellings or interfere with farmworkers’ opportunity to live with dignity 
and to enjoy associations customary among citizens.240 The farm owner cannot 
exclude visitors in such cases because when he granted access rights to the 
farmworkers to be on his private land for accommodation and working purposes, he 
effectively waived part of his right to exclude their visitors from his property. 
In State of New Jersey v Shack,241 the court recognised and upheld the 
fundamental importance of the right to life and human dignity of the migrant workers 
at the expense of the landowner’s right to exclude. The Supreme Court held that: 
                                            
237
 Dagan H “The public dimension of private property” (2013) 24 King’s Law Journal 260-288 274. 
238
 Singer JW “The reliance interest in property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 675. See 
also Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 39. 
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 State of New Jersey v Shack 58 NJ 297 (1971) 369. 
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“Property rights serve human values. They are recognised to that end and are 
limited by it. Title to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of 
persons the owner permits to come upon the premises. Their well-being must 
remain the paramount concern of a system of law. Indeed the needs of the 
occupants may be so imperative and their strength so weak, that the law will 
deny the occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential to their 
health, welfare, or dignity.”242 
Access rights in this case rested on the social needs of the farmworkers and their 
relative vulnerability, as well as on the landowner’s prior consent. Alexander is of the 
view that the limitation of the right to exclude in State of New Jersey v Shack is 
justified on the basis of the capabilities of life and affiliation, which depend on the 
landowner’s social obligation to contribute to the human flourishing of others.243 I 
agree with both Alexander and Singer on this point; looking at the facts of State of 
New Jersey v Shack, the landowner’s obligation to permit access does support the 
capabilities of life and health and advances other non-property constitutional rights. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the facts of Nhlabathi and 
Others v Fick.244 Although the case involved legislation,245 it shows how the right to 
exclude is limited where the landowner had voluntarily granted access to 
farmworkers for employment and accommodation purposes. In Nhlabathi and Others 
v Fick the right to exclude was limited by a statutory right to establish a grave, which 
gives effect to farm occupiers’ non-property constitutional rights, namely secure 
tenure as well as religious and cultural rights.246 
                                            
242
 State of New Jersey v Shack 58 NJ 297 (1971) 372. 
243
 Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
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In certain instances the social-obligation norm also applies to businesses that 
serve the public. US case law, such as Uston v Resorts International Hotel, 
Incorporation,247 extended the right of reasonable access to all places open to the 
public. As a result of the reasonable access rule, property owners who open their 
property to the public have an obligation not to exclude others. Moreover, their 
exclusionary rights are limited in public accommodations on the basis of race, colour, 
religion and national origin.248 
The social-obligation norm also applies in cases dealing with public access to 
beaches.249 The social-obligation norm in cases involving access to and use of 
privately-owned beaches entails that the landowner is to ensure reasonable access 
to the beach to the general public as a way of supporting the capabilities of life of 
others.250 To this extent, limiting the right to exclude for recreational purposes can be 
justified by the commitment to further non-owners’ ability to flourish. Alexander 
argues that recreation is a necessity that is an important aspect of the capabilities of 
life and affiliation. With regard to the capability of life, he suggests that health is the 
most vital aspect, in that if all persons are provided with reasonable access to basic 
modes of recreation and relaxation, this would contribute to the goal of living capable 
lives.251 With regard to the capability of affiliation or sociability, Alexander writes that 
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 445 A2d 370 (NJ 1982). 
248
 Civil Rights Act of 1964; Fair Housing Act of 1968. 
249
 Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 745-820 806. 
250
 Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 745-819 804-807 argues that owners of private beaches are obligated to grant access to non-
owners for recreational purposes. See also Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Association 471 A2d 
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“affiliation includes the ability to recognise and show concern for other human 
beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; and to be able to imagine the 
situation of another”.252 Affiliation encompasses friendship and social participation, 
which are important for social relationships.253 I agree with Alexander’s suggestion 
that recreation is an important aspect of health, which is a key dimension of the 
capability of life.254 If provision is made for everyone, both non-owners and 
landowners, to have reasonable access to beaches for recreation and relaxation, this 
would in turn contribute to the goal of living lives worth living. 
The public trust doctrine, which also supports access rights to beaches, could 
be said to encompass the social-obligation norm. The doctrine was adopted in 
California and New Jersey state law as the doctrinal basis for requiring public rights 
of access to private beaches.255 In Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Association 
the court reasoned that the public trust doctrine acknowledges that the ownership, 
dominion and sovereignty over land, which extends to the mean high water mark, is 
vested in the state in trust for the people.256 Consequently, the landowner’s right to 
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 Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 745-820 806, citing Nussbaum M “Human rights and human capabilities” (2007) 20 Harvard 
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exclude is limited for recreational purposes so as to meet the public needs 
(legitimate interests of non-owners) and to further the general welfare. 
The same argument, that recreation is an important aspect of human 
capabilities, can be used to justify limiting the right to exclude when non-owners use 
their statutory right to roam on privately owned land. Anderson states that the British 
government’s commitment to improving countryside access is grounded in values 
such as providing for transportation by foot, enhancing the enjoyment of nature, 
promoting mental and physical health, facilitating a historical and cultural connection 
and building a sense of community.257 Although not arguing from a social-obligation 
perspective, the values Anderson mentions contribute to the human capabilities of 
life, health and affiliation. Therefore, the limitation presented by the Countryside and 
Rights of Way Act258 is justified because its provisions place strong emphasis on 
promoting these human capabilities. Roaming rights under the CROW Act and the 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act259 also evoke a sense of community among non-owners 
who share access rights to land.260 Lovett argues that the provisions of the LRSA 
incorporate and seek to promote virtues of responsibility, humility as well as mutual 
regard, and that they also provide more potential for human flourishing.261 
Accordingly, landowners have an obligation to foster the abovementioned 
capabilities and this obligation requires landowners to allow non-owners to have 
                                            
257
 Anderson JL “Countryside access and environmental protection: An American view of Britain’s 
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access to their land.262 Court decisions that effectively enforce human capabilities 
result in limiting the right to exclude while the needs of others, both owners and non-
owners, are upheld against the landowner’s right to exclude. 
According Alexander, property law promotes human capabilities through 
shaping human relationships of reciprocity and community.263 The community is 
necessary to create and foster such social relationships, which enhance norms such 
as dignity, equality, respect, justice and freedom and not just individual interests.264 
In view of the community argument, limiting the right to exclude in the South African 
constitutional context when it clashes with non-property constitutional rights is 
justified because of the need to advance, protect and promote the rights to life, 
human dignity and equality. These rights are the most fundamental rights in the 
Constitution, so that allowing non-owners to have access to private, public or quasi-
public land ensures the exercise of these rights and other intricately linked rights in 
the Bill of Rights. 
The arguments advanced by the progressive property theorists provide 
valuable justifications or the basis for justificatory arguments for limiting a 
landowner’s right to exclude by granting non-owners access rights to his property. Of 
interest to this dissertation is that these theorists to a greater or lesser extent show 
that the enforcement of property rights, the right to exclude in particular, stops where 
                                            
262
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there is a need for both non-owners and other landowners to have access rights to 
be on or to pass over the landowner’s land. In this context, although access rights 
are limitations, they are not described as exceptions. This means that sometimes not 
the access rights but the exclusion of non-owners must be justified. 
 
2 3 The idea of absolute ownership and exclusivity: A doctrinal analysis 
2 3 1 The content of landownership in South African law: General background 
It is difficult to describe ownership in a simple definition.265 Any understanding of 
ownership is based on historical, philosophical, religious, economic, political and 
social considerations.266 In South African law, the definition of ownership most often 
referred to emanates from court decisions and academic literature, which highlight 
historical developments and various views regarding the notion of ownership. The 
current principles of ownership are based on Roman-Dutch law.267 
Ownership was never defined in Roman law but the institution of ownership 
existed. However, in early Roman law, there was no precise notion of ownership.268 
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 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 91. 
266
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 Diόsdi G Ownership in ancient and preclassical Roman law (1970) 51. Johnston D Roman law in 
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rd
 ed 2005) 
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The concept of dominium emerged later on while the terminology for ownership was 
still rather vague in early law.269 The ownership that Roman law recognised was 
called dominium in classical law.270 This referred to the relationship of a dominus to a 
res. Furthermore, it was a relationship, not a right or a bundle of rights.271 In Roman 
law, ownership was not regarded as an absolute or unrestricted right.272 In other 
words, dominium was never absolute in Roman law.273 Ownership was limited in 
various ways,274 including by public law in the interest of public health and safety. 
Secondly, an owner could voluntarily limit his right of ownership by giving actual use 
and enjoyment to others, for instance by usufruct.275 Thirdly, the power of an owner 
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Acta Juridica 39-52 39, 48 (with reference to footnote 7); Van der Walt AJ & Kleyn DG “Duplex 
dominium: The history and significance of the concept of divided ownership” in Visser DP (ed) Essays 
on the history of law (1989) 213-260 217 (with reference to footnote 28). 
274
 Thomas PhJ Introduction to Roman law (1986) 37. 
275
 Another example is that the owner could agree to lease his property to another and so divest 
himself of the possession (in the sense of physical control) and allow the lessee the use and 
enjoyment of the property. See Van Warmelo P An introduction to the principles of Roman civil law 
(1976) 78. 
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over his land was fettered by his neighbours’ rights to enjoy their property.276 These 
limitations on ownership show that it was by no means absolute. 
A similar picture regarding the absoluteness of ownership appears in Roman-
Dutch law. Roman-Dutch law was neither characterised by an absolute notion of 
ownership, nor was it the source of the view of absolute ownership as it might be 
discernible in South African law, because in most instances ownership was restricted 
by both private and public law.277 Roman-Dutch law in this regard developed on the 
basis of Bartolus’ definition of ownership as the right to perfectly dispose over a 
corporeal object, insofar as is not prohibited by law.278 Bartolus’ definition of 
ownership appears to create the idea of ownership as an absolute right, but in fact it 
does not.279 The fact that his definition ends with the words “… insofar as is not 
prohibited by law” means that ownership is enjoyed within the boundaries of what the 
law allows. Arguably, Bartolus’ definition is similar to the modern German definition 
of ownership, namely that “ownership is what the law allows”.280 Bartolus’ definition 
of ownership shows that ownership is not absolute but inherently limited. Bartolus’ 
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definition was adopted by Grotius, who views ownership as the power to make full 
use of the object for one’s own benefit and according to one’s own will, to the extent 
that such use is not prohibited by law.281 Grotius’ definition gives rise to the Roman-
Dutch idea that ownership grants the landowner the most comprehensive collection 
of entitlements, including the right to exclude.282 However, Grotius’ definition, just like 
Bartolus’ definition of ownership, does not describe ownership as an absolute right. 
The definitions of ownership proposed by Bartolus and Grotius have been influential 
in Roman-Dutch law and this is reflected in the definition of ownership generally 
upheld in South African law.283 
The idea that ownership is absolute is a product of nineteenth century 
pandectism. Windscheid describes ownership as the power, granted by law and 
backed up by judicial remedies, to enforce one’s will against others.284 In this 
context, a real right is a right that allows the beneficiary to enforce her will by 
determining the actions of everybody else with regard to the object of the right.285 
This definition emphasises the exclusive nature of real rights and distinguishes 
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ownership from limited real rights in a particular way. The difference is that 
ownership gives an owner the power to exclude others and to determine the use of 
the property, while the beneficiary of a limited real right has the power to exclude 
others only in regard to certain uses of the object.286 For example, a lease conveys 
the right to exclusive possession on the tenant; that is, the right in the tenant to 
exclude all comers from the property, including the landlord.287 Windscheid’s 
description of the subjective right presents ownership as largely characterised by the 
power to exclude, either absolutely or according to the nature of the right. Arguably, 
a sense of individual power and autonomy is thereby incorporated into the notion of 
exclusivity, in line with the metaphor “a man’s home is his castle”. In this regard, it 
appears that the right to exclude is an essential element of ownership and of all real 
rights, although it is relative to each kind of right. 
Windscheid’s definition indicates that the source of the notion of absolute 
ownership is nineteenth-century pandectism and not Roman-Dutch law.288 It is due 
to the pervasive influence of pandectist scholarship that the institution of ownership 
is generally described and understood as “absolute” in academic literature, where 
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pandectism had most influence.289 In the pandectist system of rights, ownership is 
the most complete real right, which allows the owner to enforce his will with regard to 
all aspects of the control and use of the property.290 
The South African civil-law291 concept of ownership has been adopted in the 
theory of subjective or private-law rights, where it reflects Windscheid’s definition of 
rights and specifically of ownership.292 The theory of subjective rights is accepted in 
private-law doctrine, especially during the pre-constitutional era, as a good reflection 
of the nature of private law rights.293 In this doctrinal context, ownership is perceived 
as a stronger and more valuable right than either limited real or personal property 
rights because it is the most extensive real right, and it is portrayed as absolutely 
enforceable. Furthermore, ownership is stronger and more valuable than limited real 
rights because it is the most complete and comprehensive real right from which all 
                                            
289
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other limited real rights are derived.294 This more or less pandectist notion of 
absoluteness only affected South African academic literature, but it had no visible 
effect on case law. Van der Merwe could be regarded as the first academic scholar 
to establish the foundation of the modern conception of ownership.295 His definition 
of ownership as the most complete and extensive private right that a person can 
have with regard to a corporeal thing is generally accepted in South African law.296 
Van der Merwe’s definition is also an indication of the acceptance of the notion of 
absolute ownership from the nineteenth century pandectists, such as Windscheid, 
that forms part of the South African common law tradition, at least in academic 
literature. 
In case law, the courts refer to the Roman-Dutch law definition, namely that 
ownership is the most complete right that allows any use of property insofar as the 
law does not prohibit it, which is still based on Bartolus’ definition. In Roman-Dutch 
law ownership is neither absolute (unlimited) nor exclusive. The definition used by 
the South African courts includes the qualification “what the law allows”. The case 
law indicates that ownership is considered absolute only in the sense that it is a 
more complete right than the limited real rights. This implies that ownership is not 
regarded as absolute in the sense that a landowner can do what he wants, because 
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the exercise of ownership rights depends on what the law allows. Accordingly, a 
landowner’s right to exclude is qualified in that he can exercise his right to the extent 
that it is not prohibited by law. The case law displays a more or less consistent 
adherence to this non-absolute approach.297 
In Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand Townships Registrar298 the court 
held that Savigny’s definition of ownership may be accepted as high authority. 
Savigny defines dominium (ownership) as the unrestricted and exclusive control that 
a person has over a thing.299 The court further explained that the owner, although he 
has full control of the immovable property, also has the power to part with so much of 
his control as he pleases.300 The owner may, if he chooses, let his property to 
another to use the land for a certain period of time against the payment of a certain 
rent. However, despite the pandectist language the court’s decision does not in fact 
reflect the absolute conception of ownership that would correspond with Savigny’s 
definition. The court referred to Roman-Dutch law, inter alia, stating that a lessee 
could not be ejected by a purchaser on the basis of the huur gaat voor koop rule that 
protects the lessee against eviction before the expiry of the lease.301 The huur gaat 
voor koop rule does not reflect the notion of absolute ownership that would resemble 
Savigny’s definition. This decision is an exception to the general observation 
regarding case law in the sense that courts very seldom refer to Savigny (who also 
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was not a pandectist), although in this respect his definition looks similar to the 
pandectists’ notion of ownership. The courts usually refer to the Roman-Dutch law 
notion of ownership. 
Savigny’s view of ownership contradicts Bartolus’ notion of ownership, and it is 
also impractical in modern-day conditions. Pienaar explains that ownership of 
immovable property is generally limited in four ways, namely by the limited real rights 
of others to the property; by the personal rights of others against the owner of the 
property regarding the use, control, alienation, vindication and encumbering of the 
property; by legislation and public-law limitations in respect of regulatory measures 
that are of general interest to the state and the general public; and by limitations on 
the exercise of entitlements by owners and occupiers in accordance with the social 
function of the law in the interest of the community.302 This suggests that Savigny’s 
definition of ownership cannot be accepted as a good reflection of South African law. 
In Chetty v Naidoo303 the court, instead of giving a full definition of ownership, 
focused on just one of the entitlements of ownership, namely the right of exclusive 
possession, which means that the owner has a right to vindicate his property from 
anyone who does not have a right of possession. This decision might appear as if it 
contradicts the general observation about case law because it focuses on exclusive 
possession. The fact is that Chetty v Naidoo deals with the rei vindicatio, and it is 
therefore natural to consider that one entitlement as the primary focus. The decision 
does not suggest that the right to exclude or to vindicate is absolute. 
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In Gien v Gien304 the court held that ownership is the most complete real right 
that a person may have in respect of a thing, within the confines of the law.305 This 
definition indicates that the scope and content of ownership are qualified or restricted 
by what the law allows, in line with Bartolus’ notion of ownership. 
Ownership is also defined in case law as the sum total of all real rights that a 
person can possibly have to and over corporeal property.306 However, the most 
widely accepted definition in South African case law is that ownership is the real right 
that potentially confers the most complete or comprehensive control over property, 
subject to what the law allows.307 Despite different views on the definition of 
ownership, it appears that the definition adopted in Gien v Gien308 remains the most 
influential in South African common law. This definition says nothing about 
absoluteness or even exclusivity; it merely highlights the difference between 
ownership and possession or the limited real rights. 
The views of the courts, as expressed in case law,309 regarding the definition of 
ownership emphasise the owner’s complete or comprehensive control over property 
insofar as the law does not prohibit. As a point of departure, ownership can be 
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regarded as absolute only to the extent that it is a complete real right, subject to 
limitations. 
 
2 3 2 The notion of absolute ownership 
Absoluteness is a characteristic310 mainly ascribed to landownership in South African 
law, probably under the influence of nineteenth century pandectism.311 This section 
considers the different meanings or aspects of absoluteness and how each aspect 
relates to the exclusivity of ownership. 
Firstly, ownership is said to be absolute in the sense that it is the most 
complete real right, which distinguishes it from limited real rights. As appeared from 
section 2 3 1 above, this is a typically Roman-Dutch view of ownership. Referring to 
ownership as a complete real right denotes its fullness in the sense that only 
ownership includes all the entitlements of ownership, whereas a holder of a limited 
real right or personal right only has a limited entitlement to use someone else’s 
property temporarily.312 This meaning of absoluteness is described by Cowen as 
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plena in re potestas.313 In principle, the notion of absoluteness in this sense refers to 
completeness in the sense that the owner holds all entitlements that have not been 
suspended or transferred to someone else. There is nothing in this definition that 
contradicts or undermines the fact that the law may restrict the exercise of ownership 
in the interests of neighbouring owners and the general public.314 
Furthermore, the notion of ownership as the most complete right indicates that 
the owner has all entitlements unless he limits it himself by transferring certain 
entitlements to a non-owner. The owner can transfer some of his entitlements freely 
without his ownership of property being terminated. For example, upon transfer of a 
limited use right a servient owner loses some aspect of the right to exclude but this 
does not mean that the dominant owner acquires the right to exclude because both 
owners can use the servitude area (for example the road).315 At this point, neither the 
servient owner nor the dominant owner has an absolute right to exclude. This is 
already an indication that the right to exclude is an entitlement and not a 
characteristic of ownership, in that it shows what the servient or dominant owner can 
do with the property. This aspect of absoluteness does not necessarily imply a 
strong version of exclusivity, since the existence of the servitude limits the powers of 
the servient owner to exercise his right to exclude. Ownership is not absolute 
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because the owner has the most extensive collection of entitlements. Rather, 
ownership is absolute only to the extent that it is the most complete real right, to 
distinguish it from limited real rights. Accordingly, exclusion is not in any way 
absolute because, as an entitlement of ownership, it does not distinguish ownership 
from limited real rights since the right to exclude others could either be suspended or 
transferred to the holders of limited real rights or personal rights, while other 
entitlements may well be more important than exclusion in a given case. 
Secondly, ownership is sometimes said to be absolute in the sense that the 
property is held by an individual owner to the exclusion of others.316 This is also 
referred to as the characteristic of individuality. The individuality of ownership means 
that there is only one kind of ownership and that ownership is not fragmented.317 
This suggests that, apart from co-ownership (undivided ownership that is jointly held 
by co-owners), only one person can own property and the owner’s right is 
enforceable against the whole world.318 Van der Walt claims that this individualistic 
character of ownership underlies the strong protection afforded to an owner, in terms 
of which the owner can vindicate his property from anyone who is in possession of it 
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without being able to prove a valid legal cause for his possession.319 The individuality 
of ownership sets out the position of the owner regarding his property against other 
legal subjects and also indicates the exclusive nature of the right that an owner 
holds. This aspect presents a different meaning of absoluteness from the previous 
one and it places more emphasis on exclusivity, but it does not necessarily imply a 
strong version of exclusivity. This aspect simply shows that only one person can hold 
the right to exclude all others from the use and exploitation of property at a given 
time, but it does not describe the extent to which the right to exclude can be 
exercised by the landowner. It therefore does not imply that exclusivity is absolute or 
even strong. 
Thirdly, ownership is said to be absolute in that it is perceived as an abstract 
right to indicate that ownership is always more than the sum total of its constituent 
entitlements and that it is not exhausted or eroded by the temporary granting of 
limited real rights or by the temporary imposition of restrictions.320 This means that 
ownership is a totality of rights, contrary to the bundle of rights approach. By 
implication, when limitations are imposed on the owner, they are only temporary. 
Ownership resumes its fundamental completeness as soon as the limitations fall 
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away.321 In the same sense, ownership is also perceived as an indivisible322 and 
therefore a non-fragmented right. 
This perception of absoluteness of ownership as an abstract right relates to the 
“elasticity of ownership”.323 Some authors also refer to the elasticity of ownership as 
its residuary character.324 Importantly, the elasticity of ownership embraces the idea 
that when rights in property that are held by persons other than the owner are 
terminated, for instance when a servitude terminates, those rights automatically 
revert back to the owner.325 Cowen uses an analogy or image of a “rubber ball” to 
explain the idea of the elasticity of ownership: 
“Ownership is like a rubber ball in that no matter how much it might be 
compressed, it automatically expands again and recovers or attracts back the 
various subtractions, or iura in re aliena, once these come to an end.”326 
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In other words, regardless of limitations imposed on property, the owner will retain 
the residual right. In South African law, some authors claim that the elasticity of 
ownership renders it absolute and thus distinguishes it from all other rights that the 
owner may have in property.327 Contrary to this claim, Honoré depicts elasticity as a 
mere incident of ownership, which forms part of his list of standard incidents of 
ownership.328 The notions of abstractness, elasticity or residual and indivisible 
character of ownership appear to have the same effect, that is, as soon as a 
limitation falls away ownership resumes its natural completeness. Van der Walt329 
observes that Van der Merwe330 ascribes the characteristics of elasticity and 
abstractness to the definition of ownership in that, even if it is limited, it remains 
absolute in principle and renders all limitations exceptional. 
The abstractness of ownership is an aspect of absoluteness that has some 
implications for exclusivity. If ownership (property rights) is seen as something that is 
necessarily more than the sum total of all its constituent entitlements, ownership is 
not looked at in view of the context in which it appears or is exercised. Ownership, as 
a right, is determined abstractly and statically. Since context does not play a role, the 
exclusivity of ownership, like all the entitlements, is exercised and protected 
regardless of context, with the result that the right to exclude assumes the abstract 
and context-free character sometimes associated with its supposed absoluteness. 
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Fourthly, ownership is said to be absolute in the sense that it is unlimited in 
principle, allowing the owner to do with his property as he likes, even though it might 
be subject to temporary restrictions.331 Van der Walt argues that this perception of 
ownership, which has dominated South African legal doctrine, is often equated with 
private individual ownership of property in a free market environment.332 Private 
landownership in a free market endows the owner with entitlements that are 
unrestricted in principle, but may allow for the existence of restrictions.333 This 
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indicates that an owner is free to do what he pleases with his property, unless his 
right is restricted by legislation or by consent.334 
It is not contentious to say that ownership confers on a landowner the right to 
do with his property as he pleases, within the confines of the law. Limitations (and in 
this case, access rights of others imposed or protected by law) are seen as 
temporary restrictions on a right that is in principle exclusive.335 As a point of 
departure, the presumption is always in favour of exclusion and one has to prove 
that it is limited. Underkuffler and Singer refer to this aspect as the “presumptive 
power of ownership”.336 However, this statement can have two very different 
meanings. 
The starting point of the South African law of ownership is that ownership is the 
most complete right, which is presumed to be free from limitations imposed by law or 
by the owner’s consent. The presumptive power requires limitations on ownership to 
be proven, but as soon as one proves the existence of a limitation on ownership, the 
right exists and is protected only within the confines of that limitation. 
By contrast, the strong versions of exclusion theory hold that property or 
ownership can be limited only in exceptional cases, which means that every 
limitation must not only be proved but justified on normative grounds. In this view, 
ownership should be allowed to operate freely and with the minimum of state 
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interference.337 Limitations should be imposed only when they are strictly justified, 
and only on a temporary basis, which leaves ownership unrestricted in principle. This 
aspect of absoluteness of ownership implies exclusivity in that the landowner has 
absolute discretion to exclude anyone from his property, unless a specific limitation 
on that right was either granted by the owner or is justified by overriding normative 
considerations. In the absence of such justification, limitations imposed by the law 
can in principle be attacked on the basis of invalidity. This is perhaps the one 
understanding of absoluteness that really implies exclusivity, and where the 
hierarchical supremacy of ownership as an absolute right grants the landowner an 
absolute right to exclude anybody who cannot prove a valid and enforceable access 
or occupation right.338 
However, this is not the understanding of absoluteness that appears from 
South African law. The common law rei vindicatio is the principal remedy by which 
ownership is protected.339 The rei vindicatio entitles a landowner to recover property 
from any person who has possession of it. To succeed, the owner is required to 
prove that he is the owner of the property; that the property is in the possession of 
the defendant; and that the property is still in existence and clearly identifiable.340 If a 
                                            
337
 Van der Walt AJ “The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” 
(1992) 25 De Jure 446-457 447; Van der Walt AJ “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in 
Bernhard Windscheid’s theory of ownership” (1993) 56 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 569-589. See also Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 169-170. 
338
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 34. 
339
 Van der Walt AJ “Ownership and eviction: Constitutional rights in private law” (2005) 9 Edinburg 
Law Review 32-64 42. 
340
 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A); Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 243-244; Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: 
Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 343; Van der Walt AJ “Housing rights in the 
intersection between expropriation and eviction law” in Fox O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA (eds) The 
idea of home in law: Displacement and dispossession (2011) 55-100 55 (with reference to footnote 3). 
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landowner can fulfil these requirements he would normally be entitled to an eviction 
order. The moment the landowner fulfils the requirements, he acquires the right to 
recover his property. The only common law defence available to the defendant is to 
allege and prove a valid right of occupation, for example the existence of some right 
to possess arising from a lease agreement or from law.341 An unlawful occupier, who 
has no valid right of occupation, cannot prove such a defence and the landowner’s 
property rights takes precedence. The remedy is also used in holding over cases, 
where the legal basis for the occupation had lapsed or where a lease agreement had 
been cancelled and an occupier refuses to leave,342 in other words where occupation 
was once lawful but became unlawful. 
In this context, the common law rei vindicatio plays a major role in 
characterising the power of ownership.343 The case of Chetty v Naidoo344 is a classic 
example. The court held that the owner was entitled to exclusive possession of 
property,345 an entitlement which arises from ownership or is inherent in ownership. 
In the common-law tradition, an eviction application by a private landowner using the 
                                            
341
 Van der Merwe CG “Ownership” in Joubert WA & Faris JA (eds) The law of South Africa volume 
27 (1
st
 Reissue 2002) 217-355 para 382; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 245; Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: Adjudication 
under a transformative constitution (2010) 343. 
342
 For an example, see Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) concerning two 
cases of holding over. In Ndlovu v Ngcobo, an eviction application arose after the lease had been 
terminated and the tenant refused to vacate the property, and in Bekker v Jika an eviction was sought 
on the basis that the respondents had refused to vacate land after a sale in execution. See also Van 
der Walt AJ “Ownership and eviction: Constitutional rights in private law” (2005) 9 Edinburg Law 
Review 32-64 40-45; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 248 (with reference to footnote 67), 249. 
343
 Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 343 
argues that the power of property rights in the case of the pre-constitutional common law is reflected 
in the rei vindicatio remedy. 
344
 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A). 
345
 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. 
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rei vindicatio tends to focus on the landowner’s right to exclusive possession. The 
remedy shows the centrality, strength and essentiality of the right to exclude. The 
landowner is in a position to exercise his right to exclude non-owners from 
possessing a part or all of his property. Ownership in this light can be regarded as 
absolute and exclusive.346 
The common law rei vindicatio might appear to reflect the strong-absolute view 
of ownership and exclusion in that in an eviction case, the owner must simply prove 
that he is the owner of property held by the defendant. In fact, however, the rei 
vindicatio only forms the starting point of a process guided by the power of 
presumption. The protection afforded by the rei vindicatio is based on the 
assumption that the owner is entitled to exclusive possession of his property in the 
absence of a valid defence.347 In the event that the defendant proves a valid right of 
occupation that is enforceable against the owner, the landowner is not entitled to 
possession. More specifically, the landowner is sometimes prevented from evicting 
or excluding the defendant from his land on the basis of a valid defence deriving 
from either the landowner’s consent or legislation, mere proof of which will establish 
a conclusive block against recovery of possession. In this sense, the requirements 
for the rei vindicatio do not include a normative justification for the existence of the 
limitation; the mere existence of the valid defence prevents the landowner from 
exercising his exclusionary powers. Accordingly, limitations on the right to exclude 
are possible and normal within the evidentiary structure of the presumption that 
ownership is unlimited. 
                                            
346
 Kroeze IJ Between conceptualism and constitutionalism: Private-law and constitutional 
perspectives on property (1997) unpublished LLD dissertation University of South Africa 128, 132. 
347
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 58. 
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2 4 Conclusion 
Ownership is often regarded as absolute in several senses, the most significant 
being that ownership is unrestricted in principle. Consequently, the right to exclude 
would also be absolute. The aim of this chapter was to review the theoretical and 
doctrinal justifications for such an absolutist view of the right to exclude. The chapter 
highlights a number of theoretical considerations that point away from such a strong 
view of the landowner’s right to exclude. Firstly, the case for building an exclusivist 
theory on the basis of moral property theory seems to be weak. Secondly, even 
though modern exclusion theorists view ownership and exclusion as absolute in the 
strong sense, they accept the necessity for limitations. The general approach among 
the exclusion theorists seems to be to start with upholding the right to exclude. If 
limitations are inevitable, they are regarded as exceptional, which means they have 
to be both proven and justified, and sometimes compensation has to be paid for 
them as well. Thirdly, the exclusive use and progressive property theorists view 
limitations on exclusion not as exceptions but as inherent elements of the property 
system. Ownership and the right to exclude are in fact limited by law, just as they are 
sometimes limited by the landowner himself when he grants rights to non-owners. 
South African case law suggests that ownership and the right to exclude are 
exercised and protected insofar as the law permits. The starting point is Bartolus’ 
definition of ownership as the most complete right to dispose over a thing, insofar as 
the law does not prohibit. This means that limitations exist as a matter of course. The 
law imposes limitations on ownership, including the right to exclude, and in that case 
the owner’s right extend only as far as the law permits. This was also the general 
tenor of Roman-Dutch law and it is the position adopted in case law. Insofar as 
ownership is described as absolute, it means that ownership is the most 
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comprehensive real right or that it is presumed to be free of limitations, not that it is 
normatively unlimited. The normative decision to impose a limitation on ownership is 
therefore one to be considered by the owner himself when granting rights to others, 
or by the legislature when adopting regulatory laws, but it is not a ground on which 
the existence of limitations could be attacked in court. 
The focus of the limitation and justification debate should therefore move to 
legislation and common law that regulates the exercise of ownership. Justification 
does not require normative grounds for every limitation, because ownership is not a 
pre-social, pre-legal or pre-constitutional right. There are various factors that justify 
limiting ownership and the landowner’s right to exclude others, including social, 
economic and political factors. These factors present normative grounds for the 
limitations that are imposed on the right to exclude. Cowen argues that ownership 
carries a social responsibility or social obligation and should comply with the social 
needs of the day.348 Lewis takes Cowen’s argument further, indicating that the South 
African law of land ownership has already been transformed by social, economic, 
and political forces and that it can no longer be consistent with the traditional 
Grotian-pandectist concept of ownership as an absolute right.349 The progressive 
property theorists consider the social context that indicates why property should in 
                                            
348
 Cowen DV New patterns of landownership: The transformation of the concept of ownership as 
plena in re potestas (1984) 70-73. 
349
 Lewis C “The modern concept of ownership of land” 1985 Acta Juridica 241-266 260. See also 
Cowen DV New patterns of landownership: The transformation of the concept of ownership as plena 
in re potestas (1984); Van der Walt AJ “The fragmentation of land rights” (1992) 8 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 431-450. Van der Walt AJ “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and 
eviction orders: A critical evaluation of recent case law” (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 372-420; Van der Walt AJ “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure, and eviction orders: A 
model to evaluate South African land reform legislation” 2002 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
254-289 provides an analysis of the nature of ownership in South African law with regard to case law 
and legislation that have led to the erosion of the traditional concept of ownership. 
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fact be subject to limitations. These theorists accept that property rights are subject 
to regulatory state interference and limitation to promote the fulfilment of certain 
important human values.350 From a theoretical point of view, the limitation of the right 
to exclude is justified by the need to fulfil both owners’ and non-owners’ 
constitutional and socio-economic obligations and rights. The role of the Constitution 
in explicating normative grounds for limitations on ownership is therefore of central 
significance. 
The notion of property as an absolute right to exclude is problematic because it 
does not take into account the social context. Progressive property theory and the 
doctrinal analysis of ownership in South African law indicate that the right to exclude 
is in fact subject to a wide range of limitations, which makes it difficult to conceive the 
right as absolute and the limitations as exceptional. The limitations are inherent in 
the property system. In reality, the right to exclude as an entitlement of ownership is 
limited by law. It is therefore necessary to consider the circumstances and the ways 
in which the landowner’s right to exclude is limited. 
 
                                            
350
 See section 2 2 4 above. 
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Chapter three:  
Access rights that limit the right to exclude 
 
3 1 Introduction 
The right to exclude is limited extensively, both at common law and by statutory 
control measures or constitutional provisions, allowing non-owners to have access to 
land for various purposes. At common law, at least in principle, the right to exclude is 
strongly protected to the extent that any limitation on the right to exclude has to be 
proved. However, the idea that these limitations are exceptional is just a general 
perception, not really an accurate description of the position in law.1 Both at common 
law and in the constitutional setting, limitations on the right to exclude are inherent to 
the property system.2 According to Van der Walt, property is a limited, circumscribed 
right that is recognised and protected within a property system that is inherently and 
inevitably a regulated system.3 Many limitations on the right to exclude are inherent 
to the property system, they are granted by law, against the landowner’s will and 
without his consent. 
Property as an institution is circumscribed by limitations aimed at easing the 
tension between the right to exclude and the rules, rights and values favouring non-
owners’ access rights to land. Several courts that had to assess the presumptive 
                                            
1
 Wilkinson JH “The dual lives of rights: The rhetoric and practice of rights in America” (2010) 98 
California Law Review 277-326 290 notes that Blackstone knew that claims of absolutism were 
overstatements. Furthermore, he notes that Blackstone spent five hundred pages describing various 
situations in which property rights properly yield to community interests. Other scholars also 
acknowledge that the owner’s right to exclude is not absolute. See Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An 
introduction to property theory (2012) 143. 
2
 See the discussion in Chapter 2 above. 
3
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 29. 
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power to exclude have realised the importance of enforcing access rights to land for 
the benefit of the public.4 According to Gray and Gray, the (English) common law 
tradition has generally accepted that the estate owner enjoys an absolute right to 
determine precisely who may enter or remain on his land.5 However, there is support 
for the view that arbitrary powers of exclusion are qualified by the fundamental 
principles of human freedom and dignity.6 Many common law jurisdictions have seen 
a move away from an arbitrary exclusion rule towards a reasonable access rule in 
terms of which non-owners can be excluded only on grounds that are objectively 
reasonable.7 For instance, in Uston v Resorts International Hotel Incorporation,8 the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey confirmed the doctrine of reasonable access and 
ruled that an owner of quasi-public premises is no longer entitled to the common law 
right to unreasonably exclude others. 
An increasing recognition of access rights to land (private, public or quasi-
public) has become a notable development in property law. Courts are moving away 
                                            
4
 For example see the decisions of State of New Jersey v Shack 58 NJ 297 (1971) 305; Marsh v 
Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 506; Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v Canada [1991] 1 
SCR 139 (SC); Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western 
Cape and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). 
5
 Gray K & Gray SF “The idea of property in land” in Bright S & Dewar J (eds) Land law: Themes and 
perspectives (1998) 15-51 37. See also Semayne’s Case 77 ER 194 (1604), which established the 
principle that a homeowner has a right to defend his premises against intrusion. This case introduced 
the metaphor “every man’s house is his castle”. 
6
 Gray K & Gray SF “The idea of property in land” in Bright S & Dewar J (eds) Land law: Themes and 
perspectives (1998) 15-51 38. See also Gray K “Equitable property” (1994) 47 Current Legal 
Problems 157-214 172-181. 
7
 Gray K & Gray SF “The idea of property in land” in Bright S & Dewar J (eds) Land law: Themes and 
perspectives (1998) 15-51 38; Gray K & Gray SF “Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public space” 
(1999) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 46-102 55-57. The doctrine of reasonable access is 
applied in countries such as United States of America, United Kingdom, and Scotland. 
8
 445 A2d 370 (NJ 1982) 373. See also Gray K “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law 
Journal 252-307 291. 
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from the traditional default position by allowing access rights against the landowner’s 
right to exclude.9 However, an expansion of access rights over privately owned land 
could give rise to major challenges, particularly given that a private landowner is 
presumed to have the right to exclude others from his land.10 
Lovett states that it is practically possible for a modern, democratic nation 
committed to the rule of law, the protection of private property and an open market, if 
it wants, to create a property regime that largely replaces the ex ante presumption in 
favour of the right to exclude with an equally robust, but rebuttable, ex ante 
presumption in favour of access.11 American property law places a high value on the 
right to exclude as a core principle of private ownership, whereas Scots law has a 
completely different approach.12 The LRSA shows that the landowner’s right to 
exclude is in fact subject to limitations in the form of a statutory right to roam. 
Lovett’s recognition of the possibility of providing stronger and general access rights 
to non-owners provides a useful framework for the arguments developed in this 
chapter. 
Taking into consideration growing awareness of access rights to property, a 
pertinent question is to establish where access rights originate. What is the range of 
                                            
9
 For example see Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v Canada [1991] 1 SCR 139 (SC); 
New Jersey Coalition Against the War in the Middle East v J.M.B Realty Corp 650 A.2d 761 (NJ 
1994); Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape 
and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). 
10
 A greater part of this study focuses mainly on access rights to be on or to move over privately 
owned land. However, it is also important to consider, albeit not extensively, access to public or quasi-
public land. 
11
 Lovett JA “Progressive property in action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 
Nebraska Law Review 739-818. 
12
 The approach stems from the enactment of general public recreational access rights encompassed 
in the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (LRSA). See Lovett JA “Progressive property in action: The 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 Nebraska Law Review 739-818 740-741. 
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limitations that are imposed on the right to exclude in form of access rights? How 
and to what extent do access rights limit the landowner’s right to exclude? In this 
chapter, I describe different access rights that limit the right to exclude, taking into 
account where, when and for what activities these access rights can be exercised. 
The purpose of the chapter is to identify sources of law that grant non-owners 
access rights to privately owned land (and also to public or quasi-public land), to 
identify the content and purpose of those access rights, and to ascertain the impact 
that those access rights may have on the landowner’s right to exclude. 
Property is not only concerned with the right to exclude but also with other 
rights to have access to property belonging to another person - the right to be 
included.13 Access to property can take place either with or without the landowner’s 
permission or consent.14 When non-owners gain access to property with the consent 
of the owner, the landowner is exercising his right to determine the access of others 
to his property. To be more precise, access without the owner’s consent concerns a 
non-owner’s right to be included and access with his consent concerns the 
landowner’s right to allow non-owners to have access to his land.15 For the purposes 
of this chapter, access rights are either granted by law (non-consensual) or are 
consensual. 
Non-owners’ access rights result from competing claims to use, possess or 
enjoy property. There are a number of circumstances in which a non-owner can have 
access to property owned by another. I explain these circumstances with reference 
                                            
13
 Ellickson RC “Two cheers for the bundle of sticks metaphor, three cheers for Merrill and Smith” 
(2011) 8 Econ Journal Watch 215-222 218-220; Dagan H Property: Values and institutions (2011) 38. 
14
 Kelly DB “The right to include” (2014) 63 Emory Law Journal 857-924 866. 
15
 866. 
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to the origin of access rights and the nature and use of the property involved.16 
Firstly, access rights to be on or to pass over any kind of land, whether it is private, 
public or quasi-public, can flow directly from non-property constitutional rights such 
as life, dignity and equality. In this context, I consider situations where conflicting 
claims to the use of property involve access to privately owned land with restricted 
access to specific people, such as farm workers, who already have access to it for 
specific purposes but want to exercise their non-property constitutional rights. Some 
of the cases in this category also involve access claims to quasi-public land such as 
public accommodations for purposes of exercising the rights in question. 
Secondly, access rights can be derived from statutory provisions giving effect to 
constitutional rights such as secure tenure, housing, labour rights (strikes and 
pickets), freedom of movement and freedom of speech; or from legislation that 
provides statutory access rights but is not directly aimed at giving effect to a 
constitutional right. As appears from the discussion of the case law in section 3 3 
below, the conflict in this category mostly deals with the clash between the 
landowners’ right to exclude and access rights to quasi-public places like shopping 
malls and privately-owned places where non-owners cannot freely have access. The 
conflict usually involves a landowner who wants to exclude or evict non-owners who 
want to use his land for purposes that move outside of his permission to enter, such 
as to exercise the right to freedom of movement, freedom of speech, demonstrate 
and picket or exercise religious and cultural rights. The ability to exercise these 
                                            
16
 For purposes of the distinction between different sources of limitations I rely on the distinction set 
out in Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, 
Property and Society 15-106. Since my aim is to structure my overview of the large volume of the 
limitations that involve access (Chapter 3) in a way that will allow me to assess the differences 
between categories of justification (Chapter 4), it is not necessary at this point to reconsider this 
distinction critically. 
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freedoms and rights depends on whether non-owners have access to various places 
where these rights can be exercised. 
Thirdly, access rights can stem from common law principles that limit the right 
to exclude, on a non-consensual basis. In this category I consider conflicts arising 
from non-consensual servitudes (the right of way of necessity) and encroachments, 
where common law principles limit the right to exclude. These conflicts mostly 
involve private land. 
The right to exclude applies and can be discussed in different contexts and the 
basis and extent of the exclusionary rule depends on the nature of the property 
involved. The extent of access rights differs depending on whether the property is 
privately owned land not open to the public (private home) or whether it is privately 
owned land not open to the public but with restricted access; privately owned land 
open to the public for commercial or other specified purposes (quasi-public 
premises, such as shopping malls); and whether it is publicly owned land open to the 
public, either generally or with restricted access (public premises, such as 
pavements, public parks or government airports).17 
Generally, the owner of a private home has a legal right to exclude others from 
his property. In a private home, the scope for non-owners acquiring or exercising 
access rights is limited, and the exclusionary power is mostly unchallengeable.18 The 
                                            
17
 Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 27. 
18
 In Golden Gateway Center v Golden Gateway Tenants Association 26 Cal 4
th
 1013 (2001) 1022, 
the court pointed out that the free speech clause in the California Constitution did not protect the right 
of a tenants association to distribute its newsletter in a privately owned apartment complex against 
the objections of the landlord. The court reasoned that the exclusionary character of a private 
apartment complex made it significantly different from places that voluntarily open their doors to the 
public. See also Golinger J “Shopping in the marketplace of ideas: Why Fashion Valley Mall means 
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private homeowner is in a position to determine who may have access to his 
property because it is not open to the public.19 Because of the need for individual 
privacy, it seems reasonable to protect the right to exclude others when a private 
home is concerned.20 Protecting the right to exclude in a private home is easier to 
justify because a relatively high degree of privacy is closely related to and important 
for human flourishing, which is associated with personal development.21 The privacy 
of a landowner can also be used as a strong claim to justify exclusivity in the context 
of the family home.22 In line with the conception of ownership in South African law, a 
private homeowner is presumed to have the right to exclude others. Even so, the 
right to exclude in a private home is subject to limitations, although it is strong.23 
However, the point is that a private homeowner’s exclusionary right is relatively 
stronger than the exclusionary right in public or quasi-public places, since there are 
fewer justified reasons to regulate access to a private home. 
The right to exclude becomes weaker in the case of privately owned land that is 
open to the public, either generally or in a more restricted sense. In this instance, the 
                                                                                                                                       
Target and Trader Joe’s are the new town squares” (2009) 39 Golden Gate University Law Review 
261-289 269-270. 
19
 Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 27; Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction 
to property theory (2012) 130-131. 
20
 Van der Walt AJ “Un-doing things with words: The colonisation of the public sphere by private-
property discourse” 1998 Acta Juridica 235-281 246-247. 
21
 Van der Walt AJ “Marginal notes on powerful(l) legends: Critical perspectives on property theory” 
(1995) 58 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 396-420 411; Radin MJ “Property 
and personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1016. 
22
 Van der Walt AJ “Un-doing things with words: The colonisation of the public sphere by private-
property discourse” 1998 Acta Juridica 235-281 244. 
23
 Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 27 argues that although the right to exclude in a 
private home is stronger, it is nevertheless subject to limitations. Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An 
introduction to property theory (2012) 131 argues that a private homeowner does not have an 
absolute right to exclude others from entering or having access to his property. 
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right to exclude is challengeable – the private property owner loses the higher 
degree of exclusionary power normally associated with purely private property, such 
as a home.24 For example, the right to exclude others from businesses that are open 
to the public (quasi-public) is not as broad as in a private home, even though the 
property is also privately owned.25 The landowner’s right to exclude is already 
qualified because the landowner voluntarily opened his property to the public to use 
for designated purposes, and this imposes a duty on him to give access to and serve 
the public.26 In some instances, the relativity of the right to exclude from premises 
that are open to the public may be underscored by laws that prohibit discrimination. 
Exclusion of non-owners from some public (state-owned) property premises is 
generally restricted, as the public is usually permitted to enter public premises for its 
public benefit. However, not all state-owned or public property is available for public 
use and access. American courts draw a distinction between two kinds of state-
owned property, namely public forums (state-owned property that has been open to 
the public by tradition or designation, such as parks and streets or sidewalks) and 
non-public forums (state-owned property to which the general public does not 
ordinarily have access).27 A third kind of state-owned property is property that is 
open to the public but with restricted access for certain limited purposes. Depending 
                                            
24
 Opperwall SG “Shopping for a public forum: Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins, publicly used 
private property and constitutionally protected speech” (1981) 21 Santa Clara Law Review 801-844 
812; Gray K & Gray SF “Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public space” (1999) 4 European Human 
Rights Law Review 46-102 90. 
25
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 131. 
26
 As reflected in the sections below, the right to exclude in cases of businesses open to the public is 
limited by non-property constitutional rights or regulatory laws. 
27
 Moon R The constitutional protection of freedom of expression (2000) 148. 
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on the kind of property, the state may impose reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions on access rights, if these regulations serve an important state interest.28 
Although ownership embraces the right to exclude non-owners from property, 
the significance and force of the right depends on the type of land involved. It is 
therefore significant to distinguish between different categories of land. Furthermore, 
exclusion of non-owners from land is often based on the behaviour of non-owners29 
and on the nature, use and function of the land.30 
In this chapter I adopt a constitutional perspective and consider the limitations 
on the right to exclude with reference to their origins. The conclusion in Chapter 2 
shows that the normative question whether to limit ownership is taken before the 
dispute arises. This implies that a normative question is not taken in all access 
disputes because the question has already been considered by the legislature. It is 
therefore important in this chapter to consider access rights that limit the right to 
exclude according to their origins to determine the nature of a specific limitation. The 
                                            
28
 The public has a right to enter public forums for expressive activities such as exercising the right to 
freedom of speech and general restrictions, such as an absolute prohibition of a particular type of 
expression, will be upheld only if they are narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling governmental 
interest and leave open alternative channels of communication. See Moon R The constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression (2000) 148; United States v Grace 461 US 171 (1983) 176-178. 
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v Lee 505 US 672 (1992), the US Supreme Court 
held that an airport terminal operated by a public authority is a non-public forum that could be closed 
to all except those who have legitimate business there. 
29
 Pfeffer RE “Losing control: Regulating situational crime prevention in mass private space” (2006) 59 
Oklahoma Law Review 759-808 769-770. See also Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and 
Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus 
Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). 
30
 Gray K & Gray SF “Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public space” (1999) 4 European Human 
Rights Law Review 46-102 90 state that there may in fact be a spectrum of differing intensities of 
exclusory power extending from the purely private zone through a group of quasi-public premises 
towards a category of genuinely public property. 
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origin can therefore have a bearing on how strong the normative reason for the 
limitation is, and also on how strong the limitation itself is compared to the right to 
exclude. In this chapter I discuss different categories of limitations such as limitations 
deriving directly from non-property constitutional rights; limitations imposed by 
legislation (giving effect to a non-property constitutional right, and not directly giving 
effect to a non-property constitutional right); and limitations imposed by common law. 
This chapter considers limitations on the right to exclude primarily in the South 
African context, with some references to comparable examples from other legal 
systems. United States (US) public accommodations laws that, regulate non-owners’ 
access rights to privately owned land, together with rights and freedoms protected 
under the United States Constitution, represent a significant limit on the right to 
exclude. Problems concerning access rights that impose limitations on the 
landowner’s right to exclude are also found in English, Scots, and Canadian law. In 
this chapter, I consider examples from these legal systems with the aim of identifying 
additional examples of access rights to land. The chapter does not attempt to cover 
any foreign jurisdiction in full or discuss all the case law concerning instances in 
which access rights limit the right to exclude, but only considers a selection of 
important and relevant cases.31 
 
3 2 Limitations deriving directly from non-property constitutional rights 
Excluding non-owners from private or quasi-public property can sometimes limit their 
potential to exercise their constitutionally protected non-property rights. If a 
landowner voluntarily opens his property to the public for some benefit to himself, he 
                                            
31
 Most of the cases discussed in this chapter have been central to the exclusion and access rights 
debate of the progressive scholars. 
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simultaneously adopts responsibility to respect the public’s constitutionally 
guaranteed non-property rights as far as these relate to access to his property.32 
Consequently, the Constitution may impose limitations on the property owner’s right 
to exclude. This causes a potential conflict between property and non-property rights 
that are enshrined in the Constitution. 
Non-property constitutional rights such as the right to life, human dignity and 
equality are generally not subject to democratic deliberation, regulation and 
limitation.33 The main issue is whether landowners can exclude others from their 
property in the process of exercising their property rights when non-owners use the 
land to exercise their non-property constitutional rights. 
In jurisdictions that have a constitution as their supreme law, rights to private 
property, in particular the right to exclude, cannot be regarded as unqualified rights.34 
The right to exclude is restricted by substantial limitations to protect non-property 
rights embodied in the Constitution. The limitations originate directly from non-
property constitutional rights, as appears from case law.35 Some decisions 
demonstrate a significant interest in favour of non-owners’ access rights to land 
                                            
32
 Golinger J “Shopping in the marketplace of ideas: Why Fashion Valley Mall means Target and 
Trader Joe’s are the new town squares” (2009) 39 Golden Gate University Law Review 261-289 286. 
33
 In this regard, I am indebted to Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” 
(2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property and Society 15-106 45. 
34
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 215; Van der Walt AJ Property and 
Constitution (2012) 29. 
35
 Fourways Mall (Pty) Ltd and Another v South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union and Another 1999 (3) SA 752 (W); Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police 
Commissioner, Western Cape and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 
444 (C); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); Growthpoint 
Properties Ltd v South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others (2010) 31 
ILJ 2539 (KZD). See also Hattingh and Others v Juta (CCT 50/12) [2013] ZACC 5 (14 March 2013), 
where the landowner’s rights were balanced with the occupier’s right to family life. 
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based on the right to life, dignity and equality, in conflict with the landowner’s right to 
exclude.36 Courts treat the right to exclude as a non-absolute, restricted right that is 
justifiably and inevitably limited by non-property constitutional rights. 
The right to equality is slightly different from the right to life and dignity because 
its recognition and protection often takes place in a regulatory framework. Although 
the limitation of the right to exclude originates directly from the relevant provision in 
the South African Constitution,37 in the same way as with the right to life and dignity, 
the equality limitation is ultimately embodied in legislation. The Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA)38 regulates the right to 
equality to the extent that the limitation of the right to exclude is not imposed directly 
by the constitutional provision but by the legislation. PEPUDA gives effect to a 
constitutional right (equality and non-discrimination) in the same way that public 
accommodations laws in the US regulate the right to non-discrimination. However, 
the right to equality remains unqualified just like the right to life and dignity to the 
extent that PEPUDA regulates its enforcement but does not subject it to statutory or 
regulatory delineation. The right to life, dignity and equality illustrate the same point, 
that the right to exclude is not absolute but can be limited by law to secure non-
property constitutional rights. 
In the case of State of New Jersey v Shack39 the US Supreme Court 
recognised that the right to life and dignity of migrant farmworkers would be limited if 
private farm owners are allowed to exercise their right to exclude without restrictions. 
                                            
36
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 46. 
37
 Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (equality). 
38
 Act 4 of 2000. 
39
 58 NJ 297 (1971). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
115 
 
The case concerned two defendants (an attorney and a health service worker) who 
entered privately owned land to assist migrant farmworkers, who were employed and 
housed on the property, with information on governmental health care and legal 
services. The land was private property with restricted access, accessible to a 
restricted group of people only, namely the migrant farmworkers who had been 
granted limited access for specific purposes.40 The case deals with the access rights 
of the defendants and not of the migrant workers, since the latter already had access 
to be on the land. The farm owner sought to exercise his exclusionary powers by 
demanding that the defendants leave his property. Upon refusal to leave the land, 
the defendants were convicted for trespass. However, on appeal, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that there was no breach of the right to exclude and that 
trespass had not occurred. The court held that the farm owner’s property right, the 
right to exclude, was not absolute and had to be accommodated with the interests of 
others (defendants). The court further held that the farm owner’s title to land does 
not include dominion over farmworkers whom the owner allows to work and live on 
his farm.41 
State of New Jersey v Shack highlights the fact that fundamental human rights 
cannot be limited to protect and uphold property rights.42 The defendants’ access to 
the privately owned land, for visiting purposes, was significant to the migrant 
farmworkers’ wellbeing and to secure and support their non-property constitutional 
                                            
40
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 52. 
41
 State of New Jersey v Shack 58 NJ 297 (1971) 303. 
42
 Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745-820 808; Alexander GS & Peñalver EM “Properties of community” (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law 127-160 149-154. 
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rights to life, dignity and equality.43 The court stressed the importance of human 
dignity when it overruled the landowner’s attempt to deny access to the visitors of 
migrant workers. The Supreme Court held that: 
“The employer may not deny the worker his privacy or interfere with his 
opportunity to live with dignity and enjoy associations customary among our 
citizens. These rights are too fundamental to be denied on the basis of an 
interest in real property and too fragile to be left to the unequal bargaining 
strength of the parties.”44 
The ruling in State of New Jersey v Shack to grant the defendants access to land 
was essential to afford the migrant farmworkers the opportunity to meet their human 
needs, including interacting with the defendants to be informed of basic life-
supporting services.45 State of New Jersey v Shack confirmed that an owner must 
expect to find the absoluteness of his property rights curtailed by the organs of state 
for the promotion of the best interests of others for whom these organs also operate 
as protective agencies. In Folgueras v Hassle46 the court concurred with the decision 
in State of New Jersey v Shack, concluding that: 
“The property rights of the camp owner do not include the right to deny access to 
his camp to guests or persons working for any government or private agency 
whose primary objective is the health, welfare or dignity of the migrant workers 
as human beings.” 
                                            
43
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 52. 
44
 State of New Jersey v Shack 58 NJ 297 (1971) 308. 
45
 State of New Jersey v Shack 58 NJ 297 (1971) 303-304 the court pointed out that migrant farm 
workers are a rootless and isolated community and are often unaware of the opportunities that exist 
for them to meet their needs. 
46
 331 F Supp 615 (1971) 624. See also Gray K & Gray SF “Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public 
space” (1999) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 46-102 67. 
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Both State of New Jersey v Shack and Folgueras v Hassle concerned access to 
privately owned land for purposes of offering government services to migrant 
workers. The courts considered whether the owner of a migrant labour camp can 
deny access to visitors or government representatives seeking access to the labour 
camp to see migrant workers. In both cases, the courts held that the owner may not 
deny such access to his property. Exclusion of the visitors does not only impact on 
their constitutional rights and freedoms, but would also infringe upon the migrant 
workers’ constitutional rights to life, dignity, religion and association as well as their 
tenancy rights. 
Concerning the right to life (or a livelihood), the Supreme Court of India held in 
Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (Tellis)47 that the right to life is one of 
the fundamental constitutional rights that cannot be waived. The case concerned the 
forcible eviction of pavement and slum dwellers in the city of Bombay in India. 
According to the Supreme Court, eviction or exclusion of the pavement and slum 
dwellers would amount to a violation of their right to livelihood.48 
The Tellis decision was cited in the South African case of Victoria and Alfred 
Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and Others 
(Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) (Victoria and Alfred Waterfront),49 in 
which the court confirmed that the right to exclude can be limited in instances where 
the right to life depends on reasonable access to land. The case involved access to 
                                            
47
 (1986) SC 180 para 32. See also Tellis and Others v Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others 
[1987] LRC (Const) 351. 
48
 The right is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India 1949, which provides that no 
person shall be deprived of his life except according to procedure established by law. See Olga Tellis 
v Bombay Municipal Corporation (1986) SC 180 para 32. See also Liebenberg S Socio-economic 
rights: Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 123 for a brief discussion of the case. 
49
 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). 
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a quasi-public place for a purpose, namely begging, that was not the purpose the 
owner had in mind when he opened his property to the public. The court ruled 
against the landowners, stating that: 
“The issue of begging frequently raises a direct tension between the right to life 
and property rights. In that event, the property rights must give way to some 
extent. The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights. By 
committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we 
are required to value those rights above all others.”50 
Exclusion of non-owners in this case would amount to a violation of the constitutional 
right to life, which may be negatively affected if non-owners are prohibited from 
begging (which is regarded as a source of their livelihood). The court held that the 
right to life encompasses more than “mere animal existence”, since it includes the 
right to a livelihood.51 
The cases discussed above indicate that the right to exclude is directly and 
justifiably limited by constitutional provisions to ensure that non-property 
constitutional rights are secured when the exercise of those rights depend on access 
to land.52 Regardless of whether the property is private land with restricted access to 
a specific group of people or whether a quasi-public space, the result was the same, 
namely that the right to exclude was limited to protect constitutional rights, such as 
the right to life and dignity, which cannot be qualified. 
                                            
50
 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 448-451. 
51
 Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 122 
mentions that the right to life has been interpreted to incorporate the basic necessities of life such as 
adequate nutrition, clothing, reading facilities; the right to a livelihood; the right to shelter; the right to 
health care; and the right to education. 
52
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 55. 
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A similar conclusion follows from cases involving a clash between the 
landowner’s right to exclude and the right to equality of non-owners who want access 
to land but are excluded on grounds relating to their race, disability, gender or any 
other ground that may result in an unfair discrimination.53 For example, non-owners 
have a right under the US public accommodations laws to access public 
accommodations for particular services offered in those places, free from 
discrimination. Public accommodations consist of individual private establishments 
that are open to and serve the public, such as restaurants, inns, gas stations and 
places of entertainment.54 The Civil Rights Act confers jurisdiction upon the courts to 
provide injunctive relief against discrimination in places of public accommodation, 
stating that all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation, without 
discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, colour, religion or national 
origin.55 The Act provides the public with a right of reasonable access to all 
businesses and facilities that are open to the public.56 
                                            
53
 See section 9(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
54
 These establishments are regulated under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See also Singer 
JW “No right to exclude: Public accommodations and private property” (1996) 90 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1283-1497 1288; Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 31. 
55
 See section 201(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
56
 In Uston v Resorts International Hotel Incorporation 445 A2d 370 (NJ 1982) 373-375 the court held 
that the common law no longer entitles the owner of a quasi-public premise to arbitrarily exclude 
anyone for any reason. The court emphasised that the landowner has a duty not to act in an arbitrary 
or discriminatory manner towards persons who enter premises that the landowner has opened up for 
general public access for his own economic reasons. According to Singer JW Introduction to property 
(2
nd
 ed 2005) 26, apart from access rights under the public accommodations laws, other access rights 
include the power of the police to trespass when in hot pursuit of suspects; the rights of neighbours 
who have mistakenly occupied or improved property belonging to another; situations where the non-
owner has exceeded the scope of the landowner’s permission, such as holdover tenants who stay 
beyond the end of the lease term; and rights that non-owners may have to enter private property in 
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The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act expanded the concept of public 
accommodations to include educational institutions, doctors’ and lawyers’ offices, 
retail stores, barber shops and funeral parlours.57 Public accommodations laws 
protect non-owners’ rights to enter establishments that are open to the public without 
invidious discrimination.58 Singer states that access rights to private property that is 
open to the public under the public accommodations laws is the most significant 
limitation on the right to exclude.59 
South African law does not have specific public accommodations laws that 
regulate access to places that serve the public.60 However, general anti-
discrimination legislation was enacted to give effect to the constitutional right to 
equality, with the comparable result of prohibiting exclusion from privately owned 
land that is open to the public on the basis of unfair discrimination.61 PEPUDA62 
makes provision for a general prohibition against unfair discrimination and prevention 
                                                                                                                                       
furtherance of their personal or property interests. The other access rights mentioned here also exist 
in South African law and they are discussed in this chapter and the rest of the dissertation, only in 
light of the South African context. 
57
 See also Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 32. 
58
 Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 26, 30. See also in this regard Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 299-301; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: A 
comparative analysis (1999) 432-443; Singer JW “Property and equality: Public accommodations and 
the Constitution in South Africa and the United States” (1997) 12 South African Public Law 53-86; 
Singer JW “No right to exclude: Public accommodations and private property” (1996) 90 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1283-1497. 
59
 Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 26. 
60
 Given that the US has public accommodations laws that grant non-owners access rights to private 
property that is open to the public, it was necessary to consider examples of instances where access 
rights limit the landowner’s right to exclude. Identifying examples of access rights under US public 
accommodations laws makes an interesting case for comparison. 
61
 See the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA). 
62
 Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000. 
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of exclusion of persons on the grounds of race, gender and disability, respectively. 
PEPUDA differs in its setup from the US public accommodations laws but the effect 
is similar. The most striking difference between PEPUDA and US public 
accommodations laws is that firstly, PEPUDA provides for a general prohibition and 
prevention of unfair discrimination by either the state or any private person.63 
Secondly, PEPUDA applies to all types of land, including private property that is not 
open to the public,64 whereas the Civil Rights Act does not apply to a private club or 
other establishments that are in fact not open to the public, except to the extent that 
the facilities of such establishments are made available to the customers or 
patrons.65 It might appear that the Civil Rights Act qualifies the right to equality 
insofar as it opens room for institutions that are outside the scope of the Act to 
engage in exclusionary practices on their premises. Despite the differences, 
PEPUDA and US public accommodations laws have a similar effect on the right to 
exclude. These laws place limitations on the landowners’ right to exclude non-
owners from private or quasi-public land, to promote equality and prevent unfair 
discrimination. The idea is that the exclusion of non-owners in these contexts will 
infringe or undermine a fundamental, unqualified right to equality. Under these laws, 
landowners are likely to bear the burden of justifying their actions when they want to 
exclude non-owners because the promotion of equality and prevention of unfair 
discrimination is, in such instances, dependent on access to land. 
                                            
63
 See chapter 2 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
64
 See the schedule (in terms of section 29) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, which provides an illustrative list of unfair practices in certain sectors, 
including housing, accommodation, land and property. 
65
 See section 201(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
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The examples discussed above show when and how far the right to exclude is 
limited to secure non-property constitutional rights.66 Although life, dignity and 
equality are unqualified constitutional rights, this does not imply that people who 
want to exercise these rights have free access to privately owned land or quasi-
public land. These rights are not limited by law or regulation but they do not grant 
non-owners free access to property belonging to another person either.67 A 
landowner cannot exercise his right to exclude when it affects non-owners whose 
rights to life, dignity and equality depend on reasonable access to the land, and to 
that extent the right to exclude as an entitlement of ownership is limited by conflicting 
non-property constitutional rights.68 Furthermore, when these rights are in conflict 
with the right to exclude, it is assumed that they cannot be weighed or balanced with 
the right to exclude to determine the appropriate outcome, since balancing or any 
qualification would undermine the fundamental status of these non-property 
constitutional rights. Cases involving the clash between the landowner’s right to 
exclude and the right to life, dignity and equality therefore suggest that courts ought 
not to allow the right to exclude to automatically trump these non-property 
constitutional rights.69 
However, the trumping effect of the non-property constitutional rights discussed 
above is limited to a reasonably clearly demarcated set of circumstances, where the 
landowner’s right to exclude will have to give way. As the cases indicate, this effect 
is limited to instances where the property is either generally or specifically open to 
                                            
66
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 51. 
67
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 46. 
68
 Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 26. 
69
 Currie I & De Waal J The bill of rights handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 388. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
 
access by the affected group of non-owners in the first place, and where their 
continued access to or use of the land is vital to the exercise of their other 
constitutional rights. Furthermore, the result does not leave the landowner at the 
mercy of the non-owners in question. A landowner can impose time, place and 
manner restrictions that are necessary and reasonable in a particular context. 
 
3 3 Limitations imposed by legislation 
3 3 1 Legislation giving effect to a non-property constitutional right 
The cases in the previous section deal with non-property constitutional rights, 
namely life, dignity and equality that directly limit property rights. In this section I 
consider cases that involve access to quasi-public spaces such as shopping malls, 
and cases that involve access to and use of privately owned land with restricted 
access. 
The access rights involved here relate to non-property constitutional rights like 
freedom of speech, strike and picket and freedom of movement. Unlike the right to 
life, dignity and equality, these rights are subject to limitation and regulation in the 
same way as property rights (the right to exclude). In that sense, the right to freedom 
of movement, freedom of speech, strike and picket can be weighed up against 
property when the two sets of rights conflict. The question is whether the exercise of 
these rights is compatible with the normal use of the particular place. The examples 
that deal with this kind of use of quasi-public land show that, the right to exclude is 
sometimes statutorily limited or regulated to allow exercise of the non-property rights. 
The first set of examples deals with the exercise of the right to freedom of speech on 
quasi-public land. 
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One of the core elements of freedom of speech is the right to speak in public 
places such as public parks and shopping malls. Public places offer members of the 
public a forum to exercise their free speech rights.70 However, when public places 
are privately owned the owners sometimes regulate behaviour in these places by 
enforcing the right to exclude. Accordingly, members of the public who may want to 
engage in speech activities in these places require the consent of the owner. 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a basis for the 
protection of freedoms concerning religion, expression, assembly and the right to 
petition in American society.71 In cases involving the right to exclude non-owners 
from private property and non-owners’ competing rights that are entrenched in the 
Constitution, the US Supreme Court has made it clear that the Constitution in its First 
Amendment protection of the freedoms of religion, speech, press and assembly does 
not guarantee general access rights to private property, such as a shopping mall.72 
An exception to this basic rule is that individual states are free to extend greater 
protection to their citizens’ rights under their state constitutions.73 This exception was 
                                            
70
 Mulligan J “Finding a forum in the simulated city: Mega malls, gated towns and the promise of 
Pruneyard” (2004) 13 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 533-562 535. 
71
 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution (1791) states that “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.” 
72
 Hudgens v National Labor Relations Board 424 US 507 (1976) 519-520; Lloyd Corp Ltd v Tanner 
407 US 551 (1972) 569-570. See also Opperwall SG “Shopping for a public forum: Pruneyard 
Shopping Center v Robins, publicly used private property and constitutionally protected speech” 
(1981) 21 Santa Clara Law Review 801-844 802; Alexander MC “Attention, shoppers: The First 
Amendment in the modern shopping mall” (1999) 41 Arizona Law Review 1-48 1, 18; Gray K & Gray 
SF “Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public space” (1999) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 
46-102 80. 
73
 Alexander MC “Attention, shoppers: The First Amendment in the modern shopping mall” (1999) 41 
Arizona Law Review 1-48 18. Golinger J “Shopping in the marketplace of ideas: Why Fashion Valley 
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first examined in Marsh v Alabama,74 in which the Supreme Court addressed the 
question whether First Amendment free speech guarantee extends to privately 
owned property. In Lloyd Corp Ltd v Tanner75 it was suggested that there may also 
be a First Amendment right of access to private property where all other adequate 
alternative avenues for speech are barred. Private property (such as the private 
company town in Marsh v Alabama76 and the shopping mall in Lloyd Corp Ltd v 
Tanner and similar cases) is deemed a public space when it effectively replaces the 
local downtown, which is the primary place for the public to exercise their freedoms 
and rights.77 Privately owned shopping malls and company towns acquire a public 
                                                                                                                                       
Mall means Target and Trader Joe’s are the new town squares” (2009) 39 Golden Gate University 
Law Review 261-289 262. 
74
 326 US 501 (1946). See also Opperwall SG “Shopping for a public forum: Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v Robins, publicly used private property and constitutionally protected speech” (1981) 21 
Santa Clara Law Review 801-844 805; Okula SJ “Towards rendering New York’s free speech clause 
redundant: Shad Alliance v Smith Haven Mall” (1986) 60 St John’s Law Review 799-812 801 (with 
reference to footnote 8); Gray K & Gray SF “Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public space” (1999) 4 
European Human Rights Law Review 46-102 80. 
75
 407 US 551 (1972) 567, 569. However, in Lloyd Corp Ltd v Tanner access was denied because 
there were other alternatives for the exercise of speech and as long as these alternatives existed, the 
Constitution did not permit an incursion into a mall owner’s private property rights. Such alternatives 
would include the availability of public sidewalks, parks and streets adjacent to the store or shopping 
complex from which the demonstrators can make their viewpoints known. See also Gray K & Gray SF 
“Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public space” (1999) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 46-
102 80 (with reference to footnote 22). 
76
 326 US 501 (1946) 513 defines a company town as an area occupied by numerous houses, 
connected by pathways, which are either fenced or not as the private owners may choose. Generally, 
a company town can be explained in the sense that the whole town belongs to a private company, 
with all residential and other facilities included. 
77
 Mulligan J “Finding a forum in the simulated city: Mega malls, gated towns and the promise of 
Pruneyard” (2004) 13 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 533-562 536-539 states that shopping 
centres have largely replaced the traditional business block in American downtowns as a marketplace 
and community centre. In New Jersey Coalition Against the War in the Middle East v J.M.B Realty 
Corp 650 A2d 757 (1994) 774 the court also recognised the total transformation of private property to 
the mirror image of a downtown business district. 
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function in these conditions, and therefore expressive activity in those spaces must 
be allowed.78 The US Supreme Court has recognised a speech right in places, such 
as shopping malls, that are privately owned but that are functionally equivalent to a 
public place. This functional equivalent doctrine was born out of the decision in 
Marsh v Alabama.79 This decision laid the foundation for developing the notion that, 
under certain circumstances, the use and nature of private property may subject it to 
the public’s freedom to exercise constitutionally protected expression rights.80 
However, time, place and manner restrictions can be applied by a landowner only if it 
is reasonable to do so. 
Marsh v Alabama involved a privately owned company that prevented a 
member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses from distributing religious literature on the 
sidewalks of a company town. The private company required members of the public 
to seek prior written consent to solicit. The owners of the private company argued 
that they had the right to exclude others. The court had to consider the content of 
private ownership in the context of freedoms such as freedom of religion, speech 
and assembly that are guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.81 The court confirmed that owners generally have the right to exclude 
non-owners from their property. However, ownership does not always mean absolute 
                                            
78
 Alexander MC “Attention, shoppers: The First Amendment in the modern shopping mall” (1999) 41 
Arizona Law Review 1-48 47. 
79
 Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 506-508. See also Mulligan J “Finding a forum in the 
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dominion.82 The court rejected the owners of the private company’s contention that 
they have a right to exclude and held that their right to exclude had been diminished 
because of the public’s invitation to gain access to the property. The First 
Amendment protects the right to hand out leaflets on public streets, sidewalks and in 
public places, albeit subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.83 On 
the facts of this case, a private company that held legal title to the entire town and 
that had established a community with streets, homes and business, which is open 
to the general public, was prohibited from preventing individuals from distributing 
literature on the sidewalks of the town on similar grounds.84 The private company 
had no authority to govern the community in such a way that it restricts the citizens’ 
fundamental liberties. The private company had become a state actor because it was 
the functional equivalent of a municipality or a typical American town.85 The court 
emphasised that if a private owner, for his benefit, opens up his property for use by 
the general public, his property becomes confined by the statutory and constitutional 
rights of members of the public who use the property.86 Marsh v Alabama highlights 
                                            
82
 Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 506, 509. See also Schiff EF “Right to picket on quasi-public 
property” (1968) 25 Washington and Lee Law Review 53-59 56-57. 
83
 Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 504. See also First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v Salt 
Lake City Corporation 308 F3d 1114 (10
th
 Cir 2002). 
84
 Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 506. See Moon R “Access to public and private property 
under freedom of expression” (1988) 20 Ottawa Law Review 339-375 358; Singer JW Introduction to 
property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 78. 
85
 Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 507-509. See also Opperwall SG “Shopping for a public 
forum: Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins, publicly used private property and constitutionally 
protected speech” (1981) 21 Santa Clara Law Review 801-844 807. 
86
 Marsh v Alabama 326 US (1946) 505-506. See also Batchis W “Free speech in the suburban and 
exurban frontier: Shopping malls, subdivisions, new urbanism and the First Amendment” (2012) 21 
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 301-358 317. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
128 
 
the court’s recognition that the right of free speech occupies a preferred position as 
against the competing rights of a private property owner.87 
This move away from the strong view of the exclusionary powers of private 
owners is continued in PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins,88 which dealt with 
questions concerning First Amendment rights (free speech) on privately owned 
property that is generally open to the public. The PruneYard case concerned 
students who were ejected from a shopping mall for distributing anti-Zionist literature. 
The question before the court was whether the owner of a shopping centre has the 
right to exclude a group of students from distributing leaflets and soliciting petition 
signatures on the premises of the shopping centre. The California Supreme Court 
found that the California state Constitution protects speech and petitioning that is 
reasonably exercised on private property.89 Furthermore, it held that the shopping 
mall had taken on the character of a public forum and that its owner could therefore 
not limit free speech in it. The landowner could therefore not exclude the students. 
The US Supreme Court upheld the California Supreme Court’s decision. The court 
acknowledged that one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the 
right to exclude others but ruled that the landowner’s right to exclude can be 
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regulated or altered by the state.90 Accordingly, in view of the strong protection for 
free speech in the state Constitution, the students’ interest in exercising their right to 
free speech outweighed the desire of private property owners to exclude them from 
their property. 
In New Jersey Coalition Against the War in the Middle East v JMB Realty Corp, 
the court adopted a standard to determine when private property has been 
sufficiently devoted to public uses to trigger constitutional obligations not to abridge 
individual freedom of speech.91 This standard, the court explained, takes into 
account the normal use of the property, the extent and nature of the invitation to the 
public to use it, and the purpose of the expressional activity in relation to both its 
private and public use.92 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that owners of a 
shopping centre could not exclude persons handing out literature on their private 
property but could impose reasonable restrictions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
upheld access rights to the shopping mall on the principle that the constitutional right 
of free speech cannot be determined by title to property alone. According to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, the state Constitution conferred a right of speech in privately 
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owned regional shopping centres because these centres had essentially assumed 
the role of a new downtown business district.93 
The reasonable access rule also applies to public property such as a school. 
When considering whether access should be granted to state property, the courts 
consider whether or not the particular property is a public forum.94 Perry Education 
Association v Perry Local Educators’ Association95 concerned a public school 
system that granted one labour union access to the teachers’ mailboxes while 
denying similar access to a rival union. The rival union contended that its First 
Amendment rights had been violated, asserting that the mailboxes were a public 
forum. The court held that an individual has a right under the First Amendment to 
reasonable access for the purpose of communication.96 Such expressive activity can 
take place in parks, streets and other places where by tradition, or by state 
designation, the public has a general access right.97 The Supreme Court further held 
that the powers of the state to limit expressive activity in such places are greatly 
limited. Nevertheless, the state may restrict access to any property which is not a 
public forum, provided the restriction is reasonable, taking into consideration the 
time, place and manner of the expressive activity.98 However, the rival union could 
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not have access to the mailboxes, since the mailboxes were not a public forum.99 
The Perry case shows that owners of public property also hold exclusionary rights 
that can be exercised when it is reasonable to do so. Furthermore, the case shows 
that public access to public property for speech purposes, although protected by the 
First Amendment, can be limited.100 
The reasonable access rule also applies to public property owned by 
government, such as an airport. In Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v 
Canada101 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that access could not be arbitrarily 
denied in respect of a government-owned airport terminal concourse. The court 
viewed an airport terminal as bearing the earmark of a public arena or a 
contemporary crossroads that is a modern equivalent of the streets.102 The court 
confirmed that an absolute prohibition on political communication in the public areas 
of government-owned airports was therefore contrary to the freedom of 
expression.103 Furthermore, the court held that such prohibition constitutes a 
limitation of free speech and the state cannot rely on its ownership rights (the right to 
exclude) to impose a blanket ban on political speech on its premises. The public 
spaces in the airport were owned for the benefit of the public and reasonable access 
to such a public place could not be denied. The court applied the provision for 
reasonable access and prohibited the owners from exercising their exclusionary 
powers. 
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The cases concerning free speech suggest that owners of large shopping malls 
that are open to the public are not permitted to exercise their exclusionary powers in 
a manner that overreach the fundamental rights of non-owners.104 Even in publicly 
state owned property, access to such property may only be prohibited when it is 
reasonable. The right to freedom of speech may be reasonably limited, but it cannot 
be prohibited on property that is the equivalent of a public forum or on public 
property. Freedom of speech is guaranteed on private property that is generally open 
to the public and on public property that serves the purpose of a public forum. In 
these instances, access for freedom of speech purposes is axiomatic if the exercise 
of free speech is compatible with the use of the property and subject to reasonable 
time, place and manner restrictions imposed by the owner. 
The second set of examples of cases involves the exercise of the right to strike 
and picket on quasi-public spaces and seem to make the same point. Private 
property that is open to the public makes it possible for the public to use the property 
for various purposes, which might include the right of labour unions or striking 
workers to engage in peaceful picketing105 and also for the public to engage in public 
demonstrations. The opening up of property to the general public transforms the 
nature of that property from purely private to quasi-public, and such a transformation 
has a bearing on the competing use rights of property owners and the public. The 
question to consider here is whether, when and how the property owner or the public 
can exercise their respective rights on the property. 
                                            
104
 Gray K & Gray SF “Civil rights, civil wrongs and quasi-public space” (1999) 4 European Human 
Rights Law Review 46-102 77-78. 
105
 It is important to note that workers have an additional opportunity to picket on private property that 
is not open to the public but where they work. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
133 
 
In Growthpoint Properties Ltd v South African Commercial Catering and Allied 
Workers Union and Others106 the court considered a clash between the property 
rights of owners and the constitutional right of strikers to freedom of expression, to 
bargain collectively and to picket and demonstrate peacefully. The striking workers 
were picketing and demonstrating loudly in a privately owned shopping mall, in so 
doing allegedly disturbing and intimidating members of the public and disrupting 
normal business operations.107 Growthpoint alleged that the noise made by the 
strikers constituted a nuisance and a violation of its constitutional right to property.108 
The court stated that the dispute required balancing the conflicting rights to strike 
and picket on the one hand and other constitutional rights such as property, a 
healthy environment and free trade on the other hand. Because South African law 
does not recognise a hierarchy of rights, such a balancing requires the limiting of 
each right, since no right is absolute.109 The court therefore did not grant an order 
precluding picketing or demonstrations in the mall but ordered the strikers to lower 
the noise so that they would not interfere with the property rights of Growthpoint.110 
The court ruled in favour of the strikers by allowing them to have access to the 
shopping mall for purposes of picketing and demonstrating in a manner prescribed 
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by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The outcome of the decision is that both the 
owner’s right to exclude the strikers from the mall and workers’ right to strike and 
picket have to be exercised in a manner that accommodates the other, since both 
rights are subject to regulation. 
In US law, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)111 protects the rights of 
employees to form unions and engage in collective bargaining. The employer is 
prohibited from interfering with these rights.112 This statute has been interpreted to 
protect free speech rights of employees and non-employees who seek to 
communicate with workers at their work site for the purpose of persuading 
employees to join a union, to go on strike, or to engage in other labour practices 
protected under the NLRA.113 Hudgens v National Labor Relations Board114 
illustrates this point. The case concerned a mall owner who had threatened to press 
trespassing charges against employees who were picketing at their employer’s store 
located in the private shopping centre. The Supreme Court considered whether the 
respective rights and liabilities of the parties are to be decided under the criteria of 
the NLRA alone, or under the First Amendment standard, or under a combination of 
the two.115 The court concluded that the NLRA might statutorily limit an employer’s 
right to exclude if the purpose of this intrusion was to exercise rights to organise 
workers into unions or engage in other collective actions protected by federal labour 
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laws.116 Even though the court acknowledged that the exercise of speech rights on 
private property may in some cases be protected by state law, the warehouse 
employees did not have a First Amendment right to enter a shopping centre to 
strike.117 Nevertheless, in National Labor Relations Board v Calkins118 the court ruled 
that a union’s right to picket trumps the owner’s right to exclude under the California 
Constitution. 
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza Inc,119 
the owners of a shopping centre also sought to exclude picketers (union members) 
from their property. The union members picketed in the parking lot, at the entrance 
and exit of the shopping centre. The US Supreme Court, relying on the judgement in 
Marsh v Alabama, decided that non-owners have access to a large shopping centre 
for purposes of expressive freedom.120 The US Supreme Court held that a shopping 
centre that was freely accessible and open to the public was the functional 
equivalent of a downtown business district for First Amendment purposes.121 
Furthermore, the court held that the private owner of a store located in the shopping 
plaza could not exclude peaceful picketing by non-employees who were protesting 
the store owner’s refusal to hire union labour. The court reasoned that, unlike an 
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individual’s home (which is not ordinarily open to the public), operating a space 
where the public was permitted to freely gather entailed no privacy interest, and as a 
result there was no blanket right to exclude, and therefore access should be granted 
for the purpose of exercising First Amendment rights.122 With reference to Marsh v 
Alabama, the court held that ownership is not absolute, for when an owner opens up 
his property for use by the public his private property rights are circumscribed by the 
public’s statutory and constitutional rights.123 The shopping centre, although privately 
owned, was open to the public and therefore members of the public could not be 
excluded; the owners had lost some of their power to exclude others. 
The third example provides a similar explanation of the second part of the 
South African Victoria and Alfred Waterfront124 decision, where the court dealt with 
the tension between property rights and non-owners’ right to freedom of movement. 
The court did not enforce the landowners’ right to permanently exclude non-owners 
who had been creating a nuisance on private premises that are generally open to the 
public. The right to exclude was qualified in several respects. The court distinguished 
the large waterfront shopping complex in this case from ordinary restaurants or 
shopping malls, noting that the location, size and composition of the privately owned 
shopping complex rendered it for all practical purposes a suburb of Cape Town, to 
which members of the public had a general invitation to visit.125 The right to freedom 
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of movement applies to large shopping malls and other quasi-public spaces that 
function as public spaces, although this right cannot be exercised in ordinary 
restaurants or shops because access in such places is limited. On this basis, the 
court pointed out that the landowners did not have an absolute right to exclude and 
as a result non-owners were not prohibited from entering the quasi-public premises; 
only specific conduct can be prohibited on the premises. The nature and function of 
the property limited or at least qualified the landowner’s right to exclude. 
A blanket refusal of access to the quasi-public premises in Victoria and Alfred 
Waterfront was likely to constitute a significant restriction on the right to freedom of 
movement. Access to the quasi-public premises in this case was important for non-
owners to realise their constitutional rights. What becomes clear from the case is that 
with regard to certain types of property, landowners of quasi-public premises do not 
have an unqualified right to exclude others. To some degree, the landowner’s right to 
exclude is limited on the basis of the constitutional protection and enforcement of the 
right to freedom of movement on quasi-public premises. In appropriate instances, an 
owner is prevented from denying access to non-owners who seek to exercise their 
freedom of movement on his premises. The exercise of the right to freedom of 
movement also impacts on the right to life and dignity. Therefore, exclusion of the 
public resulting in the interference with their exercise of free movement amounts to a 
derogation of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The right to exclude should 
therefore give way to the right to freedom of movement and other fundamental rights 
like the right to life, particularly where the type of property involved is such that 
access to it is necessary for the realisation of these rights. 
The fourth set of examples are slightly different from the cases discussed 
above (which deal with access to quasi-public property) because it concerns access 
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to and use of privately owned land, including cases where no consent was granted 
for initial access and cases where consent was granted. Legislative limitation of the 
right to exclude can result from anti-eviction legislation, which protects the interests 
of occupiers against unfair or unlawful eviction, for example by virtue of the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA)126 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE).127 These acts set out stringent 
procedures that a landowner has to follow prior to or when evicting occupiers from 
his private land. Both acts have a similar effect, namely that they limit the 
landowner’s right to exclude to prevent unjustified evictions of non-owners from 
either rural or urban privately owned land. 
However, PIE differs from ESTA because it regulates unlawful occupation of 
land and consequently its measures do not create access rights because by 
definition non-owners who are in unlawful occupation of land do not have rights.128 
Rather, PIE protects unlawful occupiers against arbitrary eviction. ESTA creates 
access rights and cases where it is applied concern access claims to privately 
owned land with restricted access that is granted to a small, specific category of 
people for use and occupancy purposes. The access to or use of land granted by 
ESTA to non-owners may sometimes involve a permanent, physical invasion of the 
private land.129 The right to exclude is in these cases limited by statutory provisions 
that provide a broad category of access rights to non-owners residing on privately 
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owned land. PIE places the same kind of limitation on the right to exclude but the 
limitation is not based on access rights; instead, PIE impose limitations on the right 
to exclude on the basis of anti-eviction policy.130 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, in private law the landowner’s right to exclude 
assumes a strong position in the rights paradigm. Under the common law, the 
landowner can (in addition to asserting any other of his ownership rights) enforce his 
right to exclude by evicting unwanted occupiers with the rei vindicatio.131 Given that 
the right to exclude is strong, courts normally do not have a general discretion to 
deny the landowner’s application for an eviction order once the basic requirements 
have been meet.132 However, in recent times the courts have dismissed actions 
based on the rei vindicatio in certain instances. The Constitution, in particular section 
26(3), which provides that no one may be evicted from their home without a court 
order and only after all relevant circumstances have been considered, and PIE133 
have amended the availability of the rei vindicatio with regard to the protection of 
immovable property used mainly for residential purposes. 
Section 26 of the Constitution, together with PIE, requires specific eviction 
procedures that have to be complied with by a landowner before evicting people 
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from his land. Section 4(7) of PIE outlines specific circumstances that have to be 
considered before the eviction order is granted. The procedure set out in PIE 
protects unlawful occupiers by affording them proper judicial oversight in an eviction 
process, intended to give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution. The effect is that 
PIE, read with section 26(3), delays the eviction until it has been determined that it is 
just and equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers.134 Consideration of all the relevant 
circumstances, namely the general historical, social and economic context as well as 
the personal circumstances of the occupier, before an eviction order can be granted, 
overrides the abstract application of the common law rei vindicatio.135 This is so 
because the eviction order is not based purely on proof of the common law 
requirements that the applicant is the owner and the occupier is in possession, but 
on all relevant circumstances.136 Arguably, consideration of all relevant 
circumstances amounts to a balancing process in which the landowner’s rights are 
weighed against the interests of the occupiers. These anti-eviction measures 
significantly qualify the landowner’s right to exclude because, in this context, 
exclusion is dependent on the discretion of the courts to decide whether or not to 
grant an eviction order after all the relevant circumstances have been considered. 
Eviction of unlawful occupiers is possible, but the decision to evict is case-specific 
and context-sensitive. Therefore, the landowner’s right to vindicate is restricted by 
the Constitution and statutory regulation that protects occupiers against arbitrary or 
unfair eviction. This is a clear instance where the landowner’s right to exclude is 
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limited by virtue of legislation aimed at achieving constitutionally prescribed 
outcomes in terms of specifically promulgated legislation. 
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers137 the court held that, in light 
of section 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE, the courts should be reluctant to grant 
eviction orders against unlawful occupiers unless the eviction order will be just and 
equitable under the circumstances of each case. Van der Walt argues that the 
judgment diminishes the landowner’s entitlement to exclude or evict unlawful 
occupiers from his private land, since the eviction procedure prescribed by the anti-
eviction laws is expensive and time-consuming.138 In this instance, the landowner is 
forced to allow unlawful occupiers to continue residing on his land against his will, at 
least until the statutory requirements have been complied with. 
Because of the requirements in PIE and section 26(3) of the Constitution, it is 
uncertain when exactly an owner can succeed with the rei vindicatio. Some authors 
have argued that the rei vindicatio is still available to protect ownership of business 
premises, since PIE is not applicable to such premises but only to property used for 
residential purposes.139 In this regard, the landowner can still employ the rei 
vindicatio in so far as PIE is not applicable, to either business or residential 
premises. 
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occupier” or “occupier” under PIE or ESTA. See also Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C); Pope A 
“Eviction and the protection of property rights: A case study of Ellis v Viljoen” (2002) 119 South Africa 
Law Journal 709-720; Pienaar JM Land reform (2014) 690. 
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ESTA applies to lawful occupiers of rural land and it regulates the relationship 
between the owner and lawful occupiers. ESTA provides access rights to occupiers 
who reside on privately owned land and who had consent or another right in law to 
do so.140 ESTA generally applies to instances where a landowner grants access to 
non-owners on the basis of an employment contract that is linked to housing. For 
example, a farm owner can grant access rights to farmworkers, entailing the 
provision of housing that allows farmworkers to be on the farm for purposes of 
working and housing. The farmworkers occupy land of which they are not registered 
owners but holders of a personal right, protected by the land reform legislation 
applying to lawful occupiers.141 The issue of exclusion is triggered when the 
employment contract is terminated and the farm owner seeks to evict the 
farmworker. 
ESTA provides for instances when non-owners are allowed to have continued 
access to the land against the landowner’s will, namely when the employment 
contract is terminated. In that case, ESTA regulates the termination of the 
permission to occupy and protects the farmworkers against arbitrary eviction, to give 
effect to the right to secure tenure.142 The constitutional provision places an 
obligation on the state to improve security of tenure by way of appropriate legislation 
so that a person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of 
past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an 
Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable 
                                            
140
 See section 1 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
141
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 663; Dhliwayo P Tenure security in relation to farmland (2012) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 113. 
142
 Section 25(6) read with section 25(9) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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redress.143 ESTA seeks to strengthen and secure weak and vulnerable interests in 
land and this provides permanent or temporary security of tenure for lawful occupiers 
and their families, who occupy land for residential purposes.144 The content of the 
tenure rights includes the right to use the specific parcel of land, to reside on the 
land, and to have access to services.145 The access rights created under ESTA are 
enforceable against the landowner as well as his successors in title. Termination of 
the rights can only occur when there are valid grounds, and under fair and 
reasonable circumstances. 
Section 8(2) of ESTA creates a link between employment and the right of 
residence of occupiers employed on farmland. In some instances ESTA requires 
farm owners to continue providing housing to farmworkers even when their 
employment has been terminated.146 The impact of ESTA is that if the person sought 
to be evicted falls within the definition of “occupier”, the statutory eviction procedures 
under ESTA must be followed. This is to ensure that farmworkers are not evicted 
from the farm without proper procedural protection.147 Therefore, even if the farm 
owner wants to exercise his right to exclude by evicting farmworkers, he is obliged to 
follow the eviction procedure, which can be expensive and time consuming and 
                                            
143
 Section 25(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
144
 Dhliwayo P Tenure security in relation to farmland (2012) unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch 
University for a detailed discussion of farm workers’ tenure security. 
145
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 663. 
146
 Wegerif M, Russel B & Grundling I Still searching for security: The reality of farm dwellers evictions 
in South Africa (2005) 85. 
147
 Sections 8-13 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 set out a long and complex 
procedural process that should be followed by farm owners to effect legal evictions from farms. See 
also Pienaar JM Land reform (2014) 400-406 for a detailed discussion on the regulation of eviction. 
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might delay the eviction process.148 The eviction procedure entitles the farmworkers 
to have access to the farm for housing purposes while waiting for the eviction to be 
finalised. In other words, the anti-eviction measures protects farmworkers and also 
enable them to continue in occupation until the occupancy rights are terminated on 
lawful grounds in accordance with the requirements of ESTA.149 This limits the extent 
to which a farm owner can exert control over farmworkers who live on his land, 
thereby limiting the right to exclude. 
Apart from regulatory eviction procedures, the limitation on the landowner’s 
right to exclude is demonstrated by decisions concerning limited use of and access 
to agricultural land. For example, apart from stabilising their lawful occupation of the 
land, ESTA also provides other access rights to non-owners, based on limited 
permission to use the land, that prevent the landowner from exercising his right to 
exclude, for example in the context of burial rights.150 In the case of Nhlabathi and 
Others v Fick151 the landowner argued that section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA was 
unconstitutional because it infringes upon section 25 of the Constitution.152 ESTA 
was amended in 2001 to include burial rights in favour of occupiers of agricultural 
                                            
148
 Van der Merwe CG (with Pope A) “Ownership” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
law (9
th
 ed 2007) 469-556 549. 
149
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 127. 
150
 In this regard, see section 6(2)(dA) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, which 
provides that a farm labourer can bury his or her deceased family member, who at the time of death 
was residing on the land on which the occupier is residing, in accordance with their religion or cultural 
beliefs, provided an established practice in respect of the land exist in terms of which farm labourers 
were in the past allowed to bury their deceased family members on the farm in line with their belief or 
custom. 
151
 2003 (7) BCLR 806 (LCC) para 20. See also Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 
2011) 285-286, 297-299. 
152
 The burial right constitutes a deprivation of some incidents of ownership, including the landowner’s 
right to exclude. 
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land.153 Prior to the amendment, the courts refused to grant burial rights because 
they were different in nature to other rights in ESTA, which did not impact on the land 
physically.154 As a result of the amendment, occupiers of private farmland were 
granted the right to bury their deceased family members on the farm where they 
lived and worked, even without prior permission and against the will of the 
landowner, provided they meet the requirements stipulated in ESTA.155 The burial 
right should be in accordance with religion or cultural beliefs if an established 
practice existed in respect of land.156 An “established practice” denotes a practice in 
terms of which the owners or persons in charge routinely gave permission to people 
residing on land to bury deceased family members on that land in accordance with 
their religion or cultural belief.157 ESTA now places the landowner in a situation 
where he is not able to refuse burial on his land as long as an established practice 
exists.158 To this end, burial rights impose a permanent physical intrusion on the 
                                            
153
 Section 6(2) of ESTA was amended to include burial rights in section 6(2)(dA) and 6(5). 
154
 Serole and Another v Pienaar 2000 (1) SA 328 (LCC) para 16; Nkosi and Another v Bührmann 
2002 (1) SA 372 (SCA) para 51, which concerned the refusal of the farm owner to grant occupiers’ 
burial rights. See also Mahomed A Understanding land tenure law: Commentary and legislation 
(2009) 55-58. Pienaar JM Land reform (2014) 418-419 explains that burial rights were deemed to be 
different because they constituted a servitude, embodying a limited real right, which would have an 
impact on the landowner’s ownership rights and would also impact on the land permanently. 
155
 Pienaar JM Land reform (2014) 418-423. 
156
 Dlamini and Another v Joosten and Others 2006 (3) SA 342 (SCA) para 1. See also Pienaar J & 
Mostert H “The balance between burial rights and landownership in South Africa: Issues of content, 
nature and constitutionality” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 633-630 635; Pienaar JM Land 
reform (2014) 419. 
157
 Section 1(1) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. In Nhlabathi and Others v Fick 
[2003] All SA 323 (LCC) para 36-37 the court held that an established practice does not relate to a 
particular family but that the practice had to have been established in respect of land. See also 
Pienaar J & Mostert H “The balance between burial rights and landownership in South Africa: Issues 
of content, nature and constitutionality” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 633-630 653; Pienaar 
JM Land reform (2014) 419. 
158
 Section 6(2)(dA) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
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land. Some of the case law that dealt with the occupiers’ burial rights emphasised 
that granting such a right to occupiers amounts to an inroad into the landowner’s 
entitlements.159 The right to exclude is statutorily limited by burial rights provided 
under ESTA to secure the religious and cultural rights in line with the constitutional 
obligation. The Nhlabathi decision therefore shows how legislature can limit property 
rights for purposes of promoting constitutionally recognised non-property rights.160 
 
3 3 2 Legislation not directly giving effect to a non-property constitutional right 
In some instances, the right to exclude is subject to statutory qualification that 
derives from legislation not directly aimed at giving effect to non-property 
constitutional rights. The legislation in this category allow non-owners to have access 
to or use privately owned land without the landowner’s permission or consent. For 
this discussion it is necessary to consider examples from foreign law together with 
South African examples. English, Welsh and Scots law provide, in different forms, for 
a statutory right to roam161 on privately owned land designated for recreational 
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 Serole and Another v Pienaar 2000 (1) SA 328 (LCC); Nkosi and Another v Bührmann 2002 (1) SA 
372 (SCA). See also Pienaar J & Mostert H “The balance between burial rights and landownership in 
South Africa: Issues of content, nature and constitutionality” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 
633-630; Pienaar JM Land reform (2014) 418-422. 
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 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, 
Property and Society 15-106 74. 
161
 A right to roam mainly refers to the right to wander across open land that is privately owned. 
Although a detailed analysis of Scandinavian public access rights falls outside the scope of this study, 
it is interesting to note that this right to roam has been in existence for a long period of time in 
Scandinavian countries such as Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark. For example in Swedish law 
the “allemansrätt” meaning “everyman’s right” gives anyone in Sweden, whether local or a tourist, the 
right to roam almost everywhere they would like. See Anonymous “The right of public access” 
available online at <http://www.naturvardsverket.se/en/Enjoying-nature/The-Right-of-Public-Access/> 
(accessed on 04-06-2014). Katz L “Exclusion and exclusivity in property law” (2008) 58 University of 
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purposes.162 These statutes were enacted specifically to grant access rights to non-
owners and other neighbouring owners, to pass over or to be on privately owned 
land. The right to roam is not recognised in South African law and therefore it is 
necessary to consider other jurisdictions to identify examples of access rights that 
originate from and are protected by law. The discussion on legislation here is not an 
attempt to introduce new access rights but is to outline and explain instances in 
which statutory access rights place limitations on the right to exclude. 
 
(a) A landowner’s right to exclude non-owners from his land is limited by a broad 
category of statutory provisions that grant regulatory access to state authorities on 
private land. These include but are not limited to search, seizure and forfeiture 
powers. For example, the Income Tax Act163 and the Value Added Tax Act164 provide 
that a judge may issue a warrant authorising an officer to enter and search any 
premises.165 The search is to be conducted, on someone’s premises, without prior 
                                                                                                                                       
can use rural land for recreational purposes, so long as these uses are not inconsistent with the uses 
to which the owner has decided to put the land. Robertson HG “Public access to private land for 
walking: Environmental and individual responsibility as rationale for limiting the right to exclude” 
(2011) 23 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 211-262 215-240 notes that 
Scandinavian countries have a historic and cultural commitment of public rights of access to private 
land (countryside) for all people, for purposes of open-air recreation. Lovett JA “Progressive property 
in action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 Nebraska Law Review 739-818 776 (with 
reference to footnote 203) states that several of the core principles in the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 
2003 already exist in most of the Scandinavian countries. 
162
 The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (CROW Act) and the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 
2003 (LRSA), respectively. 
163
 Section 74D of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
164
 Section 57D of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991. 
165
 See section 57D(1)(a)(i) of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991; Section 74D(1)(a)(i) of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. Deutschmann NO and Others v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service; Shelton v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2000 (2) SA 106 
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notice and at any time to obtain any information, documents or things as evidence of 
non-compliance or offence committed in relation to which the warrant is being 
issued.166 The landowner does not have the power to deny an officer who is acting 
on this kind of authority access to his premises. In such instances, the landowner 
cannot exercise his right to exclude. 
Furthermore, the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act167 authorises 
the Director to enter any premises for the purposes of an inquiry at any reasonable 
time and without prior notice.168 In terms of this provision the landowner’s consent is 
not required for the Director to have access to his premises. This implies that the 
landowner cannot exclude anyone acting in terms of this provision. Limitations of the 
right to exclude are also authorised by the Criminal Procedure Act,169 which 
authorise entry upon premises to obtain any article required in evidence; to any 
person who is lawfully in charge of any premises and reasonably suspects that stock 
or produce has been placed on the premises; and to allow the police to prevent any 
offence in connection with state security, respectively.170 
                                                                                                                                       
(E) 113 was decided on the basis of these two sections. See also Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 313-314. 
166
 See section 57D(1)(a)(ii) of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991; Section 74D(1)(a)(ii) of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
167
 Section 6 of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act 117 of 1991. 
168
 Park-Ross and Another v The Director, Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C) 
167. See also Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 233. 
169
 Sections 21, 24 and 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
170
 Minister of Safety and Security and Another v Van der Merwe and Others [2011] 1 All SA 260 
(SCA) para 12 states that the authority that is conferred by a warrant to conduct a search and then to 
seize what is found, makes material inroads upon rights that have always been protected at common 
law, such as the rights to privacy, property and personal integrity. See also Polonyfis v Minister of 
Police and Others (64/10) [2011] ZASCA 26 (18 March 2011) para 9. 
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Those provisions in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act171 that authorise 
criminal and civil forfeiture of property that has been used to commit an offence172 
also impose limitations on the right to exclude. Forfeiture concerns state action which 
results in the loss of property to the state, without the consent or co-operation of the 
owner, because the property was involved in some way in committing a crime.173 
Civil forfeiture is enforced (without criminal prosecution or conviction) against 
innocent third parties who hold or own property, regardless of their involvement or 
knowledge of the crime.174 Both civil and criminal forfeiture constitute a significant 
limitation of property rights, in that the property, as a result of the forfeiture order, is 
forfeited to the state.175 
 
(b) The right to exclude is also limited by statutory provisions that regulate the use of 
land in the area of private law. The Sectional Titles Act176 allows a private body (the 
body corporate of a sectional title scheme) to impose rules that limit sectional title 
owners’ property rights. The sectional title owners’ right to exclude is subject to and 
limited by the regulations and rules in the Act. In terms of the Act177 the members of 
a sectional title community are bound by the registered rules of the sectional title 
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 See chapter 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. 
172
 On the distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture, see Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property 
law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 319-320. 
173
 Van der Walt AJ “Civil forfeiture of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime and the constitutional 
property clause” (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 1-45 2. 
174
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 319-320. 
175
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 322. See also section 56 of the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. 
176
 Act 95 of 1986. 
177
 Section 35 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
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scheme. According to Pienaar,178 these rules are not based on contract but are 
prescribed by legislation. In other words, the rules are enforced on members against 
their will and without their consent. Some of the rules limit a sectional title owner 
from exercising his right to exclude. For example, a sectional title owner has a duty 
to permit any person authorised in writing by the body corporate to enter his section 
or exclusive use area, at all reasonable hours and on notice, for purposes of 
inspecting it, maintaining, repairing or renewing pipes, wires, cables and ducts in the 
section.179 
In addition, the Act provides for several implied servitudes in favour of and 
against each section. These servitudes include a reciprocal servitude for the 
passage or provision of certain services through pipes, wires, cables and ducts.180 
This implied servitude confers on the body corporate the right to have access to 
each section and the exclusive use areas, to effect maintenance, repairs or renewal 
of any part of the building or any pipes, wires, cables or ducts in the building.181 
Pienaar argues that the right of access granted to outsiders in terms of the statutory 
provision is a deviation from the common law principle that an owner has exclusive 
right to use and enjoy his property, which includes his right to privacy and control of 
access to his property.182 The limitation on the right to exclude arises as a result of 
the implied servitude, created against the will of a sectional title owner in favour of 
each section in terms of legislation. 
                                            
178
 Pienaar GJ Sectional titles and other fragmented property schemes (2010) 41. 
179
 Section 44(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. See also section 13(1)(a) of the Sectional 
Titles Scheme Management Act 8 of 2011. 
180
 See section 28(1)(a)(ii) in favour of a section and section 28(1)(b)(ii) against each section. See 
also Pienaar GJ Sectional titles and other fragmented property schemes (2010) 239-240. 
181
 Section 28(2)(b) and section 44 (1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
182
 Pienaar GJ Sectional titles and other fragmented property schemes (2010) 235 (with reference to 
footnote 7). 
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(c) A limitation on the right to exclude also appears in legislation governing and 
regulating access rights in English law. A first category refers to legislation granting 
access rights in the form of a right to roam to non-owners (the public). The statutory 
right to roam granted to non-owners is recognised as a limitation of the private 
landowner’s right to exclude.183 According to Anderson,184 the right to roam refers to 
broad access rights that allow the public to wander freely over private meadows or 
other uncultivated private lands. The right to roam in England and Wales185 gives 
legislative force to an entitlement that was not recognised under common law, 
namely self-determining pedestrian access to privately owned open land.186 The 
relevant legislation was enacted to meet the demand for legally recognised access 
rights that had been lost as a result of the enclosure movement.187 The CROW Act 
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 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 193-195; Robertson HG “Public access to private 
land for walking: Environmental and individual responsibility as rationale for limiting the right to 
exclude” (2011) 23 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 211-262 213. 
184
 Anderson JL “Britain’s right to roam: Redefining the landowner’s bundle of sticks” (2007) 19 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 375-436 380. 
185
 The right is regulated by the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (CROW Act). 
186
 Gray K & Gray SF Land law (6
th
 ed 2009) 533; Gray K & Gray SF Elements of land law (5
th
 ed 
2009) 1372-1376. See also Gray K “Pedestrian democracy and the geography of hope” (2010) 1 
Journal of Human Rights and Environment 45-65 49-52; Lovett JA “Progressive property in action: 
The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 Nebraska Law Review 739-818 766; Anderson JL 
“Countryside access and environmental protection: An American view of Britain’s right to roam” 
(2007) 9 Environmental Law Review 241-259; Anderson JL “Britain’s right to roam: Redefining the 
landowner’s bundle of sticks” (2007) 19 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 375-
436. 
187
 Gray K “Pedestrian democracy and the geography of hope” (2010) 1 Journal of Human Rights and 
Environment 45-65 49 notes that there was once a “golden age” that recognised some generalised 
access rights to privately held land. Furthermore, in medieval times, some form of a right to roam over 
open uncultivated land was acceptable. However, any entitlement of this kind of access was gradually 
extinguished from the 16
th
 century onwards by the enclosure movement. See also Anderson JL 
“Britain’s right to roam: Redefining the landowner’s bundle of sticks” (2007) 19 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 375-436 383-389, who discusses the impact of enclosure on 
access rights and indicates failure of the common law to recognise a more general right to roam. See 
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grants any person the right to enter and remain on any land for the purposes of 
open-air recreation, but within strict limitations.188 Notably, the right of access 
provided by the Act is for open-air recreation. The Act limits the reach of access 
rights to five specific categories of land, namely mapped open country; mountain 
land; coastal land; registered common land; and dedicated land, which is designated 
specifically for access.189 Access rights are limited to access on foot.190 The Act has 
increased non-owners’ access to privately owned land and in doing so statutorily 
limited landowners’ right to exclude non-owners from their land. Furthermore, the Act 
changed the law’s approach to the rights of landowners and in particular landowners’ 
right to exclude.191 This change came as a result of the guarantee of public access to 
designated private lands prescribed by the Act. 
A right to roam is also recognised in Scotland. Scots law provides far-reaching 
access rights to non-owners192 and creates access rights that are much wider in 
scope than those established by the CROW Act in respect of general access rights 
                                                                                                                                       
also Lovett JA “Progressive property in action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 
Nebraska Law Review 739-818 767-770; Sawers B “The right to exclude from unimproved land” 
(2011) 83 Temple Law Review 665-696 684. 
188
 Section 2 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. See also Gray K & Gray SF Land law 
(6
th
 ed 2009) 533. 
189
 Section 1(1)-(2), 16 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. 
190
 Section 2(1)(b) of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. 
191
 Robertson HG “Public access to private land for walking: Environmental and individual 
responsibility as rationale for limiting the right to exclude” (2011) 23 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 211-262 213, citing R (Ashbrook) v East Sussex County Council [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1701 (20 November 2002) para 48, where one judge stated that the rights conferred by 
the CROW Act wrought a sea change in the law’s approach to the rights of members of the public to 
reasonable enjoyment of the countryside, even when the countryside is privately owned. 
192
 The rights are enforced through the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (LRSA). See Carey Miller 
DL “Public access to private land in Scotland” (2012) 15 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 119-
147; Gray K & Gray SF Land law (6
th
 ed 2009) 534; Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 
194. 
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to privately owned land. Prior to the enactment of the LRSA, Scots common law 
granted members of the public limited access rights over private land in the form of 
public rights of way.193 These common law rights of way were difficult to establish at 
Scots common law because their utility and occurrence were always circumscribed 
by several doctrinal considerations.194 This is one aspect that led Scots law to 
introduce a broad statutory right of responsible access. The LRSA was enacted to 
provide reasonable access rights to land for recreation and passage. The LRSA 
establishes and confers on everyone statutory access rights over, on and below the 
surface of the land, for some limited time and for specified purposes.195 Importantly, 
these access rights are subject to manner restrictions in that the exercise of the 
access right is presumed to be responsible if it does not cause unreasonable 
interference with the rights of others.196 The access right may not be exercised with 
the use of a car or motorbike.197 These access rights include the right to be on land, 
that is, to go onto and remain on any part of the land and a right to cross land.198 The 
right to be on land extends to certain purposes only. The first is for recreational 
                                            
193
 Lovett JA “The right to exclude meets the right of responsible access: Scotland’s bold experiment 
in public access legislation” (2012) 26 Probate and Property 52-56 53. 
194
 Lovett JA “The right to exclude meets the right of responsible access: Scotland’s bold experiment 
in public access legislation” (2012) 26 Probate and Property 52-56 53; Lovett JA “Progressive 
property in action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 Nebraska Law Review 739-818 
753-759. See also Gray K “Pedestrian democracy and the geography of hope” (2010) 1 Journal of 
Human Rights and Environment 45-65 50, citing Earl of Breadalbane v Livingston (1790) M 4999, as 
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 See the Preamble and Sections 1(1)-(7) of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
196
 Guthrie T “Access rights” in Rennie R (ed) The promised land: Property law reform (2008) 125-146 
134, 137. See also section 2(2) of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
197
 Gretton GL & Steven AJM Property, trusts and succession (2
nd
 ed 2013) 241-256 242-243. See 
also Combe MM “Access to land and landownership” (2010) 14 Edinburgh Law Review 106-113 106. 
198
 Section 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
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purposes.199 Although recreational purposes is not further defined in the LRSA, the 
Scottish Outdoor Access Code200 that was introduced under the legislation gives 
examples such as sightseeing; family and social activities, such as walks, picnics 
and kite flying; horse riding; mountaineering and wild camping as recreational 
activities. The second specified purpose is carrying on a relevant educational 
activity. This is defined as being concerned with furthering understanding of the 
natural or cultural heritage.201 According to the Scottish Outdoor Access Code, the 
LRSA allows access rights to be exercised by a leader and his students on a trip to 
learn about wildlife, landscapes or geological features.202 The third purpose extends 
to activities carried out commercially or for profit, that is, activities carried out by the 
general public for recreational purposes, for educational activities or for crossing 
land.203 
The right to cross land is not restricted in terms of purpose.204 The right to cross 
land is defined as going on to land, passing over it, and then leaving it for the 
purpose of getting from one place outside the land to another place.205 This access 
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 Section 1(3) of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
200
 Scottish Natural Heritage Scottish Outdoor Access Code (2005) para 2.7 available online at 
<http://www.outdooraccess-scotland.com/> (accessed on 05-05-2014). See also Tuley v Highland 
Council [2009] CSIH 31A; 2009 S.L.T 616 concerning an attempt to exclude one of the recreational 
activities, namely horse riding from a particular path. 
201
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202
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<http://www.outdooraccess-scotland.com/> (accessed on 05-05-2014). See also Lovett JA 
“Progressive property in action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 Nebraska Law 
Review 739-818 786. 
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 Guthrie T “Access rights” in Rennie R (ed) The promised land: Property law reform (2008) 125-146 
133. 
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right could encompass activities like taking a short cut across someone’s land to get 
to work, school or a bus stop.206 Basically, the access right conferred by the LRSA 
enables non-owners to go into, pass over and remain on privately owned land for 
recreational, educational or commercial purposes, without a landowner’s prior 
consent.207 The strong presumption in favour of access rights introduced by the 
LRSA is startling, given the exclusionary powers held by landowners under the 
common law. The LRSA also imposes a duty on the landowners to use and manage 
their land in a responsible way.208 This provision invokes the presumption of 
responsible land management, which includes not interfering with the access rights 
of any person exercising or seeking to exercise the access rights.209 
The LRSA prohibits landowners from taking action aimed at preventing or 
deterring the exercise of access rights. This means that landowners are prevented 
from exercising their right to exclude non-owners from their land. The local authority 
has a wide-ranging regulatory role under the Act to ensure that the public has 
reasonable access to land.210 Arguably, the LRSA redefines the right to exclude in 
Scots law by allowing a far broader range of access activities on privately owned 
                                            
206
 Lovett JA “Progressive property in action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 
Nebraska Law Review 739-818 786; Guthrie T “Access rights” in Rennie R (ed) The promised land: 
Property law reform (2008) 125-146 133. 
207
 Combe MM “Access rights: A letter from America” (2012) 16 Edinburgh Law Review 110-113 110. 
208
 Section 3(1)-(2) of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
209
 Section 11 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. See also Lovett JA “Progressive property in 
action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 Nebraska Law Review 739-818 789; Tuley v 
Highland Council [2009] CSIH 31A; (2009) SLT 616 619-620. 
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land. As Lovett puts it, the presumptive power to exclude is replaced by the 
presumption in favour of responsible statutory access rights.211 
The right to roam in England and Wales and in Scotland is a recent statutory 
innovation, which shows the state’s willingness to expand public access rights. The 
introduction of general indefeasible public access rights under the CROW Act and 
the LRSA represents a step on the road towards changing the general view that the 
right to exclude is the core of property. 
The public recreation aspect of access rights is also recognised in US law and 
it looks similar to the Scottish and English right to roam, although it is not recognised 
in legislation but in something like the public trust doctrine.212 According to the public 
trust doctrine, navigable waters, tidal wetlands, beds of navigable waters, and the 
wet sand portion of beaches are held by the sovereign in trust for use by the public in 
connection with commerce, navigation, and fishing.213 In cases where the state 
transfers such property to private owners, the property remains encumbered by the 
public trust.214 The effect is that the landowner’s right to exclude the public is limited 
to protect public access. 
                                            
211
 Lovett JA “Progressive property in action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 
Nebraska Law Review 739-818 742. 
212
 Regarding the public trust doctrine see generally Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to 
property theory (2012) 134; Blumm MC “The public trust doctrine and private property: The 
accommodation principle” (2010) 27 Pace Environmental Law Review 649-668; Van der Schyff E 
“Unpacking the public trust doctrine: A journey into foreign territory” (2010) 13 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 122-159; Byrne PJ “The public trust doctrine, legislation and green property: A 
future convergence?” (2012) 45 University of California Davis Law Review 915-930; Frank RM “The 
public trust doctrine: Assessing its recent past and charting its future” (2012) 45 University of 
California Davis Law Review 665-692. 
213
 Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) 134 (with reference to 
footnote 10). 
214
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The public trust doctrine particularly provides for public access to beaches for 
recreational purposes. Public access to privately owned beaches was historically 
limited,215 the public only being allowed to access land between the mean high and 
low tide lines (wet-sand areas) for purposes of fishing.216 The courts have in recent 
years added the aspect of recreation as one of the purposes for public access to the 
beach.217 The expansion of public beach access relates to privately owned dry sand 
portions of the beach via the public trust doctrine.218 
More strikingly, the courts in New Jersey have resolved issues of beach access 
in a way that expands public access at the expense of the landowner’s right to 
exclude. In Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Association219 the court held that a 
private non-profit entity, which owned or leased most of the beachfront lots in Bay 
Head, did not have an unlimited right to exclude members of the public from the dry 
sand portion of its beach. Furthermore, the court ruled that the public must be given 
reasonable access to the foreshore (wet-sand area) and a suitable area for 
recreation on the dry sand.220 This judgement came about as a result of the fact that 
                                            
215
 Alexander GS “Ownership and obligations: The human flourishing theory of property” (2013) 43 
Hong Kong Law Journal 451-462 459. 
216
 Alexander GS “Ownership and obligations: The human flourishing theory of property” (2013) 43 
Hong Kong Law Journal 451-462 459. See also Rose C “The comedy of the commons: Custom, 
commerce and inherent public property” (1986) 53 University of Chicago Law Review 711-781 713. 
217
 See Alexander GS “Ownership and obligations: The human flourishing theory of property” (2013) 
43 Hong Kong Law Journal 451-462 459, citing Neptune City v Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea 294 A2d 
47 (NJ 1972); Thornton v Hay 462 P2d 671 (Ore 1969); Hixon v Public Service Commission 146 
NW2d 577 (Wis 1966). 
218
 Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 86-87; Alexander GS “Ownership and obligations: 
The human flourishing theory of property” (2013) 43 Hong Kong Law Journal 451-462 459. 
219
 471 A2d 355 (NJ 1984). 
220
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Bay Head Improvement Association was a quasi-public entity.221 The court reasoned 
that where an organisation is quasi-public, its power to exclude must be reasonably 
and lawfully exercised in furtherance of the public welfare related to its public 
characteristics.222 In these instances, the landowner’s property rights, particularly the 
right to exclude, must give way. 
In the subsequent judgement of Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v Atlantis 
Beach Club223 the court expanded the scope of public access to a private beach, 
ruling that the owner of the beach property had a duty to keep the dry sand area 
open to the public. The court further held that a private beach club that was not a 
quasi-public entity was required under the reasonable access norm established in 
Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Association to provide members of the public 
with reasonable access to the beach across its dry sand area.224 The Raleigh 
Avenue Beach Association decision that entitles the public to have access to a 
privately owned beach has a significant restrictive impact on the landowner’s right to 
                                            
221
 In Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Association 471 A2d 355 (NJ 1984) 358 the court stated 
that the ownership, dominion and sovereignty over land covered by tidal waters, which extend to the 
mean high water mark, is vested in the state in trust for the people. Furthermore, ancillary to the 
public’s right to enjoy the tidal lands, the public has a right to gain access through and to use the dry 
sand area not owned by a municipality but by a quasi-public body. See Singer JW Introduction to 
property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 88; Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 
94 Cornell Law Review 745-820 803; Alexander GS “Ownership and obligations: The human 
flourishing theory of property” (2013) 43 Hong Kong Law Journal 451-462 460. 
222
 Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Association 471 A2d 355 (NJ 1984) 366. 
223
 879 A2d 112 (NJ 2005). 
224
 Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v Atlantis Beach Club Inc 879 A2d 125 (NJ 2005). See also 
Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745-820 803; Alexander GS “Ownership and obligations: The human flourishing theory of property” 
(2013) 43 Hong Kong Law Journal 451-462 459-460; Rosser E “An ambition and transformative 
potential of progressive property” (2013) 101 California Law Review 107-172 152-153. 
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exclude.225 Although the ruling in Raleigh Avenue Beach Association preserves the 
owner’s right to exclude, the decision importantly favours public access to the private 
beach for recreational purposes. 
In South African law, public access to the beach for recreational purposes is 
regulated by legislation, which is mostly relevant to coastal zone management.226 
The legal nature of the coast as public land has been recognised since Roman law, 
where the sea and sea-shore were classified as res omnium communes, meaning 
that the area was open to the enjoyment of all and could not be subjected to private 
appropriation.227 This notion was modified in Roman-Dutch law, which classified the 
sea and sea-shore as res publicae, meaning that the area was owned by the 
authorities but as custodian for the use and enjoyment of the people.228 
The National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 
24 of 2008229 provides that the ownership of coastal property, which encompasses 
                                            
225
 Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 745-820 803 argues that Raleigh Avenue Beach Association’s symbolic impact on the right to 
exclude is that it muddies the seemingly crystalline traditional rule that a private owner of the dry-sand 
portion of the beach may exclude others. 
226
 Glazewski J Environmental law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2005) 297-301. 
227
 307. 
228
 Glazewski J Environmental law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2005) 307. See also Van der Merwe CG 
Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 32-34; South African Shore Angling Association and Another v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs 2002 (5) SA 511 (SE) 11. In Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa 
Ltd v Administrator, South West Africa and Another 1958 (4) SA 572 (A) the court held that the public 
has certain simple rights to the foreshore such as to go on it, to bath and to fish and any substantial 
interference with these rights would be a wrongful act. In Anderson and Murison v Colonial 
Government 1891 (8) SC 293 296 the court stated that the government is in one sense the custodian 
of the sea-shore, on behalf of the public. 
229
 See section 11(1). The Sea-Shore Act 21 of 1935 vests ownership of the sea-shore in the State 
President. The Act regulates the accessibility of the sea and sea-shore for the use and enjoyment of 
the public. However, the Act is outdated and not in conformity with the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998. See Couzens EWF “Sea and sea-shore” in Joubert WA & Faris JA 
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the sea-shore, vests in the citizens of the Republic and the state must hold coastal 
public property in trust on behalf of the citizens of the Republic. According to the Act, 
every natural person has reasonable access to coastal public property and is entitled 
to use and enjoy it, provided such use does not adversely affect the rights of 
members of the public to use and enjoy the coastal public property; does not hinder 
the state in the performance of its duty to protect the environment and does not 
cause an adverse effect.230 However, the Act does not prevent prohibitions or 
restrictions on access to and use of any part of the coastal public property which is 
or forms part of a protected area; to protect the environment; in the interest of the 
whole community; in the interest of national security or in the national interest.231 The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism may declare any state-owned land as 
coastal public property, inter alia to improve public access to the sea-shore.232 In 
addition, each municipality whose area includes coastal public property must make a 
by-law that designates strips of land as coastal access land to secure public access 
                                                                                                                                       
(eds) The law of South Africa volume 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) 107-200 para 141; Glazewski J Environmental 
law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2005) 307, 309. Kidd M Environmental law (2
nd
 ed 2011) 229 argues that 
the coastal zone is ecologically sensitive and therefore ought to be subject to special land-use 
controls. The National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008 
now regulates the coastal zone and the Sea-Shore Act only applies to provinces to which it has been 
assigned. 
230
 See section 13(1)(a)-(b) of the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal 
Management Act 24 of 2008. 
231
 See section 13(2) of the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management 
Act 24 of 2008. 
232
 See sections 7, 8(1)(a) of the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal 
Management Act 24 of 2008 for the composition and extension of coastal public property. See also 
Couzens EWF “Sea and sea-shore” in Joubert WA & Faris JA (eds) The law of South Africa volume 
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to that land.233 The coastal access land is subject to a public access servitude in 
favour of the local municipality where the land is situated and in terms of which 
members of the public may use that land to gain access to coastal public property.234 
The question that arises when dealing with recreational activities relates to the 
public’s legal right of access to the sea-shore over private property.235 In principle, 
the public has access rights to the sea-shore but there are instances where the 
public is denied access by private land owners whose land abuts the high-water 
mark and who assert private property rights to prevent people from traversing their 
land.236 The provision of coastal access land will undoubtedly affect private land and 
limit the landowner’s right to exclude. The Act prescribes factors that the 
municipalities have to take into account when designating the access areas, 
including the importance of not restricting the rights of landowners unreasonably.237 
Accordingly, the legislation provides the public with reasonable access to the sea-
shore and it also regulates where the public can have access, what kind of access is 
required and by whom. 
 
(d) A second category of legislation recognises access rights to land when a 
landowner who wants to carry out work on his property requires him or his workers to 
gain access to a neighbour’s land for that purpose. In English common law, anyone 
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 See section 18(1) of the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management 
Act 24 of 2008. 
234
 See section 18(2) of the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management 
Act 24 of 2008. 
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who wished to enter a neighbour’s land for the purpose of carrying out work on his 
land required the consent of the neighbouring owner.238 This position has been 
significantly changed by legislation that grants access to neighbouring landowners. 
The Access to Neighbouring Land Act 1992 (UK) empowers the relevant courts to 
grant the owner of dominant land access to the servient land for the purpose of 
carrying out work, without the consent of the owner of the servient land.239 The 
access order granted by the court permits the exercise of access rights only for the 
purpose of facilitating certain types of work on the dominant land for a limited period 
of time.240 The Act only allows compulsory access in respect of work that is 
reasonably necessary for the preservation of the dominant land.241 For example, the 
court may grant an access order that allows the owner of the dominant land to carry 
out works, which include the maintenance, repair or renewal of any part of a building 
or other structure that is situated on the dominant land, to preserve it.242 
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 Grattan S “Proprietarian conceptions of statutory access rights” in Cooke E (ed) Modern studies in 
property law volume 2 (2003) 353-374 353. See also Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 Howell’s State 
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239
 Section 3(1), (2) and (7) of the Access to Neighbouring Land Act 1992 (UK). See also Grattan S 
“Proprietarian conceptions of statutory access rights” in Cooke E (ed) Modern studies in property law 
volume 2 (2003) 353-374 353; Gray K & Gray SF “The rhetoric of realty” in Getzler J (ed) 
Rationalizing property, equity and trusts: Essays in honour of Edward Burn (2003) 204-280 260. 
240
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conceptions of statutory access rights” in Cooke E (ed) Modern studies in property law volume 2 
(2003) 353-374 354. 
241
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order authorises the applicant to bring onto and leave on the servient land such materials, plant and 
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sections 3(1) and 4(1) of the Access to Neighbouring Land Act 1992 (UK). 
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Furthermore, the Party Wall etc Act 1996 (UK) confers upon a building owner, 
his servants, agents, workmen and surveyors the right to enter and remain on land, 
during usual working hours, for purposes of executing works in pursuance of the 
Act.243 The Act relates to works which a neighbouring landowner may desire to carry 
out where an adjoining wall (party wall) with a neighbour’s property might be 
affected. For example, if a landowner wants to alter the structure of the adjoining 
wall, he is required in terms of the Act to serve a notice to an adjoining landowner.244 
If the adjoining landowner does not consent, the building landowner is allowed by the 
Act to build the wall but only at his own expense.245 The general effect of the 
legislation permitting access rights for work purposes in English law is that 
landowners are required to allow other people (workers or owners of neighbouring 
land) onto their private land for reasons specified in the statutes. This imposes a 
limitation on their right to exclude. 
 
3 4 Limitations imposed by common law 
Sometimes an efficient exploitation of one’s land requires that a landowner in one 
way or another be allowed to have access to his neighbour’s land in a situation 
where it is for some reason impossible to get permission or consent. This creates a 
conflict of interests between the affected landowner who might want to exclude 
others from engaging in any activity on his land and the neighbouring landowner who 
might want access to the land in question for specific purposes. This section focuses 
                                            
243
 Sections 1(4)-(7), 2(1)-(2) of the Party Wall etc Act 1996 (UK) provide certain rights to a building 
owner, in the absence of a court order and without the adjoining landowner’s consent, subject only to 
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on two examples. The first is the right of way of necessity, which is not dependent on 
the consent of the affected owner but is acquired by way of a court order.246 A right 
of way of necessity constitutes a limitation on the ownership of neighbouring land. 
The second example involves encroachment, when a neighbour encroaches on 
another’s land without his consent and the court orders that the encroachment be left 
in place, sometimes against payment of compensation.247 Both examples illustrate 
instances where common law principles limit a landowner’s right to exclude by 
granting an access right to a non-owner without the landowner’s consent. 
The Roman-Dutch principles regarding the way of necessity are still applicable 
in South African law.248 A right of way of necessity is a right that an owner of 
inaccessible property has, in the absence of a consensual right of servitude, to pass 
over the property of adjoining owners to the nearest public road.249 A way of 
                                            
246
 For a comprehensive discussion on the right of way of necessity see Raphulu TN Right of way of 
necessity: A constitutional analysis (2013) unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch University; Van der 
Walt AJ & Raphulu TN “The right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis” (2014) 77 Tydskrif vir 
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forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 
1363-1413 1365. 
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undeveloped. See also Southwood MD The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 95. 
249
 Carter v Driemeyer and Another (1913) 34 NPD 1 3. See also Van der Walt AJ “Sharing 
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Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
165 
 
necessity is classified as a praedial servitude.250 A praedial servitude constitutes a 
burden imposed on one piece of land (servient tenement) in favour of another piece 
of land (dominant tenement).251 If it is for some reason impossible to reach 
agreement between the landowners to create or establish a right of way for the 
landlocked property to gain access to the public road, the courts can grant a 
servitude of way of necessity over a specified servient tenement and along a 
specified route.252 
                                            
250
 Southwood MD The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 96. There are two types of way of 
necessity recognised in South African law, namely a permanent way of necessity (jus viae plenum) 
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“The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 
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th
 ed 2007) 591-629 598-
599; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
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nd
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South African law does not allow a person to claim a way of necessity if he 
himself has created the situation of necessity.253 In Van Rensburg v Coetzee254 the 
court held that a claim for a right of way of necessity arises when a piece of land is 
geographically isolated and has no access, or if access is available but inadequate 
with the effect that its owner “has no reasonably sufficient access to the public road 
for himself and his servants to enable him, if he is a farmer, to carry on his farming 
operations”.255 Apart from agricultural reasons, access is also granted to 
accommodate the needs of landlocked residential and commercial property.256 
A permanent right of way affords the dominant tenement the use and 
enjoyment of a full right of way, on a continuous basis, over the servient land.257 The 
content of a way of necessity is determined with reference to the width of the road, 
the frequency of use, and the type of traffic that will make use of the road,258 based 
                                                                                                                                       
servient owner) refuses to allow the owner of the other land (dominant owner) a right of way over his 
land. 
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257
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on the economic needs of the enclosed land.259 Accordingly, if farming operations 
are conducted on the enclosed land, the way of necessity should provide an entry 
and exit for agricultural implements and machinery, trucks, and other motor 
vehicles.260 
Before the court grants a way of necessity neither the dominant nor the servient 
owner’s rights are affected.261 A right of way of necessity binds the surrounding 
properties as of right at the moment the property becomes landlocked. However, 
once it is established, this right of way can only be enforced by a court order, against 
a specific neighbouring property. The court order extends to all other persons who 
visit the owner of the dominant tenement in the normal course of events.262 The 
affected landowner is bound by the court order and has to tolerate the use of part of 
his land for access to the public road.263 The effect is that the servient owner’s right 
to exclude as well as his right to free and unburdened ownership is limited.264 
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with regard to ways of necessity that relaxes the strict requirement that the land must be completely 
landlocked, in favour of the principle that ways of necessity can be granted to improve the economic 
exploitation of land in general. See also Van der Merwe CG “The Louisiana right to forced passage 
compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1412-
1413. 
260
 Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 671E. 
261
 Southwood MD The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 115. 
262
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 328. 
263
 Van der Merwe CG “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way 
of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1372. 
264
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 453; Van der Merwe CG “The Louisiana 
right to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law 
Review 1363-1413 1364-1365, 1372. 
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Compensation is therefore required to soften the effect of any loss suffered by the 
servient owner. 
Another example of limitations originating ex lege from common law principles 
in the area of neighbour law is the case where a building encroaches on another’s 
property without his consent.265 Generally speaking, encroachment concerns the 
unlawful intrusion of material objects, into, onto or over the land of the neighbour, for 
example a building erected wholly or substantially on a neighbour’s land.266 In 
general, this wrong is regarded as a disturbance of possession that requires a 
remedy.267 The remedy that the South African common law allows in such a case is 
for an affected landowner to approach the courts for an order of removal of the 
encroaching structure on his land.268 Removal of the encroaching structure is the 
                                            
265
 There are two recognised forms of encroachment, namely building works and overhanging 
branches and intruding roots of trees. Both forms result in a permanent physical invasion of the 
neighbouring land when the encroachment violates the boundary line demarcating the two properties, 
and thereby encroaches on the land of another. This dissertation focuses only on instances where 
building encroachments are left in place by court order. See Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours 
(2010) 132. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 121. 
266
 Milton JRL “The law of neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-269 145, 234; Van der 
Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 201-203; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 121-127. 
267
 Milton JRL “The law of neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-269 234. 
268
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 202; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg 
& Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 121-127; Milton JRL “The law of neighbours in South 
Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-269 237; Van der Merwe CG & Cilliers JB “The ‘year and a day rule’ in 
South African law: Do our courts have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of 
structural encroachments on neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 587-593 588; Van der Walt AJ “Replacing property rules with liability rules: 
Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 592-628 592; Boggenpoel ZT “The 
discretion of courts in encroachment disputes [discussion of Phillips v South African National Parks 
Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010)]” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law Review 252-264 
255. See also Pike v Hamilton, Ross & Co (1855) 2 Searle 191 196, 198, 200; Van Boom v Visser 
(1904) 21 SC 360 361; Stark v Broomberg (1904) 14 CTR 135 137. 
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default remedy for encroachments and it also acts as a declaration of the affected 
landowner’s rights.269 Van der Merwe points out that the remedy is a mandatory 
interdict (injunctive relief) to enable the removal of the encroachment so that an 
owner can continue enjoying the full and undisturbed use of his property.270 The 
purpose of the remedy of removal is to restore the status quo ante.271 The right of an 
owner to demand removal would, in principle, seem to be absolute for he is 
vindicating the freedom of his property from unlawful interference.272 The right to 
insist on the removal of the encroachment is consistent with the concept of 
ownership as the most extensive real right which a person can have in respect of an 
object, whether movable or immovable.273 Accordingly, the basis of the remedy of 
removal is that the landowner can exercise his ownership rights free of any 
interference.274 
The problem occurs in cases when the court exercises its discretion in favour of 
leaving the encroachment in place instead of removal, thereby denying the affected 
                                            
269
 Pike v Hamilton, Ross & Co (1855) 2 Searle 191. See subsequent cases Van Boom v Visser 
(1904) 21 SC 360; Stark v Broomberg (1904) 14 CTR 135 137. 
270
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 201-201; Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 
133. The encroachment has a direct physical impact on the affected landowner’s undisturbed and full 
enjoyment of his land. This is because the encroacher is not exercising his ownership entitlements but 
is interfering with the neighbouring landowner’s entitlement of use and enjoyment. With regard to the 
effects of the permanent physical intrusion posed by an encroachment, see Boss Foods CC v Ingo 
Rehders Properties and Another [2014] ZAGPJHC 236 (26 May 2014) para 39. 
271
 Boggenpoel ZT “Creating a servitude to solve an encroachment dispute: A solution or creating 
another problem?” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 455-486 466. 
272
 Milton JRL “The law of neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-269 241. 
273
 Van der Merwe CG & Cilliers JB “The ‘year and a day rule’ in South African law: Do our courts 
have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of structural encroachments on 
neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 587-593 588. 
274
 Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 133, citing Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 
1989) 201-202; Boggenpoel ZT “Creating a servitude to solve an encroachment dispute: A solution or 
creating another problem?” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 455-486 455. 
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landowner’s right to demand removal. What has crystallised in a number of fairly 
recent cases is that courts are not shy to exercise their discretion to award 
compensation in place of removal.275 The discretion of the court is wide and 
equitable and depends on the circumstances in the particular case. The court will 
usually take the extent and nature of the encroachment into consideration, for 
example, the size of the encroachment to determine whether removal or 
compensation would be the appropriate remedy.276 
                                            
275
 Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). In this case, the plaintiff sought an 
order precluding the defendant from removing the encroachment that covered 80 percent of his 
property. It was questioned whether removal should be ordered in favour of the defendant or whether 
the court should exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff, leaving the encroachment in place. 
The court decided in favour of the plaintiff and denied the order for removal of the encroachment. See 
also Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Phillips v South African National 
Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) para 21. In Roseveare v Katmer, Katmer 
v Roseveare and Another (2010/44337, 2010/41862) [2013] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 February 2013) para 
15 the court confirmed that courts generally have a discretion in encroachment cases to award 
compensation instead of the removal of the encroaching structure. See also Van der Walt AJ The law 
of neighbours (2010) 161; Boggenpoel ZT “The discretion of courts in encroachment disputes 
[discussion of Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 
2010)]” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law Review 252-264 255; Boggenpoel ZT “Creating a servitude to 
solve an encroachment dispute: A solution or creating another problem?” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 455-486 455, 465; Boggenpoel ZT “Property” 2014 (1) Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law para 2 2 2. In most encroachment cases, the courts do not explain the 
implications of its decision to award compensation in place of removal – on the ownership of the 
affected land. See in this regard Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 130. 
See also Van der Walt AJ “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2008) 125 South African Law Journal 592-628 596. It is questionable whether courts can order 
transfer of the encroached-upon land in addition to compensation. See Boggenpoel ZT “Compulsory 
transfer of encroached-upon land: A constitutional analysis” (2013) 76 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 313-326. 
276
 Boggenpoel ZT “The discretion of courts in encroachment disputes [discussion of Phillips v South 
African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010)” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 252-264. See also Boss Foods CC v Ingo Rehders Properties and Another [2014] 
ZAGPJHC 236 (26 May 2014). 
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In instances where the default remedy is not applied strictly, the affected 
landowner is left with no choice but to accept the continued existence of the 
encroachment, even if it is large and significant.277 In the process, the court’s 
decision to leave the encroachment in place and award compensation may prevent 
the landowner from enforcing his right to exclude.278 This constitutes a deviation from 
the long-standing common law remedy of removal of the encroaching structure.279 
There are three kinds of losses that can result from an encroachment when the 
courts decide to leave it intact. The encroachment results in a permanent loss of use 
and enjoyment of a portion of the affected landowner’s property280 if the affected 
landowner is forced to accept the existence of the encroaching structure, sometimes 
in exchange for compensation.281 In some instances, the courts have actually 
                                            
277
 In Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O), the court stated that it would be 
willing to exercise its discretion in favour of damages instead of removal. Similarly, in Trustees, Brian 
Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 26-28, the court exercised its discretion to deny 
removal and left the encroachment in place. See also Boss Foods CC v Ingo Rehders Properties and 
Another [2014] ZAGPJHC 236 (26 May 2014); Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers (Pty) Limited 
vs Trustee of the Capital Property Trust Collective Investment Scheme in Property (unreported, 10 
December 2013: GJ case no 41882/12). See Boggenpoel ZT “Property” 2014 (1) Juta’s Quarterly 
Review of South African Law para 2 2 2 for a detailed discussion of the Fedgroup case. 
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 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 171; Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours 
(2010) 139-194. 
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 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 130; Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 17-31; Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) 
[2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] para 21. See also Van der Walt AJ “Replacing property rules 
with liability rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 592-628 592-
600. 
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 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 218 (C). See also Van der Walt AJ “Replacing property rules with liability 
rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 592-628 622. 
281
 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Lombard v Fischer [2003] 1 All SA 
698 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 218 (C). See also Temmers Z 
Building encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership (2010) unpublished LLD dissertation 
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purported to create a servitude in favour of the encroacher to explain what happens 
when the encroachment is not removed.282 Another outcome that could result from 
an encroachment is that a court explicitly orders that the encroached-upon land be 
transferred to the encroaching neighbour.283 The landowner’s right to exclude is 
significantly limited regardless of whether the order is simply to leave the 
encroachment in place; a servitude is created; or transfer of the encroached-upon 
land is ordered.284 This results in an effective or actual transfer of the land or other 
                                                                                                                                       
Stellenbosch University 144-145; Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 195-202; Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 453-454. 
282
 Recently in Roseveare v Katmer, Katmer v Roseveare and Another (2010/44337, 2010/41862) 
[2013] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 February 2013) the court dealt with a dispute between neighbours 
concerning an encroaching boundary wall between two neighbours. The boundary wall encroachment 
resulted in a portion of the plaintiff’s land being incorporated as part of the defendant’s land. The court 
ordered the plaintiff (affected landowner) to register a servitude in favour of the defendant 
(encroacher) in respect of the remaining area of the encroachment. It is unclear whether the court has 
the authority to make such an order and what the constitutional implications are. See Boggenpoel ZT 
“Property” 2013 (1) Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law para 2 3 1. Boggenpoel ZT 
“Creating a servitude to solve an encroachment dispute: A solution or creating another problem?” 
(2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 455-486 469 argues that the Roseveare judgement 
does not entirely clarify the basis on which the court assumes the power to additionally order that a 
servitude be created to preserve the existing situation (that is in a case where the encroachment 
remains intact). An important aspect to note is that the servitude in this case is created by court order 
against the will of the affected landowner and without his consent. The possibility of creating such a 
servitude in encroachment cases did not exist under the common law. See Roseveare v Katmer, 
Katmer v Roseveare and Another (2010/44337, 2010/41862) [2013] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 February 
2013) paras 8, 22. See also Boggenpoel ZT “Property” 2013 (1) Juta’s Quarterly Review of South 
African Law para 2 3 1; Boggenpoel ZT “Creating a servitude to solve an encroachment dispute: A 
solution or creating another problem?” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 455-486 469, 
479. 
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 Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 196; Boggenpoel ZT “Compulsory transfer of 
encroached-upon land: A constitutional analysis” (2013) 76 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 313-326 314. See also Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] 
ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) para 9. 
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 In this regard see Boggenpoel ZT “The discretion of courts in encroachment disputes [discussion 
of Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010)” 
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entitlements of ownership like use, the right to exclude and the right of disposal with 
regard to the particular portion of land.285 
 
3 5 Conclusion 
The constitutional perspective adopted in this chapter had an influence on the 
decision to focus on the different origins of limitations. This chapter shows that the 
Constitution, legislation and common law principles that grant access and use rights 
to non-owners, for various purposes, impose limitations on the right to exclude. This 
observation is in line with the developments in literature concerning situations in 
which access to land is upheld at the expense of a landowner’s right to exclude.286 
An overview of the limitations on the right to exclude indicates that limitations with 
different origins work in different ways. The origins of the limitations show the 
purpose for the limitation, the nature of the limitation and how it is implemented. 
                                                                                                                                       
(2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law Review 252-264 259; Boggenpoel ZT “Creating a servitude to solve an 
encroachment dispute: A solution or creating another problem?” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 455-486 456. 
285
 The creation of a servitude and the instances in which the court orders transfer of property has far-
reaching implications because a forced transfer of property rights occurs and this needs to comply 
with section 25 of the Constitution. An interesting question is whether the effect the encroachment has 
on the landowner’s right to exclude where a court transfers ownership rights or entitlements from the 
affected landowner, against his will, to the encroacher, can be justified and whether it can pass 
constitutional muster. This is discussed in Chapter 4 below. 
286
 Alexander GS “The social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 745-820 746-748; Dagan H “The social responsibility of ownership” (2007) 92 Cornell Law 
Review 1255-1274 1255-1256; Singer JW “Democratic estates: Property Law in a free and 
democratic society” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 1009-1062 1048; Singer JW “Property as the law 
of democracy” (2014) 63 Duke Law Journal 1287-1335; Alexander GS “Property’s ends: The 
publicness of private law values” (2014) 99 Iowa Law Review 1257-1296. These sources and many 
others in this regard are discussed in the preceding chapter (Chapter 2 section 2 2 4), which looks at 
theoretical justifications for limiting the landowner’s right to exclude. 
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If the limitation originates from the Constitution, the reason for the limitation is 
the Constitution. This means that if the limitation results from protecting non-property 
constitutional rights such as life, equality and dignity, the limitation is stronger than 
the right to exclude because it is constitutional and the right to exclude is not. The 
specific constitutional right precedes the right to exclude and thus limitations on the 
latter are inherent in the constitutional system. The limitation takes on a very specific 
meaning, which indicates that the right to undermine someone else’s right to life, 
dignity and equality was not included in the notion of ownership and is not part of the 
right to exclude. Courts are inclined to secure non-property constitutional rights like 
life, human dignity and equality at the cost of the landowner’s right to exclude 
because those rights are by nature unqualified. Therefore, in cases where access to 
land is essential to the protection of these constitutional rights, they are upheld. The 
constitutional limitations are different in that resolving a conflict between the right to 
exclude and one of the non-property constitutional rights does not involve balancing, 
because those rights cannot be limited or qualified.287 The equality cases belong to 
the legislative category because PEPUDA and public accommodations laws place 
statutory limitations on the right to exclude. 
If the limitation originates in legislation, the purpose of the limitation appears 
from the legislation in question. Often the legislation goes further than that; it shows 
how to do the balancing and how to resolve the conflict. When the right to exclude 
clashes with a constitutionally and statutorily protected right such as free speech or 
movement, it is the legislation that implements limitations on the right to exclude and 
that shows why and how it is limited. The conflict is resolved by balancing the two 
                                            
287
 The reason for the limitation in these cases comes from the Constitution. In Chapter 4 I argue that 
the section 25(1) analysis is not relevant in these cases. 
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conflicting rights in accordance with the legislation. In such cases, there is no 
overriding of the right to exclude; instead, it is limited in a specific way by balancing it 
against a statutory right. The conflicting rights are both subject to limitation and 
regulation and they can therefore be balanced against each other in a way that 
accommodates both rights. Therefore, it is never a question purely of overriding the 
right to exclude but of accommodating the conflicting rights. 
Limitations originating in common law are similar to statutory ones except that 
the reasons for them are not just policy in a broad sense but also balance of 
convenience. Limiting the right to exclude on a balance of convenience does not 
appear from the statutory examples, but that is the justification for the common law 
example of encroachment. If there is a dispute, the common law shows how to do 
the balancing and how to resolve the conflict. The common law examples involve 
overriding the right to exclude; usually, the affected landowner is awarded 
compensation. In statutory cases, compensation is sometimes awarded but it is the 
exception rather than the rule. For example, when the right to freedom of speech that 
is regulated by legislation clashes with the right to exclude, it is never the case that 
the owner whose right is limited is paid compensation, but instead, both rights are 
upheld. The legislation, and sometimes the landowner, imposes time, place and 
manner restrictions that determine when and how the right to exclude is limited. 
Contrary to the common law examples, the conflicting rights are therefore mutually 
accommodated and balanced. The common law limitations are different because 
they usually involve weighing of the competing interests to determine the suitable 
outcome, and if the landowner’s right is limited compensation is often payable. 
To conclude, analysis of the different origins of limitations imposed on the right 
to exclude confirms that ownership functions not only within a legal system but also 
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in a constitutional system that includes limitations. Therefore, justification for the 
limitation does not entail justifying the existence of the limitation but rather regulating 
the implementation and effect of the limitation. 
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Chapter four:  
Justifications 
 
4 1 Introduction 
The questions in this chapter are: what are the justifications for limiting the right to 
exclude by affording access rights to non-owners? Are these limitations 
constitutionally justifiable? Must the limitations caused by access rights be justified in 
all cases? These questions do not only entail whether there are sufficient reasons to 
justify non-owners’ access rights but also whether there are legitimate reasons to 
justify why landowners should carry such a burden. The broader question concerns 
the justifications for granting non-owners access rights to land, without the 
landowner’s permission or prior consent. 
Conclusions from preceding chapters suggest that the right to exclude is after 
all not so central to property law and hence some limitations are not difficult to 
justify.1 I established in Chapter 2 that the strong view of absoluteness requires 
normative justifications for the existence of these limitations, whereas the qualified 
view of absoluteness does not necessarily require such a strong normative 
justification. Justification on normative grounds is based on the assumption that 
ownership is in principle unlimited, that is, it is pre-social and pre-constitutional. As 
appears in Chapter 2, this assumption is theoretically and doctrinally weak. 
Therefore, one can assume that property rights are in principle limited and contextual 
in the sense that they function within a legal system of which limitations are an 
                                            
1
 In both Chapters 2 and 3 I established that the right to exclude is not absolute and that it is subject 
to limitations. 
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inherent part. The sources of the various limitations, for example the Constitution, 
statutes and common law, have already been established in Chapter 3. At the end of 
Chapter 3 I established that property rights are also part of a constitutional system. 
What remains to be considered is whether the limitations discussed in Chapter 3 are 
justifiable in the constitutional setting. 
In the constitutional perspective, it is not necessary to consider justification on 
normative grounds. Instead, two other types of justification are discussed in this 
chapter, arguing from the assumption that ownership is not in principle unlimited. 
The two types of justification that are relevant in the constitutional context involve the 
authority of a specific limitation and the section 25(1)2 justification for the effect that a 
specific limitation has on specific owners. Section 25(1)-type justification is only 
relevant if there is a constitutional property clause, as is the case in South African 
law.3 
The first type of justification discussed in this chapter entails that there must be 
authority and a statutory or policy reason for imposing a specific limitation on the 
landowner’s right to exclude. The justificatory grounds that usually justify limitations 
on the right to exclude in this sense include direct obligations arising from non-
                                            
2
 Section 25 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3
 In the absence of a property clause this process might adopt a different form, such as constitutional 
review. The South African property clause provides that “no one may be deprived of property except 
in terms of the law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. 
Section 25(1)-(3) of the Constitution guarantees the protection of existing property rights against 
unconstitutional interference, while section 25(5)-(9) provides a guarantee of state action to promote 
land and other related reforms. Section 25(4) is an interpretative provision that applies to both 
sections 25(1)-(3) and 25(5)-(9). The property clause also embodies a commitment to land reform. 
The result is that property rights (including the right to exclude) are subject to regulatory restrictions, 
in the form of legislation, to carry out the necessary reforms. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 12-16. 
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property constitutional rights; legislation giving effect to non-property constitutional 
rights; legislation that does not give effect to non-property constitutional rights; and 
common law principles applying to non-consensual access rights. The right to 
exclude is limited for particular purposes, such as furthering public policy or 
advancing land reform. The justification for the limitation of the right to exclude in 
these cases is often a matter of how well it serves these specific purposes. 
Secondly, for a specific limitation, in a particular case, the section 25(1)-type 
justification may also be necessary. In addition to the law of general application 
requirement section 25(1) justification adopts the form of the non-arbitrariness 
requirement. The non-arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1) is a proportionality-
based test that ensures that the effects of a particular limitation are justified in the 
sense that they are not unjustifiably unfair or disproportionate. Limitations emanating 
directly from a constitutional provision, without intervening legislation, might not 
require the section 25(1) justification, or proportionality justification, at least not 
always,4 because the rights to life, dignity and equality cannot be balanced against 
the right to exclude. 
Accordingly, the discussion of the justifications for limiting the right to exclude in 
this chapter does not focus on the reasons for granting non-owners access rights, 
but rather on the authority for and the effects of limiting the landowner’s right to 
exclude. These justifications are analysed from a constitutional perspective. 
 
 
 
                                            
4
 See the discussion below in section 4 2 1. 
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4 2 Justification for a specific limitation 
4 2 1 Non-property constitutional rights 
From the point of view adopted in Chapter 2, the right to exclude others may or may 
not be central to the notion of ownership, but it is not absolute and it can be assumed 
that property is limited in principle. Limitations therefore always are possible, the 
remaining question being only how they are imposed and what their effects are. In a 
constitutional context, particularly the South African context, non-property 
constitutional rights such as the right to life, human dignity and equality are so 
fundamental that their protection sometimes requires limiting the right to exclude.5 
The right to exclude sometimes clashes with non-property constitutional rights of 
non-owners who need access to property to exercise their constitutional rights such 
as the right to life, dignity and equality. When there is a clash between the right to 
exclude and one of these rights, the courts tend to uphold the non-property 
constitutional rights. The case law dealing with the clash between the landowner’s 
right to exclude and non-property constitutional rights indicates that where the 
protection of rights like life, equality and dignity depends on access to land, the right 
to exclude is limited accordingly.6 
                                            
5
 In the German law context Grimm D “Dignity in a legal context and as an absolute right” in 
McCrudden C (ed) Understanding human dignity (2013) 381-391 387-388 explains that dignity is 
regarded as an absolute right and that every infringement of it is a violation. 
6
 Arguing from a German law perspective, Grimm D “Dignity in a legal context and as an absolute 
right” in McCrudden C (ed) Understanding human dignity (2013) 381-391 388 states that dignity as an 
absolute right always trumps and no limitation can be justified if it is at stake. The argument that Fox 
O’Mahony makes in her work on property outsiders and displacement through eviction especially of 
vulnerable people (old age people), provides further theoretical support for the argument that I make 
in this dissertation regarding non-property constitutional rights such as right to life, dignity and 
equality. Although her work is not based on the South African Constitution, her argument is more or 
less the same that there are stronger constitutional rights that should override the right to exclude. 
See Fox O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA “The idea of home in law: Displacement and dispossession” in 
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The purpose of justification in this context is to determine the authority for 
limiting the right to exclude so as to secure non-property constitutional rights of non-
owners with regard to the land. These rights are not generally subject to democratic 
deliberation, regulation and/or limitation7 and therefore the justificatory process does 
not involve a proportionality-type balancing of the conflicting rights.8 The justification 
in these cases involves the determination of reasons whether the right to exclude is 
indeed limited to secure and protect non-property constitutional rights, and whether 
there is valid authority for the limitation. The authority is usually constitutional. 
The decision in State of New Jersey v Shack9 confirms that the right to exclude 
is limited on constitutional grounds if the exclusion of non-owners from privately 
owned land would result in an interference with fundamental non-property 
constitutional rights such as life and dignity. Van der Walt explains that the court in 
State of New Jersey v Shack treated the conflict between the landowner’s right to 
exclude and migrant farmworkers’ right to life and dignity as a matter of determining 
where the limits of the right to exclude have to be drawn to secure the constitutional 
right to life and dignity.10 The court did not balance the conflicting rights against each 
other, but secured the right to life and dignity by accepting that the right to exclude is 
qualified and determining where the limits of exclusion have to be drawn to ensure 
                                                                                                                                       
Fox O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA (eds) The idea of home in law: Displacement and dispossession 
(2011); Fox O’Mahony L Home equity and ageing owners: Between risk and regulation (2012); Fox 
O’Mahony L “Property outsiders and the hidden politics of doctrinalism” (2014) 62 Current Legal 
Problems 409-445. 
7
 See Chapter 3, section 3 2 above. See also Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of 
property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property and Society 15-106 45. 
8
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 51, 61. 
9
 58 NJ 297 (1971). 
10
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 55. 
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that the right to life and dignity is protected.11 The decision highlights the fact that 
limiting the right to exclude is constitutionally justified because of the need to protect 
and uphold the right to life and dignity of migrant farmworkers.12 
The constitutional protection of fundamental rights also justified the limitation of 
the right to exclude in Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police 
Commissioner of the Western Cape and Others,13 where the court dismissed the 
argument that the landowners have a right to exclude that needs to be protected. In 
South African law, fundamental rights are not ranked hierarchically, but the 
Constitutional Court has established that the right to life and dignity are the most 
important human rights and the source of all other rights in the Bill of Rights.14 The 
Victoria and Alfred Waterfront decision strengthens the argument that when the right 
to exclude clashes with a fundamental right such as the right to life, the question is 
not a justification for limiting the right to exclude, but instead for the view that 
property is inherently limited and that the right to exclude is relative. A fundamental 
right such as the right to life justifiably imposes limitations on the landowner’s right to 
exclude non-owners from the premises, which practically form a suburb of Cape 
                                            
11
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 55. 
12
 See also Folgueras v Hassle 331 F Supp 615 (1971) 624-632. 
13
 [2004] 1 All SA 579 (C) 448. Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons 
from American takings jurisprudence (2006) 11-12 states that “the South African Constitution 
recognises duties as well as rights and stresses as its core value human dignity rather than individual 
liberty.” He adds that the Constitution recognises specifically enumerated social and economic rights 
as positive constitutional rights. 
14
 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 144, 146, 214, 217. Currie I & De Waal J The bill of 
rights handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 250-253, 258-259 argue that the right to life and dignity are unqualified 
and are given stronger protection than other rights. See also Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa volume 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2005) ch 36 1-75 19-24; Van 
der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property and 
Society 15-106 49. 
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Town. The right to life includes the right to a livelihood and, in this case, the right to 
beg for a living. To ratify a blanket entry prohibition against the affected persons 
would interfere with their source of livelihood and would impact on their right to life. 
The court referred to Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation,15 where the 
Supreme Court of India held that the right to life, which encompasses the right to a 
livelihood, is a fundamental constitutional right that cannot be waived.16 The 
exclusion of the pavement and slum dwellers would have amounted to a deprivation 
of their means of a livelihood and consequently their right to life. Since the right to life 
must be protected without qualification, the right to exclude had to give way. 
The right to equality also places a limitation on the right to exclude that requires 
justification. The limitation emanates from a constitutional provision and is also 
embodied in legislation, which makes the right to equality slightly different from the 
right to life and dignity, although it remains unqualified. Public accommodations 
laws17 were enacted in the US to protect the public against exclusion from public 
accommodations on the grounds of race.18 These public accommodations laws limit 
the landowner’s right to exclude, but the limitations are justified because they secure 
and promote the right to non-discrimination. In South African law PEPUDA has 
similar effects. PEPUDA was enacted to give effect to section 9 of the Constitution 
(the equality provision). PEPUDA reflects the goal of a democratic and constitutional 
society, where landowners are prevented from excluding non-owners on the grounds 
of race, gender and disability. PEPUDA and public accommodations laws limit the 
                                            
15
 (1986) SC 180 para 32. See also Tellis and Others v Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others 
[1987] LRC (Const) 351. 
16
 The right to life is entrenched in article 21 of the Constitution of India 1949. 
17
 Such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
18
 Singer JW Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 45-86. 
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landowner’s right to exclude to protect and promote public interests as well as to 
ensure equal treatment of all persons. 
The point in this section is that when the right to exclude clashes with non-
property constitutional rights such as rights to life, dignity and equality, the exercise 
of the right to exclude is limited insofar as it is necessary to secure and protect these 
constitutional rights. In such cases, it is not expected that the non-property 
constitutional rights should be limited to accommodate the right to exclude because 
these rights are unqualified. In addition, it is impossible to limit the right to life, dignity 
and equality without undermining them. Therefore, a proportionality-based 
justification will not apply in these cases because the non-property constitutional 
rights cannot be weighed against the right to exclude.19 
Justification in this context does not involve justifying the existence of 
limitations. This section assumes that limitations are in general justified if there is a 
reason for them and their effect is proportionate. The reason for the limitation is the 
non-property constitutional rights, and the authority for the limitation is the 
Constitution. With regard to the equality cases, the authority for the limitation is the 
legislation specifically enacted to give effect to the right to equality. If the effect of the 
limitation is an issue, section 25 of the Constitution or other proportionality tests may 
follow, but usually not required because preventing a landowner from discriminating 
does not result in loss of a valuable property entitlement. The intervening legislation 
means that one has to at least consider the section 25(1)-type justification because 
the legislation needs to be properly introduced and implemented. 
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 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
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4 2 2 Legislation directly giving effect to a non-property constitutional right 
This section examines the justificatory grounds that are usually considered when the 
landowner’s right to exclude is limited when it clashes with legislatively-enforced, 
constitutionally protected non-property rights. The legislation limits the right to 
exclude so as to protect constitutional rights such as the right to freedom of speech, 
strike and picket, freedom of movement, and secure tenure. These non-property 
constitutional rights limit the right to exclude, but since they are subject to democratic 
deliberation, regulation and limitation20 with the result that conflicts between the right 
to exclude and these rights can usually be resolved by limiting both rights and 
looking for a suitable accommodation from both sides.21 The justification for 
limitations arising from these statutory regulatory measures is fairly easy to establish 
insofar as they are implemented to promote the public interest, and in some 
instances to implement certain constitutional imperatives. Statutory rights are not 
judicially balanced with the right to exclude because such balancing of rights has 
usually already been done by the legislature when drafting the statutes. The point is 
therefore usually to establish the desired balance with reference to the goals and 
requirements set out in the legislation. 
US case law that deals with expressive activities in quasi-public places such as 
a shopping mall indicates that the exercise of freedom of expression rights (speech 
and petitioning)22 can sometimes not be prohibited but can reasonably be limited in a 
                                            
20
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 62. 
21
 For example see the decisions of Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 506; Committee for the 
Commonwealth of Canada v Canada [1991] 1 SCR 139 (SC); Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd 
and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus 
Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). 
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 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution (1791). 
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way that ensures the exercise of the right of free speech in quasi-public places and 
upholds the owner’s right to exclude.23 This implies that freedom of expression rights 
are subject to both statutory regulation and conduct rules imposed by the landowner. 
In PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins,24 the landowner’s right to exclude was 
limited because the owner had invited the public onto his property and non-owners 
can exercise their freedom of expression rights in quasi-public premises. In 
Growthpoint Properties Ltd v South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union and Others,25 the court also adopted a balancing approach in solving the 
conflict between the constitutional rights to strike and picket and the landowner’s 
property rights. The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) gives effect to labour 
rights such as the right to picket26 and strike27 entrenched in the Constitution, 
providing that employers may not unreasonably withhold permission to picket on 
their premises.28 Since neither right is absolute, the court ordered the strikers to 
reduce the level of the noise and the landowners to tolerate the picketing. The 
decision relies on balancing language but the result does not reflect judicial 
balancing in the sense of the court weighing up of one constitutional right (right to 
strike or picket) against the other (property).29 The balancing process entails 
determining whether the limitation imposed by the legislation is proportionate, taking 
into account that the desired balancing has already been done by the legislature 
                                            
23
 See Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946); PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins 447 US 77 
(1980); New Jersey Coalition Against the War in the Middle East v J.M.B Realty Corp 650 A2d 757 
(NJ 1994). See also Chapter 3 above for a detailed discussion of these cases. 
24
 447 US 77 (1980). 
25
 (2010) 31 ILJ 2539 (KZD). 
26
 Section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
27
 Section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
28
 Currie I & De Waal J The bill of rights handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 389. 
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when the LRA was drafted.30 Therefore, as long as the strikers’ actions are in line 
with the Act, they are acting within their rights even though their actions involve a 
limitation of the owner’s right to exclude. The fact that the legislature has already 
struck the balance in the legislation means that it has decided on what would be 
allowable when pickets or strikes occur on private land. The outcome in a dispute 
between the right to strike or picket and the landowner’s property right is based on 
the balance already achieved in the LRA, which entails that both rights can be 
exercised in a way that accommodates the other. As a result of the balancing 
process already achieved in the legislation and the fact that the limitation of the right 
to exclude is authorised by such legislation, the right to exclude is justifiably limited. 
A similar result appears in the cases where the right to exclude clashes with the 
right to freedom of movement. The Victoria and Alfred Waterfront case highlights the 
fact that the affected persons’ right to freedom of movement requires limiting the 
right to exclude because permanent exclusion of the respondents from the premises 
would clash with their constitutional right to freedom of movement.31 Unlike the right 
to life, the right to freedom of movement is limited and consequently the tension 
between the right to exclude and freedom of movement should be resolved “in a 
manner which permits the rights of both parties to be vindicated to the greatest 
extent possible”.32 In the court’s view, the landowners could prohibit certain unlawful 
behaviour on their land, but they could not place a blanket entry prohibition on the 
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 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 77. 
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 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 451. 
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affected persons.33 The protection of the right to free movement prohibits landowners 
from simply excluding the affected persons. 
The limitation of the right to exclude is slightly different in cases dealing with 
private land and legislation that imposes limitations on the landowner’s right to 
exclude. Legislation such as PIE provides protective measures against unlawful 
evictions under section 26(3) of the Constitution. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers34 the Constitutional Court stated that under the Constitution, the 
protection of property as an individual right is not absolute but subject to societal 
considerations. Section 26(3) of the Constitution and land reform laws are meant to 
redress past injustices and also to prevent evictions from recurring.35 In light of the 
South African history of land dispossessions and the practice of excluding people 
from certain privately owned places, land reform and anti-eviction laws were enacted 
to regulate landowners’ rights in land to give effect to the constitutional rights of non-
owners.36 The overall effect of the statutory provisions (such as in PIE) is that the 
landowners’ traditionally strong common law right to evict (or exclude) is limited.37 
The justification for this limitation on the right to exclude comes from the 
constitutional goal of the relevant legislation. 
In this regard, excluding people from privately owned land would in some cases 
be contrary to a specific constitutional provision. Land reform and anti-eviction laws 
                                            
33
 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 452. 
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 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 16. 
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 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 19. 
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 Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 also contains provisions 
regarding land reform. 
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should therefore be interpreted and applied in line with the constitutional imperative 
to prevent arbitrary evictions. Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers38 
emphasised that when dealing with constitutionally protected rights, the starting and 
ending point of the analysis must be to affirm the values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom. The specific constitutional right that was at stake in this case is section 
26.39 Liebenberg argues that the significance of the Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers decision lies in its insistence that unlawful occupiers (who 
enjoyed minimal rights under the previous legislative and common law regime) are 
now the bearers of constitutional rights, especially housing rights in section 26 of the 
Constitution.40 The housing clause (section 26 of the Constitution) confers on 
unlawful occupiers interrelated procedural and substantive protections in the context 
of legal steps that have to be followed to evict these occupiers from their homes.41 
The section 26 housing right can be balanced with the property rights (the right to 
exclude) to decide the outcome of a particular dispute.42 The court referred to other 
constitutional rights, namely human dignity, equality and freedom, because they 
might function as a support for the housing right. Nevertheless, these rights do not 
justify the limitation imposed on the right to exclude. Instead, the justification derives 
from legislation such as PIE that gives effect to section 26. Accordingly, non-owners’ 
use and occupation of privately owned land is secured by limiting the landowner’s 
right to exclude as far as it is necessary and reasonable to do so. 
                                            
38
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Section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA, which permits occupiers to bury deceased family 
members on private land without the owner’s permission, was enacted to fulfil a 
constitutional mandate to ensure that occupiers can exercise their religious and 
cultural beliefs, which form an important part of their security of tenure.43 Nhlabathi 
and Others v Fick (Nhlabathi)44 highlights the extent to which legislation limits 
property rights to promote constitutionally protected non-property rights. The court 
did not simply uphold the landowner’s right to exclude but took into account the 
rights of the occupiers as prescribed in ESTA and the Constitution and ruled against 
the landowner, upholding the transformative obligations embodied in the 
Constitution. At the same time, the court did not simply override the landowner’s right 
to exclude because the right to a burial is only confirmed after considering the rights 
of the landowner and those of the occupiers. Section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA requires that 
the competing rights of the landowner and of the occupier must be considered when 
determining whether the right to appropriate a grave should be granted and if an 
established practice to do so had existed in the past. The court explained that the 
establishment of a grave would in most instances constitute a minor intrusion on the 
landowner’s right to exclude and in such instances, it is justified to protect occupiers’ 
religious and cultural rights.45 
The fact that legislation purports to give effect to a constitutional right,46 triggers 
the subsidiarity principles as they are described by Van der Walt. These principles 
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establish guidelines that identify the source of law that primarily governs litigation 
about an alleged infringement of rights.47 The aim of the subsidiarity principles is “to 
ensure Constitution-focused application, interpretation and development of 
legislation and the common law, in line with the one-system-of-law-principle 
established by the Constitutional Court”.48 According to the first principle, a litigant 
who avers that a right protected by the Constitution has been infringed must rely on 
legislation specifically enacted to protect that right and may not rely on the 
constitutional provision directly when bringing action to protect the right.49 According 
to the second principle, a litigant who avers that a right protected by the Constitution 
has been infringed must rely on legislation specifically enacted to protect that right 
and may not rely on the common law directly when bringing action to protect the 
                                                                                                                                       
25(6) - tenure security), and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
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right.50 When the right to exclude clashes with non-property constitutional rights that 
are specifically protected in specifically enacted legislation; the matter should be 
decided on the basis of the legislation in question, rather than directly on the basis of 
the constitutional right or on the basis of common law.51 This means that in cases 
where there is a clash between the right to exclude (which is a common law right) 
and a non-property constitutional right, the dispute has to be decided on the basis of 
legislation that regulates the limitation on exclusion to give effect to a the 
constitutional right. The starting point for adjudication of a dispute about the right to 
exclude and non-property constitutional rights should not be the common law right to 
exclude but the protection of the non-property constitutional right in accordance with 
the legislation enacted to give effect to that right. 
The nature of the justification in this section is not to justify the existence of 
limitations on the right to exclude (property is assumed to be limited in principle), but 
to establish whether there is a valid reason and authority for a specific limitation. The 
reason for the limitation is the constitutional right involved in a particular dispute, and 
the authority is the legislation enacted to give effect to it. Justification here is a 
question of whether the limitation of the right to exclude advances the constitutional 
purpose as set out in the legislation. The examples considered in this section show 
that the law that imposes limitations on the right to exclude is valid and it seeks to 
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give effect to a constitutional right. Secondly, the justification involves ensuring that 
the effects of the limitation are proportionate as foreseen in the legislation.52 
 
4 2 3 Legislation not directly giving effect to a non-property constitutional right 
Some statutory regulatory measures that were not specifically enacted to give effect 
to any constitutionally protected right nevertheless limit the landowner’s right to 
exclude others from privately owned land. Justification in this context involves 
determining the reasons and authority for the limitation of the right to exclude. 
Legislation imposing limitations on the right to exclude determines the limits of and 
the extent of the limitation to ensure a reasonable balancing of the conflicting rights. 
In some instances actual access rights are created, subject to reasonable exercise 
requirements that involve mutual accommodation of the landowner’s property rights 
(the right to exclude) and non-owners’ right to be on the land. 
The landowner’s right to exclude is limited when a judge issues a search 
warrant that authorises an officer to enter and search any premises, without the 
landowner’s prior permission in the process of conducting an investigation.53 The 
right to exclude in these instances is limited by the regulatory exercise of the police 
power.54 In terms of the police-power principle, any regulatory action involving a 
limitation of the landowners’ right to exclude is justified if it is specifically aimed at 
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53
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protecting and promoting public health and safety interests.55 The limitation on the 
right to exclude non-owners from privately owned land emanating from statutory 
powers of search, seizure and forfeiture of property56 is justified by a legitimate 
public purpose, namely the protection of public health and safety.57 
Statutory limitation of ownership (including the right to exclude) by the joint 
exercise of entitlements by sectional owners regarding the common property as well 
as by the rules enforced by the body corporate is authorised by the common 
interests of the sectional title owners as a whole.58 Limitation of a sectional owner’s 
right to exclude forms an inherent part of sectional ownership of a sectional title 
scheme, justified in the interest of the sectional title community.59 
Statutory access rights that limit the right to exclude others from privately 
owned land can also be justified by the notion of a proper social order. Grattan bases 
the justification for granting access rights through legislation,60 on a proprietarian 
vision of property rights.61 As Alexander puts it, the concept of property as propriety 
conceives of property as the material foundation for creating and maintaining a 
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proper social order, which is the private basis for the public good.62 The justification 
arising from the proprietarian vision of property envisions the subordination of 
individual preferences to a substantive vision of a proper social order. The social 
ordering that is envisioned is one of a harmonious relationship between neighbours, 
where one neighbour subordinates his own interests to that of the other.63 In this 
regard, limiting the right to exclude by legislation64 is justified because it promotes 
and secures a proper social order. A vision of a proper social order is consistent with 
the notion of the social-obligation norm of ownership.65 
Access rights in the form of a right to roam can be justified in a similar way.66 
The CROW Act can be seen as restoring public access rights that were taken away 
by the enclosure movement,67 requiring a balancing of the property rights of 
landowners and non-owners’ access rights. Since the public access rights are 
exercised by non-owners within strict limitations, it can be argued that the CROW Act 
embodies the desired balance between competing interests in land. This means that, 
as long as the right to roam is limited to certain places and times and if non-owners 
act within the prescribed limitations, the landowners’ rights are preserved and 
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demand for greater access rights that they had lost because of the enclosure movement. I established 
in Chapter 3 that the CROW Act is a notable limitation on the right to exclude. 
67
 Anderson JL “Countryside access and environmental protection: An American view of Britain’s right 
to roam” (2007) 9 Environmental Law Review 241-259 253. 
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balanced with access rights. Therefore, the statutory right to roam provided in the 
CROW Act is justified because it supports the exercise of lost but regained public 
access rights, which reflect society’s needs and values. The limitation of the right to 
exclude is justified with reference to historical and social considerations. 
Similarly, the LRSA balances competing interests in land by imposing a duty on 
landowners to use and manage their land in a way that is responsible. Landowners 
are presumed to be acting responsibly if they do not cause unreasonable 
interference with the access rights of any person seeking to exercise them.68 In the 
same vein, non-owners are presumed to be taking reasonable access, when such 
access gives landowners reasonable measures of privacy and undisturbed 
enjoyment around their homes. The LRSA balances the presumption of reasonable 
land management and reasonable access taking to the extent that the landowner 
cannot deter non-owners from exercising their access rights.69 The limitation of the 
right to exclude by the provisions of the LRSA is justifiable because the provisions 
foster a potentially transformative property regime that is based on the relationship 
between landowner and non-owners, grounded on the principles of reciprocity and 
mutual respect.70 Furthermore, the provisions safeguard the landowners’ privacy and 
also protect their legitimate land management interests. 
Justification in this context is therefore not about justifying the existence of 
limitations because property is limited in principle. Instead, justification means there 
is reason for a specific limitation on the right to exclude, and authority for it in the 
                                            
68
 Section 3(2) of the LRSA. See also Lovett JA “Progressive property in action: The Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 Nebraska Law Review 739-818 789. 
69
 Section 14 of the LRSA prohibits a landowner from preventing access rights. 
70
 Lovett JA “Progressive property in action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 
Nebraska Law Review 739-818 778. 
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form of legislation. The legislation, for example the CROW Act and LRSA set out the 
procedure to ensure that the effect of the limitation is not disproportionate. 
 
4 2 4 Common law rights 
The common law principles regarding the right of way of necessity and 
encroachment illustrate how the common law, for policy reasons, allows non-owners 
to have access to land, in so doing limiting the affected landowner’s right to exclude. 
The justification in both cases involves policy considerations, namely economic 
efficiency (in right of way of necessity cases) and balance of convenience (in 
encroachment cases).71 In each case, the justification involves a balancing of the 
conflicting interests. The approach of the courts in right of way of necessity cases is 
to balance the policy considerations and the landowner’s property right to determine 
whether or not to grant a right of way of necessity. In these instances, it is a question 
of whether the impact on the landowner weighs heavier than the policy 
considerations. In other words, it is the public policy considerations and the rights of 
the owner of the servient tenement that are balanced, the question being whether 
policy considerations require the courts to enforce a right of way of necessity on land 
against the landowner’s consent. In encroachment cases the courts weigh the rights 
of the affected landowner and the encroacher against each other to decide the 
balance of convenience. I do not seek to give a detailed discussion of all the 
justifications for a court order granting a right of way of necessity or for allowing an 
                                            
71
 The justification is different in these cases because the right of way of necessity is a property 
limitation and therefore it requires a property type justification. Whereas encroachment is a delict 
issue and the justification is based on delict and not property. 
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encroachment to remain in place.72 Rather, I discuss only those justifications based 
on policy considerations that further the argument that the limitations on the right to 
exclude on the basis of non-consensual access rights are justifiable. 
Scholars and court decisions have propounded various factors that justify 
limiting the right to exclude by granting a right of way of necessity over a servient 
tenement. Case law shows that a right of way of necessity is granted on the basis of 
public policy to promote efficiency and utility benefits in the use of valuable land.73 
This is confirmed by the academic literature. Hayden argues that the doctrine of the 
way of necessity is based on public policy in favour of the efficient utilisation of land 
                                            
72
 See Raphulu TN Right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis (2013) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University; Van der Walt AJ & Raphulu TN “The right of way of necessity: A 
constitutional analysis” (2014) 77 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 468-484 and 
Temmers Z Building encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership (2010) unpublished LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University for an in-depth analysis of the right of way of necessity and 
encroachments, respectively. 
73
 In Saner v Inanda Road Board (1892) 13 NLR 225 the court confirmed and granted the way of 
necessity for the optimal exploitation of the land. In Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 
671E the court stated that a right of way of necessity must assist the owner of the dominant tenement 
(if he is a farmer), to continue with viable farming operations and also for transporting farm produce. 
In Naudé v Ecoman Investments en Andere 1994 (2) SA 95 (T) the court granted the owner of the 
dominant tenement a right of way of necessity over the neighbouring farm to serve as an access road 
to a public holiday resort, despite the change in the use of land. In Sanders NO and Another v 
Edwards NO and Others 2003 (5) SA 8 (C) the court granted a right of way of necessity to ensure 
successful farming operations. In Jackson v Aventura Ltd [2005] 2 All SA 518 (C) the court granted a 
right of way of necessity in favour of the dominant tenement owner for purposes of constructing a 
road that would provide access to their landlocked land. Even though the court a quo had granted a 
right of way of necessity on the basis of practical need, this decision was later set aside by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Aventura Ltd v Jackson NO and Others 2007 (5) SA 497 (SCA) 500 in 
which the Court ruled that the necessity for a right of way had not been established by the owners of 
the dominant tenement. See also Raphulu TN Right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis 
(2013) unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch University Chapter 3, section 3 2 for a detailed 
discussion on why the right of way of necessity is necessary. See also Van der Merwe CG “The 
Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 
Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1382-1383. 
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in the case of landlocked property.74 Van der Merwe states that “public policy 
dictates that valuable land, located in a desirable and strategic area, should not be 
taken out of use and commerce”.75 According to Southwood, the reason for granting 
a way of necessity is that public policy does not allow land to be sterilised by 
insufficient access.76 In the absence of an agreement between a servient tenement 
owner and a dominant tenement owner, courts step in to grant a right of way of 
necessity on the basis of public policy77 related to social and economic goals and the 
economic exploitation of land.78 Raphulu concludes that efficient use of land does 
                                            
74
 Hayden TC “Way of necessity – Hanock v Henderson” (1965) 25 Maryland Law Review 254-259 
258. See also Southwood MD The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 99 who states that the right 
of way of necessity has its genesis in public policy. 
75
 Van der Merwe CG “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1369. 
76
 Southwood MD The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 99. It should be noted that similar policy 
reasons are advanced both when a right of way of necessity and the unilateral relocation of a 
specified right of way are granted by a court order. In this regard see Raphulu TN Right of way of 
necessity: A constitutional analysis (2013) unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 81; 
Kiewitz L Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 107. See also Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 
(SCA) para 35. 
77
 Raphulu TN Right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis (2013) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University Chapter 3, section 3 3 for a detailed discussion on public policy and the right 
of way of necessity. 
78
 Van der Merwe CG & Pienaar JM “Law of property (including real security)” 2003 Annual Survey of 
South African Law 376-428 415 state that the granting of a way of necessity by a court order in 
Sanders NO and Another v Edwards NO and Others 2003 (5) SA 8 (C) represents the modern trend 
with regard to ways of necessity that relaxes the strict requirement that land must be completely 
landlocked, in favour of the principle that ways of necessity can be granted to improve the economic 
exploitation (productiveness) of land in general. In this regard see Van der Merwe CG “The Louisiana 
right to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law 
Review 1363-1413 1412-1413. Southwood MD The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 106, citing 
Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 152 and Maree v Raad van Kuratore vir Nasionale Parke 1964 (3) 
SA 727 (O) 730 states that the decision to grant and enforce a right of way of necessity on the basis 
of public policy makes it possible to make economic use of otherwise inaccessible land, which would 
be rendered useless without the right of way. 
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not only benefit the private land owner but also benefits society.79 Society as a whole 
benefits from the efficient use of landlocked land because, among other things, the 
efficient use of the land raises productivity and creates employment.80 
The justification for limitations imposed on the right to exclude in encroachment 
cases is different because the policy considerations are largely based on the balance 
of convenience. In encroachment cases, the courts’ exercise of their discretion to 
leave an encroaching structure in place, even where the encroachment is significant, 
is mainly based on pragmatic considerations of equity and fairness.81 Temmers 
argues that the courts reject an absolute right to demand removal of the 
encroachment for pragmatic and policy reasons.82 The courts’ discretion to leave a 
building encroachment intact is determined on the circumstances of each case. The 
circumstances that the court relied on to leave the encroachment intact in Rand 
                                            
79
 Raphulu TN Right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis (2013) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University Chapter 3, section 3 3. 
80
 Van der Merwe CG “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1412-1413 argues that the rationale for granting 
a right of way of necessity is to foster public utility of tracts of land and to protect the social needs of 
society. 
81
 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138; Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) para 34; Roseveare v Katmer, Katmer v Roseveare and Another 
(2010/44337, 2010/41862) [2013] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 February 2013) para 21. See also Temmers Z 
Building encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership (2010) unpublished LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 5, 93; Boggenpoel ZT “The discretion of courts in encroachment disputes 
[discussion of Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 
2010)]” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law Review 252-264 257; Boggenpoel ZT “Compulsory transfer of 
encroached-upon land: A constitutional analysis” (2013) 76 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 313-326 314; Boggenpoel ZT “Creating a servitude to solve an encroachment dispute: 
A solution or creating another problem?” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 455-486 
465. 
82
 Temmers Z Building encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership (2010) unpublished LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 109. 
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Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander (Rand Waterraad)83 were mainly based on the 
affected landowner’s delay in bringing the application: the time period between 
becoming aware of the encroachment and filing the complaint for its removal shows 
that the affected landowner did not suffer any significant harm.84 The court also 
relied on the principles of reasonableness and fairness to both parties.85 The loss 
that the affected landowner would suffer if the encroachment is left intact was less 
than the loss that would be suffered by the encroacher if the encroachment was 
ordered to be removed.86 This indicates that the courts weigh the affected 
landowner’s interests against the interests of the encroacher to determine the 
balance of convenience. In Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale (Brian Lackey 
Trust)87 the court also reasoned that the encroaching owner would suffer prejudice 
should demolition of the encroaching structure be ordered, which would far outweigh 
the prejudice suffered by the affected landowner should demolition be denied. The 
court considered the cost of demolition, the cost of rebuilding the house and the 
inconvenience due to the lengthy delay before completion, as compared to the 
prejudice potentially suffered by the plaintiff. The court took into account the fact that 
the defendant had effectively lost all use and enjoyment of the property, but found 
that unlike the plaintiff, the defendant would be fully compensated for his loss if 
compensation was awarded. The court came to the conclusion that compensation 
would be appropriate in the circumstances. Similarly, in Roseveare v Katmer, Katmer 
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 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
84
 138-139. 
85
 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 133. See also Boggenpoel ZT 
“Creating a servitude to solve an encroachment dispute: A solution or creating another problem?” 
(2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 455-486 461. 
86
 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 139. 
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 Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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v Roseveare and Another (Roseveare)88 the court exercised its wide and general 
discretion to award compensation instead of removal of the encroachment with 
reference to the size of the encroachment, which was insignificant. 
Property is limited in principle and therefore the justification in this context is not 
for the existence of limitations. In both the right of way of necessity and 
encroachment cases, there is reason for limiting the right to exclude, namely policy 
in the form of economic efficiency and balance of convenience. The authority of the 
limitation is the common law and it can be assumed that the common law is in line 
with the Constitution, section 39 and thus it is legitimate and valid. 
 
4 3 Justification for the effect of limitations on owners 
4 3 1 Introduction 
In section 4 2 above, I discuss the justification for limitations on the right to exclude, 
taking into account that property is limited in principle and that the existence of 
limitations is therefore to be expected. In instances where the landowner is 
prevented from excluding others on the basis of non-property constitutional rights, 
legislation or common law, the constitutional provision, legislation or the common law 
principle in question will generally provide the reason for the specific limitation and 
the necessary authority for imposing it on property rights. In this section, I consider 
the constitutional justification for the effects that the limitations might have on a 
specific landowner. 
This justification process usually takes place in terms of section 25(1), which 
aims to test the validity and the proportionality of limitations. Hence, the section 25(1) 
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 (2010/44337, 2010/41862) [2013] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 February 2013) para 15. 
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test looks at access rights from the landowner’s perspective, and the question is 
usually whether the imposition on his right to exclude is valid and proportionate. 
When the law limits a landowner’s right to exclude non-owners, the result is a 
deprivation of the landowner’s right to exclude. 
The first question that needs to be dealt with in this section is whether the 
deprivation caused by the limitation imposed on the right to exclude complies with 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. The second question is whether the deprivation 
could also constitute expropriation of the landowner’s property in line with section 
25(2) of the Constitution. 
 
4 3 2 The structure of section 25 
In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
(FNB)89 the Constitutional Court held that the purpose of section 25 of the 
Constitution is to strike a proportionate balance between the protection of private 
property rights and the promotion of the public interest; section 25 therefore serves 
both a protective and reformative purpose.90 Broadly speaking, section 25 (1) to (3) 
guarantees the protection of existing property rights against unconstitutional 
interference and section 25 (5) to (9) is aimed at legitimatising and promoting land 
and other related reforms.91 As a result, the property clause has to be regarded as a 
                                            
89
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 para 50. See also Roux 
T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa volume 3 (2
nd
 
ed OS 2003) ch 46 1-37 3. 
90
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 13. 
91
 Section 25(1) deals with deprivation, section 25 (2) and (3) with expropriation, section 25(4) with 
interpretation and sections 25 (5) to (9) with land and other related reforms. There is an inherent 
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constitutional effort at balancing the individual and the public interest in a 
constitutional manner.92 The biggest challenge is the seemingly contradictory 
relationship between the protection of existing property rights and land reform as well 
as other related reform initiatives.93 To avoid the tension between the provisions in 
section 25, the property clause must be interpreted and applied with regard to the 
historical and constitutional context.94 
Generally, the constitutional protection of property differs from private-law 
protection of property. The purpose of the constitutional property clause is not to 
guarantee and insulate existing property interests (the landowner’s right to exclude) 
but to establish and maintain a balance between, on the one hand, the individual’s 
(landowner’s) vested rights and, on the other hand, the public interest in the 
                                                                                                                                       
tension in the property clause between protecting existing rights and the reform of property interests. 
These seemingly contradictory provisions are interpreted purposively to ensure that both the 
protective and the reformative purposes of section 25 are respected, protected and promoted. See 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 12-16. 
92
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 20-21 argues that the property clause 
was drafted in such a way as to legitimatise land reform and to ensure that the constitutional 
protection of existing rights should not exclude or frustrate land reforms. See also Van der Walt AJ 
“Striving for the better interpretation: A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s Harksen and 
FNB decisions on the property clause” (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 854-878 866. 
Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
521 state that the South African property clause serves a dual purpose, which is to secure existing 
rights on the one hand and promote social transformation on the other. 
93
 Section 25(1)-(3) and section 25(5)-(9). Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 
22 explains that it is both necessary and possible to read the provisions in section 25 “as a coherent 
whole that embodies a creative tension within itself, without being self-conflicting or contradictory.” It 
is necessary to interpret section 25 purposively as a “coherent whole, within its historical and 
constitutional context” to avoid a conflicting approach. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 14ff. 
94
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 16; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
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regulation of property.95 This implies that individual interests are subject to controls, 
regulations, restrictions, levies, deprivations, and changes that promote or protect 
legitimate public interests.96 The presence of regulation sometimes has serious and 
negative effects on property owners but compensation is not generally given for 
these kinds of infringements.97 Accordingly, the overall effect of section 25 is that the 
protection of property as an individual right is not absolute but subject to limitations 
imposed on the strength of societal considerations, which may include the necessity 
for granting non-owners access rights to land.98 
The decision in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers underscores 
the fact that the protection of existing private law-based relations to property is not 
the primary purpose of section 25.99 Instead, this section is aimed at achieving social 
transformation, in accordance with constitutional values such as human dignity, 
equality and freedom.100 In light of section 25, the government is under an obligation 
to pursue land and other reforms, some of which involve limitations on the 
landowner’s right to exclude. The constitutional property clause accommodates and 
authorises transformative and regulatory measures in the property regime that will 
have an impact on the landowner’s right to exclude. It is therefore necessary to 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 91. 
96
 91. 
97
 91. 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 para 49-50; Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 16; Reflect-All 1025 CC and 
Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and Another 
2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 33. See also Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional property law” (2009) 3 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review of South African Law para 2.2. 
99
 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 16-17; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 581. 
100
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 15-16. 
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ascertain whether these limitations of the right to exclude are in compliance with the 
requirements of section 25(1). The Constitutional Court outlined a methodology for 
this process in its FNB decision. 
 
4 3 3 The FNB methodology 
The FNB decision prescribed a methodology, which proposes that all limitations of 
property rights will be regarded as deprivations and tested against the requirements 
of section 25(1) of the Constitution. The methodology entails a seven-stage inquiry 
that is set out as follows: 
“(a) Does that which is taken away from [the property holder] by the operation of 
the law in question] amount to ‘property’ for purposes of section 25? 
(b) [If yes,] Has there been a deprivation of such property [by the organ of state 
involved]? 
(c) If there has, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of section 
25(1)? 
(d) If not, is such deprivation justified under section 36 of the Constitution? 
(e) If it is, does it amount to expropriation for purpose of section 25(2)? 
(f) If so, does the deprivation comply with the requirements of section 25(2)(a) 
and (b)? 
(g) If not, is the expropriation justified under section 36?”101 
The first question is whether there was an arbitrary deprivation of property. The 
enquiry begins with three threshold questions, namely whether the applicant is a 
beneficiary entitled to protection under section 25; whether the affected interest is 
                                            
101
 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
volume 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 1-37 3 list these steps in accordance with the questions formulated 
in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
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property; and whether the property interest was infringed.102 If there was an arbitrary 
deprivation of property, the second question is whether that deprivation is justifiable 
under section 36(1). If the arbitrary deprivation is not justifiable, the deprivation is 
unconstitutional and the matter ends there. If the deprivation complies with section 
25(1) requirements or is arbitrary but reasonable and justifiable under section 36(1), 
the next question is whether the deprivation amounts to an expropriation. If the 
deprivation amounts to expropriation, it must comply with section 25 (2) and (3). If it 
complies with section 25 (2) and (3), the expropriation is legitimate and valid. 
However, if the deprivation amounts to expropriation and does not satisfy section 25 
(2) and (3) requirements, the expropriation could be justified under section 36(1). If 
the expropriation is justified, it is valid but if it cannot be justified, it is invalid. 
Any property dispute based on section 25 would generally proceed according to 
the FNB methodology. In this section, I look at the different instances in which the 
right to exclude is limited, taking into consideration the steps set out in the FNB 
decision, to determine whether the limitations are valid in terms of section 25. The 
methodology introduced in FNB proposes that all limitations of property will be 
regarded as deprivation and tested against the requirements of section 25(1) first 
before the next question, whether a particular limitation also constitutes expropriation 
in line with section 25(2). For this reason, I first focus on the non-arbitrariness test 
(section 25(1)) and thereafter (if necessary) I consider section 25(2) pertaining to 
expropriation. 
                                            
102
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 75. Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, 
Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa volume 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 1-37 2-5 
indicates that these questions are likely to be “sucked into” the arbitrariness test, namely whether the 
deprivation is arbitrary. 
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In the subsequent sections, I first explain how the limitation of the right to 
exclude amounts to a deprivation.103 Secondly, I investigate whether the limitation of 
the right to exclude (the deprivation in question) satisfies the requirements of section 
25(1), namely the law of general application104 and the non-arbitrariness test.105 In 
the final section, I explain why the deprivation of the right to exclude probably does 
not, in the South African context, amount to an expropriation that needs to satisfy 
section 25 (2) and (3) requirements.106 
Thus far, the dissertation has referred to the phrase “limitation of the 
landowner’s right to exclude” to denote the fact that the right is restricted by the 
measure in question. In section 25 the phrase “limitation of property” has a different, 
much more technical meaning in that not every deprivation amounts to a limitation in 
this sense, but only deprivation that does not comply with the requirements in section 
25(1) (that is, arbitrary deprivation). The meaning of the phrase “limitation of the 
landowner’s right to exclude” is therefore closer to deprivation in section 25(1). The 
deprivation needs justification when it is arbitrary or disproportionate. 
 
4 3 4 Deprivation: section 25(1) 
The FNB decision attached a broad interpretation to the term “deprivation”, 
describing it as “any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private 
property”.107 This broad interpretation denotes that deprivation encompasses all 
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 See section 4 3 4 below. 
104
 See section 4 3 5 below. 
105
 See sections 4 3 5 and 4 3 6 below. 
106
 See section 4 3 7 below. 
107
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. 
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state interferences with property, while expropriation is a narrower sub-category of 
deprivation.108 In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and 
Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights 
Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others (Mkontwana) the Constitutional 
Court apparently restricted the interpretation of deprivation by stating that the 
question whether there has been a deprivation depends on the extent of the 
interference.109 According to the court, a substantial interference that goes beyond 
the normal restrictions on property in an open and democratic society would amount 
to deprivation.110 In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and Another (Reflect-All)111 and 
Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
and Others (Offit)112 the Constitutional Court, although not expressly, seems to have 
followed the wider FNB approach rather than the narrow Mkontwana approach to the 
definition of deprivation.113 It can be assumed, in view of the FNB approach, that a 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. See also 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 203-204. 
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 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 32. 
110
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deprivation should include all but the legally irrelevant de minimis interferences with 
property.114 A valid deprivation therefore entails any properly authorised and fairly 
imposed regulatory limitation on the use, enjoyment, exploitation or disposal of 
property, to protect and promote public health and safety or in pursuit of other 
legitimate public purposes, without compensation.115 
Most of the instances where the right to exclude is limited by operation of law 
discussed in Chapter 3 constitute deprivations of the landowner’s right to exclude in 
this sense. An exception is the cases discussed in Chapter 3 where the right to 
exclude is limited directly by a non-property constitutional right such as life or dignity, 
without the mediation of implementing legislation. In those cases the right to exclude 
is restricted constitutionally and directly, resulting in an ex ante truncated right that 
never included the ability or entitlement to effect the relevant exclusion, because no 
principle or entitlement can exist that directly contradicts a constitutional right or 
provision. The limitation of the right to exclude in these cases is ex ante and 
therefore no deprivation in the sense of section 25(1) takes place. 
Those instances where the right to exclude is limited by a non-property 
constitutional right such as equality, on the basis of dedicated legislation, do bring 
about a deprivation of property in the sense of section 25(1). The legislation 
involved, such as PEPUDA and US public accommodations laws, determine the 
limits imposed on the right to exclude to protect the right to equality and non-
discrimination. This statutory deprivation is subject to section 25(1) analysis. 
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All other legislation116 that gives effect to non-property constitutional rights like 
freedom of speech, the right to strike and picket, freedom of movement or secure 
tenure limit the landowner’s right to exclude in a similar way. Legislation117 that is not 
directly intended to give effect to a particular constitutional right but that pursues 
some other valid and legitimate statutory goal also limit the landowner’s right to 
exclude in a similar way. These laws prescribe regulatory measures that set out how 
and in what instances the right to exclude is limited for different purposes. The 
limitations that result from these laws qualify as deprivations of the right to exclude. 
In the third instance, the common law principles regarding non-consensual 
access to another person’s land limit the right to exclude. When a court order 
enforces a right of way of necessity, without the consent of the owner of the servient 
tenement, and when a court decides to leave an encroachment intact against 
payment of compensation, these two outcomes amount to a forced transfer of some 
of the landowner’s property rights, in particular the right to exclude as far as it 
concerns the relevant portion of the land. When these limitations are enforced in 
terms of the common law the result is once again a limitation of the right to exclude 
that qualifies as a deprivation of the right to exclude. 
In all instances where the right to exclude is limited without the consent of the 
landowner and against his will, the result is a deprivation of property in the form of 
                                            
116
 For example the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (USA); 
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the right to exclude. The next question is whether the limitation constitutes arbitrary 
deprivation of the landowner’s right to exclude non-owners from his property. 
 
4 3 5 The section 25(1) analysis 
Section 25(1) is the point of departure for determining whether a limitation of the right 
to exclude might be the object of a constitutional property challenge. In terms of 
section 25(1), a deprivation must first of all be in terms of law of general application 
and secondly the law may not permit arbitrary deprivation of property. This implies 
that even when the deprivation is authorised by law of general application, namely 
legislation or the common law, it would be unconstitutional if it does not comply with 
the non-arbitrariness118 requirement in section 25(1). 
The first requirement in terms of section 25(1) insists that a deprivation must be 
authorised by “law of general application” for it to be valid. The first enquiry in terms 
of this requirement should be whether the deprivation is authorised by a law that is 
formally valid, in the sense that it was properly enacted and promulgated.119 Section 
25(1) refers to “law of general application” as opposed to “a law of general 
application” to ensure that the regulatory deprivation of property may also be 
authorised by rules of common and customary law.120 The authorising law must be 
generally and equally applicable to ensure equal treatment.121 Accordingly, a law that 
provides for deprivation and singles out a particular individual or group of individuals 
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in a discriminatory fashion will not comply with the law of general application 
requirement.122 
The fact that section 25(1) requires “law of general application” implies that the 
deprivation enquiry in any constitutional property dispute should not focus on state, 
administrative, judicial or private action that effected the deprivation.123 The validity 
of a deprivation depends on law that authorises the particular action.124 
It is generally accepted that law of general application includes legislation, 
regulations, principles of common law, and rules of court.125 As was explained in 
Chapter 3 above, the relevant limitations of the owner’s right to exclude, and 
therefore the law of general application is, depending on the context, either 
legislation or common law. These sources of law provide regulatory measures and 
principles that prevent the landowner from exercising his right to exclude. 
Some legislation provides regulatory measures that limit the right to exclude so 
as to protect and enforce non-owners’ non-property constitutional rights, while other 
statutes do so in pursuit of other legitimate statutory, regulatory or policy aims and 
objectives. The common law principles that regulate the creation and enforcement of 
a right of way of necessity constitute law of general application.126 Similarly, in 
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encroachment cases the law of general application is the common law.127 The 
common law, as developed in case law, provides that in certain instances a court 
may enforce a right of way of necessity or may deviate from the default remedy of 
removal and instead award compensation in encroachment cases.128 Therefore, 
legislation or common law that limits the right to exclude constitutes law of general 
application for purposes of section 25(1). The authorising law in a particular case 
validates the limitation imposed on the right to exclude. 
The second requirement is that the relevant law of general application may not 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property.129 There are two criteria, in terms of FNB, 
that determine whether a deprivation is arbitrary.130 A deprivation of property will be 
arbitrary if there is insufficient reason for the deprivation (substantive arbitrariness) or 
if the deprivation is procedurally unfair (procedural arbitrariness).131 In FNB the court 
specifically focused on the substantive arbitrariness requirement and did not 
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 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) 876, 915; S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) paras 
64-65 provide authority that the common law qualify as law of general application. See also Boss 
Foods CC v Ingo Rehders Properties and Another [2014] ZAGPJHC 236 (26 May 2014); Boggenpoel 
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extensively discuss the test for procedural arbitrariness.132 In Mkontwana and 
Reflect-All the court merely described procedural fairness as a flexible concept that 
can be determined with reference to all the circumstances.133 However, in National 
Credit Regulator v Opperman (Opperman)134 the court explained that a deprivation 
of property that is effected in terms of legislation will be procedurally arbitrary if a 
court adjudicates a dispute and makes an order without being allowed to exercise a 
discretion that takes into account what is just and equitable in the particular case.135 
Therefore, a deprivation of the landowner’s right to exclude would be procedurally 
unfair if the law of general application in a particular case does not provide the court 
with a discretion based on justice and equity. The question of procedural 
arbitrariness would probably not arise in cases where the right to exclude others 
from private land is limited by a court order based on the common law. The court 
deciding whether to limit the right according to common law principles would take 
into account all the relevant factors that would exclude procedural arbitrariness. 
However, when the deprivation results from a court order based on legislation will 
depend on the question whether the legislation leaves the court the necessary 
discretionary space, as the Opperman decision shows. 
In terms of the second criterion of the non-arbitrariness requirement, a 
deprivation is arbitrary and in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution if the law 
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in question (in terms of which the deprivation is effected) does not provide sufficient 
reason for the deprivation.136 In FNB the Constitutional Court described how 
“sufficient reason” is to be established, namely that there must be an evaluation of 
the relationship between the deprivation in question and the purpose of the law in 
question.137 To achieve this, the court explained that “a complexity of relationships 
has to be considered”.138 These include the relationship between the purpose for the 
deprivation and the person whose property is affected by the deprivation;139 the 
relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, and the nature of the property; 
and the extent of the deprivation.140 In other words, there must be a sufficient nexus 
between the deprivation in question (the means employed) and the reasons for the 
deprivation (the ends sought to be achieved).141 With regard to the extent of the 
deprivation, the court held that the purpose of the deprivation must be more 
compelling when the deprivation in question concerns ownership of immovable 
property and corporeal movable property rather than when it concerns a lesser 
property right, and when all rather than just some of the entitlements of ownership 
are embraced by the deprivation.142 In addition, the court held that the substantive 
136
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
137
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Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 49. 
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National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100(a). See also 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 245.
142
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100 (e), (f). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
217 
 
arbitrariness test is contextual. The arbitrariness test may vary between mere 
rationality and something closer to the proportionality test in section 36(1) of the 
Constitution.143 Accordingly, establishing “sufficient reason” is context-based.144 In 
each particular case, depending on the nature of the property and the extent of the 
deprivation, a court has the discretion whether to apply a thin or a thick test.145 
According to these guidelines, the non-arbitrariness test for law that deprives a 
landowner of the right to exclude should generally speaking not be extremely strict 
because it concerns just one entitlement of ownership (exclusivity), but at the same 
time the test should not be meaningless either because it concerns ownership of 
land. 
The first element of the non-arbitrariness provision ensures that regulatory 
deprivation is rationally connected to some legitimate government purpose.146 The 
second element is that any law that authorises the deprivation must establish 
sufficient reason for the deprivation.147 In this sense, the deprivation should not only 
be rationally linked to a legitimate government purpose, but should also be justified 
in the sense of establishing a proportionate balance between means and ends.148 
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4 3 6 Application of the substantive non-arbitrariness test 
The law that limits the owner’s right to exclude may not allow a deprivation that is 
arbitrary. In terms of the FNB decision, a deprivation would be arbitrary if there is 
insufficient reason for it. The first leg of the non-arbitrariness test questions whether 
there is sufficient reason for the limitation. The second leg involves making an 
assessment based on proportionality on an individual level. In this regard, courts 
should engage in a “nuanced and context-sensitive” form of balancing when 
determining the impact of a particular deprivation.149 
As indicated in section 4 3 2 above, the constitutional property clause aims to 
advance the public interest in relation to property.150 In Reflect-All the Constitutional 
Court held that property rights are determined and afforded by law and can be 
limited to facilitate the achievement of important social purposes.151 Therefore, the 
legitimacy of the deprivation of the right to exclude must be considered in view of 
what the property clause seeks to achieve. 
In cases where direct non-property constitutional rights limit the right to 
exclude, the section 25(1) justification is only relevant in the equality cases because 
of the presence of legislation. PEPUDA and US public accommodations laws were 
enacted to give effect to the right to equality and to guard against discriminatory 
exclusion from land. The equality cases are subject to section 25(1) scrutiny. The 
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public purpose sought to be achieved by these laws will prima facie constitute a valid 
and legitimate reason for the deprivation of the right to exclude. The legislation does 
not have a disproportionate effect because it applies generally. In this context, it is 
likely that a rationality-type approach would be sufficient to justify the deprivation of 
the right to exclude. Accordingly, the deprivation of the right to exclude that will result 
from securing the right to equality through specifically enacted legislation, in a 
particular instance, will generally not be arbitrary. The need to protect and promote 
the achievement of fundamental human rights and important constitutional 
imperatives provides sufficient ground to justify the deprivation in terms of section 
25(1). 
Other non-property constitutional rights like freedom of movement, freedom of 
speech, right to strike and picket, and secure tenure are slightly different from the 
right to equality because they can be balanced against property rights. When dealing 
with legislation aimed at giving effect to these rights, the first question is whether the 
reason for the limitation provides sufficient justification for the deprivation. The 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is an example of legislation that limits the right to 
exclude for the sake of giving effect to constitutionally protected labour rights. 
Depending on the circumstances of each case, like in Growthpoint, the deprivation 
should not be arbitrary if the legislation already has a built-in mechanism that 
reasonably balances the competing rights. A deprivation might be arbitrary if a court 
order goes beyond what is stipulated for in the Act or if the legislation does not allow 
room for judicial discretion. 
In Victoria and Alfred Waterfront the court recognised the tension between 
property rights of landowners, in particular the right to exclude, and the affected 
persons’ freedom of movement. The court did not apply the FNB methodology to 
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ascertain whether the limitation of the landowner’s right to exclude amounts to a 
deprivation and whether the deprivation complies with the non-arbitrariness 
requirement of section 25(1). In the context of the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront 
case it need to be established whether the reason(s) for the court’s order to only 
prohibit certain unlawful behaviour rather than a blanket entry prohibition would be 
sufficient under the circumstances to justify the deprivation in question. According to 
the FNB decision, the relationship between the means employed and the ends 
sought to be achieved must be assessed. In Victoria and Alfred Waterfront the 
means employed to protect the right of free movement in quasi-public places is not 
to allow a blanket exclusion of the affected persons from the premises. The reason 
why the court made this order was to protect the right of freedom of movement. The 
purpose of the deprivation of the landowner’s right to exclude is to ensure that the 
right to freedom of movement is not compromised. Furthermore, the nature of the 
property and the circumstances are relevant factors to consider. The premises in this 
case is quasi-public in nature because it is generally used for a purpose that is open 
to the public. Members of the public are invited to visit the premises whether they 
intend to conduct business there or not. The court took into account the location, size 
and composition of the premises and held that it was for all practical purposes a 
suburb of Cape Town and should be distinguished from an ordinary shop or 
restaurant.152 The factors in FNB suggest that the court might take into account less 
invasive means to achieve the intended outcome before considering invasive 
measures. In Victoria and Alfred Waterfront the court stated that a prohibition of 
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unlawful behaviour instead of a blanket entry prohibition would optimise the 
landowners’ property right (the right to exclude) and non-owners’ freedom of 
movement on the premises. The court’s ruling allows landowners an effective way of 
exercising reasonable control over unlawful behaviour on the premises and reflects 
the fact that only one entitlement of ownership is affected by the deprivation, namely 
the right to exclude. This suggests that ownership is not totally taken away from the 
landowners; they can impose reasonable entry, use and conduct regulations on the 
premises. Since the deprivation affects only one entitlement of ownership and since 
the public purpose involved is significant, namely to protect and promote the right to 
freedom of movement, the deprivation is not arbitrary. 
A similar conclusion can be reached when regarding the Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) provisions that limit the landowner’s right to 
exclude. The reason for the deprivation can be inferred from the objectives of the 
Act, to give effect to section 25(6) of the Constitution by promoting and protecting 
occupiers’ non-property rights. ESTA has a legitimate government function to further 
the public interest in the tenure reform programme. In Nhlabathi and Others v Fick153 
the court came to the conclusion that even if section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA is in conflict 
with section 25 of the Constitution, it does not constitute an arbitrary appropriation of 
a grave.154 The following grounds were considered by the court as an indication that 
depriving the landowner of some of his ownership entitlements is justified: the right 
does not cause a major intrusion on the landowner’s property rights; the right is 
subject to balancing with the landowner’s property rights and may sometimes be 
subordinate to them; the right exists only where there is an established past practice 
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with regard to gravesites; and the right will enable occupiers to comply with religious 
or cultural beliefs that form an important part of their security of tenure.155 
Furthermore, taking into consideration the significance of the religious or cultural 
beliefs of many occupiers regarding the burial of family members, the constitutional 
mandate to provide occupiers with legally secure tenure would in most cases be 
sufficient to justify the deprivation of some of the entitlements of ownership, in 
particular the right to exclude.156 Accordingly, a limitation imposed on the right to 
exclude even in circumstances that cause permanent or physical invasion of private 
land (such as the appropriation of a gravesite) can be constitutionally justified, as 
meant in section 36, if the limitation serves a legitimate, specific land reform 
purpose.157 In this case, the deprivation of the right to exclude is justified in fulfilment 
of the statutory recognition of the occupiers’ security of tenure in accordance with the 
constitutional mandate. 
The purpose of PIE is to give effect to the anti-eviction provision in section 
26(3) of the Constitution. Unlike ESTA, PIE does not protect existing access rights or 
create new ones but its anti-eviction regulatory measures limit the landowner’s right 
to exclude. The decision in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers158 gave 
an indication that statutory regulatory measures like PIE are meant to prevent 
arbitrary evictions. This means that in land reform legislation that includes anti-
eviction regulation, the deprivation of the landowner’s right to exclude will be justified 
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by the constitutional anti-eviction imperative159 and the general transformative vision 
of the Constitution. Anti-eviction regulation should satisfy the requirement for 
proportionality when it affects all landowners more or less equally in that, for 
example, all landowners are subject to the same costly and time-consuming eviction 
procedures prescribed by PIE.160 However, eviction cases will often require 
something closer to full proportionality review, for example when anti-eviction 
measures practically deprive an individual landowner or a small group of landowners 
completely of the possibility of obtaining an eviction order in instances where such 
an order would normally have been granted.161 A good illustration on this point is 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd and Others (Modderklip).162 In Modderklip the landowner was prevented from 
executing an eviction order against unlawful occupiers because of the sheer number 
of people involved and their personal circumstances.163 The deprivation brought 
about by the practical impossibility of evicting the unlawful occupiers might be 
arbitrary in the absence of compensation. According to the court an award of 
constitutional compensation was the most appropriate remedy.164 Arguably, the 
compensation was awarded to avoid unfair or disproportionate effects on the 
individual landowner.165 The compensation award might only work when the delay in 
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evicting the unlawful occupiers is overly long but temporary; if it is permanent and 
therefore effectively impossible to evict, the deprivation might be arbitrary and cannot 
be saved by a constitutional compensation award.166 
With regard to deprivations that result from legislation not directly giving effect 
to constitutional rights, it is important to establish whether there is sufficient reason 
for the provision that limits the right to exclude to determine the impact it has on the 
landowner. In cases where the landowner’s right to exclude is limited by search, 
seizure and forfeiture of property in terms of an authorising law,167 the deprivation is 
a result of the regulatory exercise of the state’s police power with the aim to achieve 
one of its core functions, namely public health and safety. The legitimacy of the 
deprivation must be evaluated in view of this purpose. Generally, legislation that 
provides statutory access rights for purposes of search, seizure and forfeiture of 
property has a legitimate regulatory purpose that is sufficient to justify the deprivation 
of property rights, the right to exclude in particular.168 However, in most cases it may 
still be relevant to consider the deprivation on a higher of level scrutiny to assess the 
fairness of the deprivation on an individual basis.169 
The management rules of sectional title schemes that are prescribed and 
enforced by legislation170 may in some cases cause a deprivation of the right to 
exclude. Generally, deprivation of the right to exclude would be constitutionally 
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permissible when the management rules are imposed in the interest of the property 
community and when the rules comply with the requirements of the arbitrariness 
test.171 
A similar conclusion can be reached with reference to the legislation from 
foreign jurisdictions that grant non-owners and other landowners access rights to 
land. Although the legislation in question172 deprives the landowner of his right to 
exclude, the deprivation, if tested against the requirements of section 25(1) of the 
South African Constitution, might not be arbitrary because the right to roam 
legislation was enacted for historical and social reasons aimed at restoring access 
rights to land. The legislation also attempts to eliminate arbitrary effects by making 
provision for reasonable access rights that are to be exercised within strict limits, in 
part set out in statutory regulations and in part determined by the landowner. 
Arguably, the two acts have a built-in mechanism that guards against 
disproportionate effects. However, an arbitrary deprivation might ensue if non-
owners are allowed to exercise their right to roam in a way that goes beyond the 
limits of the legislation and in the process interfere with the landowner’s privacy, use 
and enjoyment of property as well as his land management interests. The application 
of the non-arbitrariness test in beach access cases would not be different from the 
right to roam cases, with the result that the deprivation might not be arbitrary in these 
cases. Similarly, the deprivation arising from the access to neighbouring land 
legislation173 might not be arbitrary insofar as it provides sufficient justification for the 
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deprivation, namely for public interest considerations and to promote a proper social 
order, and provides mechanisms to prevent or minimise unfair outcomes. 
Limitations of the right to exclude based on common law principles are mainly 
justified by policy considerations. The outcome of a court order to enforce a right of 
way of necessity and to leave the encroachment in place qualifies as a deprivation 
for section 25(1) purposes and it is necessary to consider whether there are 
sufficient reasons to prevent the deprivation from being arbitrary. In view of the case 
law concerning the policy considerations in cases involving a right of way of 
necessity,174 it is unlikely that a court order enforcing a right way of necessity would 
cause an arbitrary deprivation of the right to exclude. The common law principles 
relating to the right of way of necessity seek to connect a piece of landlocked land to 
the public road to ensure the efficient utilisation of land and also because of practical 
need.175 These policy considerations usually constitute sufficient reason to justify a 
deprivation. Generally, a grant of a right of way of necessity is justified when the 
dominant tenement owner proves necessity, when a right of way does not impose 
extensive burdens on the servient land that destroy all his ownership rights, and 
when the dominant tenement owner pays just compensation. Moreover, Raphulu 
argues that the intervention of the courts, acting with the authority of the common 
law, is the most appropriate mechanism to solve the problem of landlocked land in 
cases where a dominant owner cannot acquire an ordinary servitude of way by 
contract.176 The court exercises a discretion to either grant a right of way of necessity 
or not, taking into account all the relevant factors, the context and effect that the 
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discretion will have on the one party or the other one. The deprivation resulting from 
the granting of a right of way of necessity should comply with the requirements of the 
non-arbitrariness test if the servitude is granted by a court order after considering 
and applying common law requirements regarding the right of way of necessity.177 
So if the court follows the requirements and apply them properly, the outcome in a 
particular case should not be arbitrary because the court’s discretion ensures 
proportionality although it might affect the property owner. The possibility of 
arbitrariness is further diminished if compensation is granted to the servient 
tenement owner. 
In the context of encroachment, the question is whether the reason for 
awarding compensation instead of removal is sufficient in the circumstances to justify 
the deprivation of the right to exclude. Boggenpoel argues that the substantive 
arbitrariness requirement must be complied with by considering whether there is 
sufficient reason for the institutional shift from the common law remedy of removal to 
an award of compensation.178 The case law shows that the shift away from the 
common law remedy aims to ensure a more just and equitable outcome in suitable 
cases. Therefore, the justification for limiting the right to exclude centres on 
considerations of pragmatism, policy and individual justice, which may well be 
sufficient to cause a deviation from the common law remedy that protects the 
landowner’s right to exclude. In Boss Foods CC v Ingo Rehders Properties and 
Another179 the court held that the weighing of the relevant factors by a court will 
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serve as the mode of protection against arbitrary deprivation of property. Boggenpoel 
explains that the exercise of the court’s discretion in terms of the common law to 
either favour demolition or compensation ensures that the deprivation will not per se 
result in arbitrary deprivation of property.180 However, this conclusion does not apply 
if a court decides to leave the encroachment intact and further orders the affected 
landowner to register a servitude in favour of the encroacher, because such an order 
might not comply with the requirements of section 25(1). Unlike the servitude of right 
of way of necessity, which is also created against the will of a landowner and is 
authorised by the common law, the servitude created by court order in Roseveare 
does not have a clear source of authority in the common law, which could be 
problematic on a constitutional level.181 The deprivation resulting from the court’s 
order to register a servitude in encroachment cases is likely to be unlawful on the 
basis that it is not clear that the common law authorises such an order.182 
Boggenpoel adds that the deprivation may also be unconstitutional because it does 
not comply with the arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1)183 because in 
Roseveare the court does not provide a clear or specific, separate justification for the 
creation of a servitude in favour of the encroacher.184 
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4 3 7 Expropriation: Section 25(2) 
Generally, both deprivation and expropriation involve some kind of state interference 
with property. However, deprivation does not have to involve a state acquisition of 
property and is usually not subject to compensation, while expropriation involves 
state acquisition of the property that requires compensation.185 Expropriation is 
usually defined in contrast with deprivation, which is seen as a less intrusive 
limitation of property that generally occurs when the state regulates the use and 
enjoyment of property in the interest of the public, and compensation is not generally 
required.186 According to the FNB test, the question whether deprivation of property 
amounts to an expropriation must be considered once it is determined that the 
deprivation is not arbitrary or can be justified in terms of section 36(1). 
Having established that a particular deprivation of the right to exclude complies 
with section 25(1) of the Constitution, it is necessary to consider whether it amounts 
to expropriation. Section 25(2) provides three requirements for a valid expropriation, 
namely that expropriation of property must take place in terms of law of general 
application, be for a public purpose or in the public interest and be subject to 
compensation. Section 25(3) further specifies that compensation must be just and 
equitable and sets out certain factors that could be considered in determining the 
amount. In view of the FNB methodology the law of general application issue is likely 
to be dealt with conclusively during the deprivation analysis stage and as a result, it 
will not be necessary to raise it again if the issue should proceed to the expropriation 
analysis stage.187 If the section 25(2) law of general application requirement should 
come up, the issues should be similar to those that apply in the case of section 
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25(1),188 even though the law of general application for expropriation (section 25(2)) 
differs from the section 25(1) law of general application in two ways. Firstly, common 
law does not feature as law of general application in expropriation cases because 
there is no common law authority for expropriation in South African law.189 Secondly, 
in the expropriation context the authorising law has to authorise a very particular kind 
of state action, namely expropriation of private property for a public purpose or in the 
public interest.190 This means that expropriation rests on the basis of legislation that 
authorises a specific kind of state action to serve a particular public purpose or 
interest. 
In US law, limitations imposed on the right to exclude have sometimes been 
treated as takings191 for specific reasons that are worth mentioning.192 The US 
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courts’ takings decisions suggest that at least some governmental interferences with 
the landowner’s right to exclude are likely to be treated as takings.193 In Kaiser Aetna 
v United States194 the US Supreme Court held that requiring public access that limits 
the right to exclude would amount to a taking of property without compensation in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, the court held that the right to 
exclude, which is seen as a universally held fundamental element of property rights, 
falls within the category of interests that the government cannot take without 
compensation.195 The Kaiser Aetna decision was later applied in other cases dealing 
with the landowner’s right to exclude. For instance, in Loretto v Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV196 the Supreme Court held that property owners could not be 
required, without compensation, to allow cable companies to install wires and cable 
boxes on their building. The court held that any permanent physical invasion, even if 
it causes the smallest infringement of the landowner’s right to exclude, triggers a per 
se taking, which merits compensation.197 In Nollan v California Coastal 
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Commission198 the Supreme Court ruled that a landowner could not be expected to 
allow a public right of way over his land, as a condition for obtaining a building 
permit, without payment of compensation. In Dolan v City of Tigard199 the court found 
that a complete abrogation of the right to exclude with respect to a portion of land is 
a taking, even though the portion in question is relatively trivial. These cases indicate 
that the courts did not engage in a balancing of the interests of landowners and non-
owners, even though a balancing test would have benefited the public considering 
that, in some cases, there was only a slight intrusion on the right to exclude.200 
However, the decision in PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins201 suggests 
otherwise. The court in this case held that the limitation of the right to exclude a 
particular category of customers from a shopping centre was not a taking.202 The 
court upheld a state constitutional requirement that owners of shopping centres who 
have already invited the general public to their property should permit individuals to 
exercise speech and petition rights. The court viewed the temporary invasion of 
property as being more of a regulation of use of property than a taking. This is 
because the owner of the shopping centre was free to adopt and enforce regulations 
regarding the time, place and manner in which the activities of the petitioners would 
be permissible. Seen in this light, the exercise of free speech and petition rights in 
the shopping centre did not amount to an unconstitutional limitation of the right to 
exclude. 
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US courts might react similarly (in the sense that any permanent physical 
invasion is seen as a per se taking) to South African cases dealing with some 
limitations of the landowner’s right to exclude. For example, in the Nhlabathi203 case 
a US court would probably have awarded compensation for a forced transfer of 
property that resulted in depriving the landowner of his property for the sake of land 
reform objectives. The Nhlabathi decision suggests that expropriation without 
compensation is possible and justifiable in certain circumstances but the court did 
not decide whether the section in question did in fact amount to an expropriation.204 
However, the circumstances of the Nhlabathi case led the court to decide that the 
enforcement of section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA does not constitute a major intrusion on the 
landowner’s property rights. The court decided that the provision in question was not 
unconstitutional (in the sense that it did not authorise an arbitrary deprivation) and 
that the statutory obligation imposed on the landowner to allow the appropriation of a 
gravesite on his land without compensation was reasonable and justifiable in line 
with section 36 of the Constitution.205 
Similarly, the US courts would possibly award compensation in cases involving 
the CROW Act and LRSA in terms of the Fifth Amendment takings grounds.206 The 
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two acts permit the right to roam on privately owned land, which presents a 
significant deprivation of the landowner’s right to exclude, but without making 
provision for compensation when such deprivation occurs.207 However, both acts 
establish a fair balance between public access rights and the landowner’s property 
rights, which balance effectively renders the acts constitutionally compliant. In light of 
section 25 of the Constitution of South Africa, the courts would most likely react 
differently and not consider the limitation of the right to exclude as a taking of 
property (or an expropriation). 
In conclusion, it should be noted that in the specific context of the South African 
property clause it may well never be necessary to raise the expropriation issue or to 
proceed to the section 25(2) stage of the FNB analysis unless the deprivation in 
question (limiting the owner’s right to exclude) specifically arises from legislation 
(since there is no common law authority for expropriation in South African law) that 
explicitly or at least clearly and implicitly authorises expropriation of the affected 
rights, for a public purpose or in the public interest, against compensation. 
 
4 4 Conclusion 
In Chapter 2 I discuss one type of justification, namely theoretical and doctrinal 
justifications for limiting a landowner’s right to exclude on a normative basis, 
departing from the assumption that ownership is unlimited in principle and that every 
limitation requires such justification. That chapter shows that the foundations for this 
assumption are weak. The aim of this chapter is to consider justificatory arguments 
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of a different kind, assuming that ownership is not unlimited in principle, namely 
justification for a specific limitation and section 25(1) justification for the effect that 
the limitation has on a specific landowner. This chapter established that the 
justifications for limiting the right to exclude depend on whether the limitation is 
imposed directly by a non-property constitutional right; by legislation giving effect to a 
non-property constitutional right; by legislation not specifically giving effect to a non-
property constitutional right; or by common law principles. 
Constitutional limitations on the right to exclude others from private, public or 
quasi-public land generally protect non-property constitutional rights like life, dignity 
and equality. These non-property constitutional rights are generally unlimited and not 
subject to regulation, which implies that when these rights are in conflict with a 
property right (which is subject to limitation) the issue is not whether the limitation on 
the right to exclude is justifiable or whether exclusion is at all allowed and justifiable 
but that the right to exclude must simply give way to a direct constitutional right. At 
least for life and dignity this is a direct constitutional limitation that brings about an ex 
ante truncated property right and there is no deprivation in terms of section 25(1) or 
limitation in terms of section 36(1) that requires any justification. It results from the 
supremacy of the Constitution over any law or entitlement that conflicts with these 
rights. 
When courts deal with the conflict between the right to exclude and other non-
property constitutional rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement, right 
to strike and picket and secure tenure, competing interests are weighed to determine 
which outcome would be the most appropriate in a particular case. The above 
mentioned rights are enforced and regulated by legislation. Legislation giving effect 
to a non-property constitutional right and legislation not specifically giving effect to a 
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constitutional right can limit the right to exclude. In certain instances the balancing of 
interests already prescribed by the legislature when drafting legislation enacted to 
give effect to the constitutional right in question, assists the courts in the weighing 
process. Protection of the constitutionally and statutorily protected non-property 
rights, as well as other policy grounds and objectives, justifies the limitation placed 
on the right to exclude. 
The nature of justification here assumes that property rights are limited in 
principle and that legitimate limitations may be expected. The justification process 
considers whether there are reasons for the limitation and whether there is authority 
for a specific limitation in a specific case. The legislation in question in a specific 
case is the authority for the limitation and it shows why the right to exclude should be 
limited, usually it is for a valid reason. 
Justification for a specific limitation also features in the private law (common 
law) context where the right to exclude is limited for policy reasons. The right to 
exclude is limited when a right of way of necessity is enforced by a court order or 
when a court exercises its discretion in favour of leaving an encroachment in place. 
In these instances the courts weigh the interests of the affected landowner and the 
encroacher (in encroachment cases) and the interests of the servient tenement 
owner against public policy (in the right of way of necessity cases) to determine the 
appropriate outcome. In doing so, the courts limit the right to exclude on policy 
reasons such as the efficient use of land or on the basis of a balance of prejudice. 
This means that in property disputes the protection of the right to exclude is not a 
default outcome. Rather, after the consideration of all relevant factors in a particular 
case, the courts may limit the right to exclude if it is necessary and justifiable. 
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Insofar as the limitations on the right to exclude are justified on the basis of 
authority and reason for the limitation, it becomes necessary to look at section 25 to 
ascertain whether the effect of the limitations are constitutionally valid and legitimate. 
The section 25(1) analysis, questions whether the limitations imposed on the right to 
exclude comply with section 25(1) of the Constitution. In instances where the law 
imposes limitations on the right to exclude, the outcome is a deprivation of the right 
to exclude.208 The deprivation is authorised by law of general application for a valid 
public purpose. The important part of the section 25(1) analysis is to determine 
whether the deprivation of the right to exclude has a non-arbitrary effect on individual 
landowners. The extent of the deprivation is case-sensitive. If there is a rational 
connection between the means employed and the ends sought by the deprivation, 
which guards against disproportionate effects, the deprivation that results from 
limiting the right to exclude is mostly going to be justifiable and would generally 
amount to non-arbitrary deprivation. In other words, the deprivation of the right to 
exclude complies with section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
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Chapter 5:  
Conclusion 
 
5 1 Introduction 
The aim of this dissertation is to consider, from a constitutional perspective, the 
absoluteness assumption and the centrality of the right to exclude. An overview of 
the research problem in the introductory chapter indicates the complex relationship 
between the right to exclude and access rights.1 The right to exclude is commonly 
perceived as the core entitlement of ownership that should be protected and strongly 
upheld unless it is limited justifiably. Sometimes the right to exclude is limited when it 
clashes with non-property constitutional or statutory rights to protect these rights, 
and when their enforcement is dependent on access to land. This raises significant 
questions relating to the role, scope and the supposed primacy of the right to 
exclude, when and how it is limited by law, and whether the limitation is theoretically, 
doctrinally and constitutionally justifiable. 
The underlying assumption throughout this dissertation is that it is misleading to 
regard ownership and exclusion as absolute rights. The notion of absolute ownership 
can be understood in different ways. Ownership can be seen as absolute in the 
sense that it is the most complete real right; as an abstract right; as an individual 
right; and as an unlimited right in principle, although subject to limitations. Viewing 
ownership as absolute in the abstract sense means that the right to exclude is not 
limited by considerations of justice or context. Absoluteness in the sense that 
ownership is unlimited in principle although it is subject to limitation is often 
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understood to mean that the right to exclude is unlimited, except in exceptional 
cases where limitations are normatively justified. However, case law, doctrine and 
theory associated with these meanings do not support the view that the right to 
exclude is absolute in the strong sense. I assumed in Chapter 1 that access rights 
imposed by law in fact limit the right to exclude, and that these limitations are often 
constitutionally justified. 
This dissertation therefore considered the theoretical and doctrinal perspectives 
on the existence and nature of limitations on the right to exclude; access rights that 
in fact limit the right to exclude; and the justification for those limitations in a 
constitutional context.2 Therefore, it is necessary to conclude this dissertation with a 
discussion regarding the complexity of the relationship between exclusion and 
access rights to determine whether the research question was answered and to 
reflect on the relative nature of the right to exclude. This conclusion also explores 
some of the implications of considering different origins of limitations and different 
types of justification for limiting the right to exclude 
 
5 2 Conclusions: The relative nature of the right to exclude 
5 2 1 The idea of absolute ownership and exclusivity 
Chapter 2 offers an overview of theoretical and doctrinal perspectives on limitations 
that are imposed on the right to exclude. The point of departure was that the right to 
exclude can be viewed in a strong-absolute sense. The chapter highlights a number 
of theoretical considerations that do not support such a strong view of the right to 
exclude. Firstly, moral property theories do not provide theoretical support for such a 
strong notion of absolute ownership and exclusion that requires a moral justification 
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whenever any limitation is imposed on the right to exclude. This is because moral 
property theorists such as Locke and Hegel do not discuss the issue of absoluteness 
directly and the different readings of both theories (labour and first occupation) make 
it controversial to support a strong, absolute view of the right to exclude.3 Secondly, 
modern property theory does not provide support for the strong notion of absolute 
ownership and exclusion either. Proponents of a strong exclusion theory tend to view 
property through the lens of the right to exclude. Exclusion theorists therefore treat 
limitations on ownership as exceptional, arguing that as a point of departure, the 
right to exclude should be upheld and protected. Exclusion is seen as a simple keep-
off message. However, even when exclusion theorists see the right to exclude as the 
most important, core, or essential property entitlement, that does not mean that it is 
unlimited. The right to exclude can be limited, even if the limitations are viewed as 
exceptional. The only outcome of this view is that any limitation must be proved 
specifically; requires special justification; and might require compensation.4 In fact, 
modern exclusion theorists describe the right to exclude as relative and accept 
limitations for pragmatic reasons such as efficiency.5 Thirdly, there are theoretical 
views that support a limited or qualified right to exclude. Exclusive use and 
progressive property theorists agree that a landowner is presumed to have a right 
that is free of limitations, but add that there is always a possibility that limitations 
could be imposed, and these limitations are not seen as exceptional in the sense 
that they are almost impossible.6 Some theories accept that limitations on the right to 
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exclude are not only possible but normal and relatively common.7 Progressive 
property theorists take into account the fundamental human values and interests of 
non-owners, and they do not simply prioritise the protection of the right to exclude. 
Limitations on the right to exclude are therefore accepted readily, sometimes even 
without compensation. 
Exclusion, exclusive use and progressive property theorists acknowledge the 
existence of limitations on property and on the right of exclusion in particular but they 
have different views on the nature of the limitations. The exclusion theorists view 
limitations as exceptions to the absolute-exclusion rule, while the exclusive use and 
progressive property theorists view limitations as inherent to the property system.8 
On the whole it cannot be said that property theory offers strong or unanimous 
support for an approach that treats the right to exclude as an absolute entitlement, 
even when it is regarded as a core or essential property right. 
In Chapter 2 I further explained that the definition of ownership in modern South 
African law has been influenced by pandectism in academic literature, where it is 
often said that ownership is absolute in the sense that limitations are exceptional.9 
This notion of ownership appears to support a strong view of absoluteness. 
However, pandectism did not have such a strong effect in South African case law. 
Courts normally adopt the pragmatic Roman-Dutch law notion that ownership is the 
most complete real right that an owner can have with regard to property, but this 
right can only be exercised within the limits of the law.10 The word “absolute” is 
seldom used directly by the courts, except in a very specific context. When the 
                                            
7
 For a detailed discussion on these theories, see Chapter 2 section 2 2 4 above. 
8
 See in this regard Chapter 2 sections 2 2 2, 2 2 3 and 2 2 4 above. 
9
 See Chapter 2 section 2 3 1 above. 
10
 See Chapter 2 section 2 3 2 above. 
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courts use the word “absolute”, they mostly refer to the Roman-Dutch law notion that 
ownership is either the most complete real right, distinguishing it from limited real 
rights, or absolute in Bartolus’ sense that an owner can use his property in any way 
that is not specifically prohibited by law. Accordingly, South African case law seems 
to convey either that the owner holds the most comprehensive collection of 
entitlements or that the evidentiary starting point is the presumption that ownership is 
free of limitations, which have to be proved. The evidentiary starting point denotes 
that mere proof of the existence of a limitation is required and not justification for the 
limitation in a normative sense. This does not convey the theoretical idea of 
absoluteness in the strong sense, and in fact comes closer to the exclusion 
arguments of exclusive use and progressive property theorists. Furthermore, the 
brief historical background on ownership shows that the South African legal doctrine 
does not in fact support a strong argument in favour of absolute exclusivity.11 
Consequently, ownership and the right to exclude allow for the existence of 
limitations as a matter of course. The owner cannot do with his property as he 
deems fit or exercise his right to exclude outside of the limits imposed by law. The 
limitations imposed by law on the right to exclude are regarded as presumptively 
secondary, but they are not seen as normatively exceptional. Therefore, absolute 
ownership does not mean that the right to exclude can be exercised without 
limitations or that ownership is unlimited prior to law or outside of the legal system. 
At most, the initial presumption is against limitations until they are proven. 
Consequently, it is not important to determine whether limitations are inherent 
in ownership. The point is rather whether limitations on ownership are inherent in the 
legal system in which it functions. The conclusion in Chapter 2 points out that the 
                                            
11
 Regarding the brief historical background on ownership, see Chapter 2 section 2 3 1 above. 
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theoretical and doctrinal perspectives on the limitation of the right to exclude point 
towards a notion of ownership that functions within a legal system, which includes 
property and of which limitations are an inherent part.12 Furthermore, theoretical and 
doctrinal views show that justification for limitations has a specific meaning. In 
particular, justification does not require normative grounds for the existence of every 
limitation, because ownership and the right to exclude are not regarded as pre-
social, pre-legal or pre-constitutional rights. The limitations are not imposed on pre-
law rights; the right to exclude is limited within the legal system, and therefore the 
normative question whether to limit it is taken (during the constitution- or statute-
writing process) before a particular dispute arises. 
 
5 2 2 Limitations 
The limits and content of property are determined by law and hence the strong 
notion of absolute ownership and absolute exclusivity has no place in the 
constitutional setting. The conclusion in Chapter 3 confirms that ownership functions 
within a legal system and also in a constitutional system.13 The legal and 
constitutional system includes limitations on the right to exclude, and the source of 
those limitations (constitutional, statutory or common law) has an influence on the 
authority for and effect of the limitations. The different origins of limitations imposed 
on the right to exclude indicate the purpose and nature of those limitations. The 
origins also reflect the normative reasons for the limitations and the strength of the 
limitations as compared to the right to exclude. 
                                            
12
 See Chapter 2 section 2 4 above. 
13
 See Chapter 3 section 3 5 above. 
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Chapter 3 shows that limitations directly originating from the Constitution 
function within specific circumstances and are normally stronger because they 
embody constitutional obligations. Consequently, conflicts between the right to 
exclude and these limitations are not resolved by way of balancing. The right to 
exclude must give way when it clashes with unqualified non-property constitutional 
rights such as life, dignity and equality to ensure that these rights are secured and 
protected.14 However, this does not imply that non-owners have free access to land, 
because these non-property constitutional rights do not grant or create a general 
right of access to land. The point is that a landowner cannot deny access to his land 
if non-owners depend on reasonable access to that land for purposes of exercising 
their non-property constitutional rights.15 
If limitations originate from legislation or the common law, the relevant 
legislation or common law principles will show how to resolve conflicts and balance 
out the competing rights. Non-property constitutional rights like freedom of speech, 
freedom of movement, the right to strike and picket and to secure tenure, which are 
subject to regulation and limitation by law, are balanced out against property in 
accordance with the legislation that gives effect to those constitutional rights. The 
fact that neither the right to exclude nor the non-property constitutional rights are 
absolute and that both are regulated and limited in terms of legislation makes it 
possible to regulate potential conflicts between the competing rights by 
predetermining how conflicts are to be adjudicated.16 Since both sets of competing 
rights are subject to regulation, balancing or another form of mutual accommodation 
                                            
14
 See Chapter 3 section 3 2 above. 
15
 See in this regard Chapter 3 sections 3 2 and 3 5 above. 
16
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal for Law, Property 
and Society 15-106 70. See the discussion in Chapter 3 section 3 3 above. 
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is usually prescribed by the relevant legislation. Therefore, limitations originating 
from legislation do not override the right to exclude; limitations are imposed by 
balancing the right to exclude against a non-property constitutional right or a 
statutory right, in a way that accommodates both rights. The legislation or the 
landowner can usually impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on 
non-owners wishing to have access to the land. This implies that both sets of 
competing rights are upheld and therefore the affected landowner is usually not 
awarded compensation.17 The common law examples are different in this respect 
because the right of way of necessity and encroachment examples show that the 
competing interests are weighed against each other, whereafter one party wins and 
the affected landowner, whose right to exclude is limited, is awarded compensation 
for the loss suffered.18 
Normally, access rights to land involve a limitation of the right to exclude, but 
not all limitations create or imply access rights. Some limitations on the right to 
exclude involve only access rights, for example the right to roam and access to the 
beach cases. These cases involve legislation that explicitly creates access rights that 
limit the landowner’s right to exclude.19 The legislation stipulates when and how 
access rights should be exercised and determines the extent of the limitation 
imposed on the right to exclude.20 Other cases also involve access and denying 
access but they do not involve access rights in the technical legal sense, meaning 
                                            
17
 In this regard, see Chapter 3 sections 3 3 and 3 5 above. 
18
 On the common law examples, see Chapter 3 sections 3 4 and 3 5 above. 
19
 See Chapter 3 section 3 3 2, with reference to legislation regulating the right to roam such as the 
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 and the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, and legislation 
regulating beach access in the South African context such as the National Environmental 
Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008. 
20
 See Chapter 3 section 3 3 2 above. 
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that non-owners do not have a right to claim access to land. For example, in Victoria 
and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape 
and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae)21 it was decided that the 
landowners cannot deny others access to their land, but that does not mean that the 
respondents have acquired rights to gain access to the land in the technical sense. 
The Constitution, PEPUDA22 and public accommodations laws do not grant or create 
access rights, but they limit the landowner’s right to exclude non-owners in that a 
landowner cannot deny others access to the land when the exercise of their 
constitutionally and statutorily protected rights depends on such access.23 In other 
instances, limitations on exclusion imply that access and use rights are directly or 
indirectly granted by a court order, based on common law principles, for example in 
the right of way of necessity and encroachment cases.24 Other cases are clearly not 
about access rights or any kind of rights at all. In some circumstances, an owner of 
private land may be prevented from excluding non-owners from his land or from 
evicting them once they have gained access for residential purposes.25 If the non-
owner is an unlawful occupier, the limitation on the right to exclude is regulated by 
legislation, specifically the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). In principle, PIE is not aimed at creating 
access rights or any right at all because it is focused on regulating eviction of 
unlawful occupiers of land. However, PIE may in practice involve accommodation or 
land being made available to unlawful occupiers, albeit temporarily.26 The result is 
                                            
21
 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). 
22
 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA). 
23
 See Chapter 3 section 3 2 above. 
24
 See Chapter 3 section 3 4 above. 
25
 See Chapter 3 section 3 3 1 above. 
26
 Pienaar JM Land reform (2014) 338. 
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that PIE limits the landowner’s right to exclude to prevent unlawful eviction, but it 
does not specifically create or grant access rights. 
Taking into account the expansion of limitations on the right to exclude, for 
various purposes, in South African law and other jurisdictions (US, Scots, and 
English law), the limitations imposed on the right to exclude indicate that the right is 
relative rather than absolute. Limitations on the right to exclude are expected and 
cannot be seen as exceptions that need to be proven and justified on normative 
grounds, because some limitations are imposed directly by non-property 
constitutional rights, by legislation, and by common law. Further indications to the 
same effect include the fact that the range of the limitations is so wide; and that the 
origin or part of the origin of limitations on exclusion from quasi-public places and 
privately owned places is consent. The range of access rights that limit the right to 
exclude shows that limitations are normal and common in a legal and constitutional 
system. 
 
5 2 3 Justifications 
Limitations on the right to exclude can generally be justified in terms of existing 
constitutional and property doctrine. South African case law reflects the notion that 
ownership functions within a legal and constitutional system of which limitations are 
an inherent part.27 Therefore, justification for the limitation of the right to exclude on 
normative grounds is not necessary because ownership is not an unlimited right in a 
pre-constitutional setting. Therefore, one can assume that property rights are in 
principle limited and contextual. From a constitutional perspective, limitations are 
from the beginning part of the system within which property functions. Consequently, 
                                            
27
 See Chapters 2 and 3 above. 
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justification refers to justifying the authority and reasons for and effect of a specific 
limitation imposed on the right to exclude, instead of justifying the very existence of a 
limitation. 
In this sense, I consider two types of justification in Chapter 4. The first is 
authority and the ground for a limitation, which involve the validity and legitimacy of 
the limitation. The second is the section 25(1) justification, which involves the effect 
of the limitation on a specific owner, examining (apart from authority for the 
limitation) whether the effect is proportionate. I discuss these two types of 
justification separately but there is an overlap between them as far as the authority 
for the limitation is concerned. This is as a result of the South African property 
clause, section 25, that includes both authority and proportionality requirements. Not 
every legal system has a constitutional property clause that contains both 
requirements and not every legal system with a property clause combines the two 
requirements like section 25(1) does. As a consequence, I discuss the authority and 
legitimacy issue twice in the South African context.28 
In Chapter 4 I establish that justifications for the limitation vary depending on 
whether the landowner is prevented from excluding others on the basis of non-
property constitutional rights; legislation that was enacted to give effect to non-
property constitutional rights; legislation that was not directly enacted to give effect to 
non-property constitutional rights; or the common law. 
The Constitution imposes constitutional obligations that require the protection 
and promotion of non-property constitutional rights like life, dignity and equality. 
These rights are unqualified, which suggests that the right to exclude is limited in 
principle to allow for the protection of these non-property constitutional rights. If the 
                                            
28
 For a detailed discussion on the justification issue, see Chapter 4 sections 4 2 and 4 3 above. 
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constitutional obligation necessarily implies limitation of the right to exclude, the 
limitation is justified by the Constitution. As a result, it is unnecessary to inquire 
whether the limitations imposed on the right to exclude can be justified on other 
grounds other than the Constitution. Rather, the right to exclude (property) must give 
way so that these rights are secured in line with the constitutional mandate.29 
The right to equality functions on the same constitutional level as the right to life 
and dignity, but the presence of legislation regulating equality implies that these 
rights should be treated differently. The right to exclude is limited if it results in 
discriminatory practices or if it affects the right to equality. In principle the same 
argument applies in the right to life and dignity cases; the right to exclude is limited if 
it affects these non-property constitutional rights. However, in equality cases the 
limitations imposed on the right to exclude do not originate directly from the 
Constitution but from the legislation enacted to give effect to the constitutional right 
to equality. Therefore, legislation such as the US public accommodations laws and 
PEPUDA,30 which regulates its application, and not the Constitution, justify equality 
limitations on the right to exclude.31 In equality cases, it is therefore necessary to 
determine the authority and reason for the limitation and whether the effect of the 
limitation is proportionate (section 25(1) justification).32 Since there is no legislation 
giving effect to the right to life and dignity, only the constitutional authority for the 
limitation is applicable, and therefore there is no need for section 25(1) analysis.33 
The different treatment of the life and dignity cases and equality cases in the 
                                            
29
 See Chapter 4 section 4 2 1 above. 
30
 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA) does 
not define or qualify the right to equality; instead it only regulates its application. 
31
 In this regard, see Chapter 4 section 4 2 1 above. 
32
 See Chapter 4 sections 4 2 1 and 4 3 above. 
33
 See Chapter 4 sections 4 3 4 and 4 4 above. 
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justification process casts some light on the overlap concerning authority in both 
types of justification. 
Legislation usually limits the right to exclude for a specific statutory goal that 
justifies preventing a landowner from excluding non-owners who want to gain access 
or from excluding persons whom the landowner had voluntarily given access to. If 
the legislation was enacted to give effect to a non-property constitutional right, the 
reason for the limitation is the protection of that particular constitutional right; if the 
legislation was not specifically intended to give effect to a non-property constitutional 
right, the reason for the limitation would normally be indicated in the legislation in 
question. In both instances, the authority for the limitation is the legislation that sets 
out its purpose and prescribes the procedure to ensure proportionate outcomes. 
Statutory examples that are discussed in this chapter show that there usually is a 
reason and authority for specific limitations imposed on the right to exclude.34 
The common law examples show that the authority for limiting the right to 
exclude is the common law. The reason for the limitation is based on policy, but 
there are different kinds of policy, namely economic efficiency (in right of way of 
necessity cases)35 and balance of convenience (in encroachment cases).36 These 
policy considerations justify limitations placed on the right to exclude. An award of 
compensation to the affected landowner in the right of way of necessity and 
encroachment cases has a significant role in determining whether the limitation is 
justifiable. In both cases, compensation is paid for the right that was forcibly 
                                            
34
 See Chapter 4 sections 4 2 2 and 4 2 3 above. 
35
 See Chapter 4 section 4 2 4 above for a discussion of the policy considerations in the right of way 
of necessity cases. 
36
 For a discussion of the policy considerations in encroachment cases see Chapter 4 section 4 2 4 
above. 
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transferred and acquired.37 The effect of compensation in both cases is to equalise 
the burden for the landowner’s right to exclude that was limited, either because of a 
balance of convenience (in encroachment cases), or for economic efficiency reasons 
(in the case of the right of way of necessity).38 
Assuming that property is limited in principle, limiting the right to exclude is 
firstly justified on the basis of authority and reason (grounds for validity). However, it 
is also necessary to justify the effect that the limitation might have on a specific 
landowner. A landowner is deprived of the right to exclude when the law imposes 
limitations on the right (except in constitutional cases dealing with the right to life and 
dignity, where there is no intervening legislation and the right to exclude is limited 
directly by the Constitution, bringing about an ex ante truncated right). In cases 
where the limitation amounts to a deprivation of property, the deprivation must be 
authorised by law of general application for a valid purpose. The case by case non-
arbitrariness test ensures that the deprivation effected by the limitation of the right to 
exclude is not arbitrary to comply with section 25(1) requirements. The section 25(1)-
type justification is a proportionality-type justification that ensures that the effects of a 
specific limitation, on the affected owner, are not disproportionate. In this sense, the 
effects of limiting the landowner’s right to exclude are justified in that they are not 
unjustifiably harsh or unfair. 
In view of the Constitution, legislation and common law, the right to exclude in 
the strong-absolute sense is not supported by theory, doctrine or case law. In fact, 
the right to exclude is relative and its limitation in this regard cannot be seen as mere 
exceptions that require strong normative justification. The right to exclude is qualified 
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 Van der Walt AJ “Sharing servitudes” 2016 (Forthcoming) 1-77 42. 
38
 See Chapter 3 sections 3 4 and 3 5 above. 
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in general on pragmatic and contextual grounds. The constitutional perspective 
adopted in this dissertation indicates that property rights are in principle limited and 
that they function within a legal and constitutional system that includes limitations. 
Limitations are therefore viewed in a constitutional context, and not with a focus on 
individual rights. Accordingly, the nature of justification entails that the authority for 
and effects of limiting the landowner’s right to exclude are to be considered in a 
constitutional system, which does not require normative justificatory grounds for a 
specific limitation. 
 
5 3 Concluding remarks 
An assessment of the right to exclude and its relation to access rights to land raises 
questions about the idea of absolute ownership and exclusion. The central argument 
of this dissertation is that the right to exclude is in principle limited, with the result 
that limitations in the form of access rights are to be expected and often justifiable. 
Theoretical and doctrinal literature does not support a strong, absolute exclusion 
right that requires normative justificatory grounds whenever a limitation is imposed 
on the right. In that sense, property rights are limited and contextual insofar as they 
function within a legal and constitutional system that includes limitations. Limitations 
on the right to exclude originate from different sources that identify the purpose and 
nature of the limitation. This dissertation has redefined the notion of justifications for 
limiting the right to exclude: assuming that property rights are not in principle 
unlimited, justification does not involve normative reasons for the existence of every 
limitation but rather means that the authority and grounds for the limitation and the 
effect of the limitation on a specific owner must be established in the constitutional 
context. 
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The content of the landowner’s right to exclude is defined or shaped by the 
nature of the property involved and the origin of a specific limitation. The right to 
exclude can be enforced strictly in a private home, but its enforcement on public or 
quasi-public land is often limited. When an owner opens his property to the public for 
his own benefit, his property rights become circumscribed. Although the property is 
privately owned, a general or unrestricted invitation to access land for public use 
causes the land to lose its purely private nature and it acquires a public character. 
Consequently, an owner of private property that is open to the public cannot deny 
access to his property to non-owners who want to exercise their constitutionally and 
statutorily protected rights. The cases discussed in this regard establish that private 
ownership and its exclusionary powers cannot be used to define or limit public 
access to quasi-public places for social, commercial or recreational purposes. These 
cases also suggest that limitations on the right to exclude are not exceptional, 
because access is granted on the basis of implied consent from the owner. However, 
the constitutional obligations imposed by non-property constitutional rights are more 
important than consent. 
It is a misconception to regard the right to exclude as an absolute right, 
considering the complex relationship between the right to exclude and authorised 
access to property. Instead, property should be considered in a constitutional system 
that recognises competing rights, and of which limitations are to be expected. Many 
property law rules govern the relationship between owners and non-owners and thus 
property rules cannot be viewed or analysed purely in terms of exclusion. In the 
South African law context, property law has changed considerably in line with the 
Constitution. Consequently, property rights cannot only be perceived in terms of its 
exclusionary element, since it involves a constitutionally required balance between 
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the interests of both owners and non-owners. Accordingly, the institution of property 
should be re-evaluated in light of the current needs and changing circumstances of 
society. 
The complex relationship between the right to exclude and access rights 
indicates that the way forward is not to focus solely on exclusion. Rosser criticises 
the progressive property theorists (who argue that property is about more than just 
exclusion) for not being radical enough and not focusing their attention on broader 
issues of acquisition and distribution of property.39 The progressive property theorists 
emphasise underlying human values that should limit the right to exclude but treat 
acquisition and distribution of property as secondary to rules involving use rights.40 
An approach that also pays more attention to acquisition and distribution would 
consider the problematic origins of property law and the exclusionary effect of 
ownership rights related to acquisition and inequality.41 Mossoff (an exclusive-use 
theorist) argues that acquisition, use and disposal represent a conceptual unity that 
together serve to give full meaning to the concept of property.42 Having considered a 
wide range of access rights to land, the point is that focusing on exclusion 
necessarily masks important contextual factors, which are important for revisiting 
acquisition and distribution, and broader access to land issues. 
Exclusion and access rights are both legitimate interests in land. Perhaps more 
emphasis should also be put on the social function of property rather than focusing 
on exclusion. Furthermore, perhaps Dyal-Chand’s and Van der Walt’s notion of 
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 Rosser E “An ambition and transformative potential of progressive property” (2013) 101 California 
Law Review 107-172 109, 111. 
40
 111. 
41
 111. 
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 Mossoff A “What is property? Putting the pieces back together” (2003) 45 Arizona Law Review 371-
444 376. 
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sharing as an alternative remedial (reconciling) option can influence the outcome of 
disputes involving exclusion and access.43 The examples of access rights discussed 
in this dissertation involve situations where the law, namely the Constitution, 
legislation and common law, justifies some kind of enforced sharing of property 
against the landowner’s will. The common law principles pertaining to the right of 
way of necessity is a good illustration of a forced sharing outcome.44 The 
requirement to prove necessity makes it possible to create a sharing outcome. If the 
court applies the requirements strictly and if enforcing a right of way of necessity 
does not cause disproportionate effects on the servient tenement owner, it can be 
argued that the outcome complies with the Constitution. The Constitution and 
legislation also makes it possible to create forced sharing based on constitutional 
reasons or on specified statutory goals in instances where the right to exclude 
clashes with non-property constitutional rights, statutory rights protected in dedicated 
legislation, or legislation not directly giving effect to a constitutional right.45 
The model of enforced sharing furthermore promotes outcomes that do not 
focus solely on exclusion but on actual use of the land and the interests of the 
parties involved, to ensure that competing interests are fairly accommodated.46 In 
other words, the model creates a middle space for courts to think about property 
through the lens of sharing rather than the lens of exclusivity.47 
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 Dyal-Chand R “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723; Van der Walt 
AJ “Sharing servitudes” 2016 (Forthcoming) 1-77. 
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 Van der Walt and Dyal-Chand, see the discussion in Chapter 2 section 2 2 3 above. 
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 Van der Walt AJ “Sharing servitudes” 2016 (Forthcoming) 1-77. 
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 Dyal-Chand R “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723. 
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As is evident thus far, court decisions in statutory and common law cases often 
result in limiting the landowner’s right to exclude, after a balancing process that 
ensures mutual accommodation, in a way that resembles a sharing remedy. The 
work of Singer offers alternative perspectives on the role that democracy plays in 
property law to ensure sharing outcomes that do not violate fundamental values. 
Singer describes property as “the law of democracy” to indicate that property rights 
are defined and limited by the requirements of living together in a democratic society 
that is characterised by fundamental values of liberty, equality and democracy.48 In 
this context, property shapes social relations and should therefore be regulated by 
law to ensure that democracy is upheld and that freedom and equality are promoted. 
This dissertation argues that the right to exclude functions within a legal and 
constitutional system that determines whether to allow or deny landowners the right 
to control access to their land. In instances where the exclusion of non-owners would 
be inconsistent with the norms governing a democratic society, the right to exclude 
should be limited to embrace democratic values. In light of Singer’s idea of property 
as the law of democracy, limitations cannot be viewed as exceptions; they are 
central to the property law system. Focusing on exclusion detracts attention from the 
norms and values that enable people to live together in a democratic society. 
Considering the cases and examples that I discuss in this dissertation, this means 
that sometimes a solution to a particular conflict depends on a sharing remedy that 
reconciles, balances, or accommodates competing rights. 
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To conclude, it is perhaps appropriate to once again reflect briefly on the 
Victoria and Alfred Waterfront decision.49 The decision shows that the right to 
exclude is not prioritised abstractly and that exclusion of non-owners is not always a 
preferred outcome.50 The landowner’s right to exclude is limited when it concerns a 
quasi-public space or even private property (with restricted access), if access to the 
land is reasonably necessary to secure important non-property constitutional rights. 
Upholding the right to exclude absolutely and abstractly may in practice derogate 
from fundamental human rights. The court refused to grant a blanket prohibition 
against entry so as to protect the respondents’ right to life, dignity and freedom of 
movement. The resulting limitation on the landowners’ right to exclude is a result of 
protecting a non-property constitutional right, namely life and dignity. The discussion 
in previous chapters indicates that the right to life and dignity cannot be balanced 
against the right to exclude because they are fundamental constitutional rights and 
the constitutional obligation to uphold them is stronger than the right to exclude. This 
has implications for constitutional analysis in that there is no need for section 25(1) 
analysis in these cases. In the part of the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront decision 
dealing with the right to freedom of movement the court seems to engage in a 
balancing process to determine the appropriate outcome that would optimise the 
respondents’ freedom of movement without necessarily causing disproportionate 
effects for the landowners. However, the balancing process does not involve 
balancing the constitutional right to freedom of movement and the right to exclude, 
but rather a weighing of different factors to determine whether the effects of the 
limitation would be proportionate in the specific case. In this context and because of 
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 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). 
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 See Chapter 3 section 3 3 1 above. 
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the applicability of mediating legislation, the section 25(1) analysis is applicable to 
test whether the limitation complies with the Constitution. The Victoria and Alfred 
Waterfront decision shows that different sources of law impose limitations on the 
right to exclude, for different reasons, and that the limitations consequently require 
different kinds of justification. The decision also indicates the importance of context 
and the qualified nature of the right to exclude. 
In conclusion, courts tend to make ex post, contextualised decisions about the 
relative needs and interests of landowners and non-owners, with the result that 
landowners’ right to exclude is limited, when the exercise of fundamental 
constitutional rights, statutory rights or common law rights depends on access to 
land. Therefore, depending on the context of the dispute, the right to exclude is 
sometimes limited to allow non-owners to have access to land belonging to others, 
so as to protect their rights. Furthermore, depending on the nature of the property 
(whether it is private, public or quasi-public), landowners’ right to exclude is often 
justifiably limited in a constitutional system. 
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